Paper 2023/1698
Another Look at Side-Channel Resistant Encoding Schemes
, Slovak University of Technology in Bratislava, Slovakia, TTControl GmbH, Vienna, Austria, University of Novi Sad, SerbiaAbstract
The idea of balancing the side-channel leakage in software was proposed more than a decade ago. Just like with other hiding-based countermeasures, the goal is not to hide the leakage completely but to significantly increase the effort required for the attack. Previous approaches focused on two directions: either balancing the Hamming weight of the processed data or deriving the code by using stochastic leakage profiling. In this brief, we build upon these results by proposing a novel approach that combines the two directions. We provide the theory behind our encoding scheme backed by experimental results on a 32-bit ARM Cortex-M4 microcontroller. Our results show that such a combination gives better side-channel resistance properties than each of the two methods separately.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Attacks and cryptanalysis
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- Keywords
- side-channel attackscountermeasuresencodingcoding schemes
- Contact author(s)
-
houxiaolu email @ gmail com
jbreier @ jbreier com
kmladen @ uns ac rs - History
- 2023-11-03: approved
- 2023-11-02: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2023/1698
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2023/1698,
author = {Xiaolu Hou and Jakub Breier and Mladen Kovačević},
title = {Another Look at Side-Channel Resistant Encoding Schemes},
howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2023/1698},
year = {2023},
note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/1698}},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/1698}
}
