Paper 2023/1698

Another Look at Side-Channel Resistant Encoding Schemes

Xiaolu Hou, Slovak University of Technology in Bratislava, Slovakia
Jakub Breier, TTControl GmbH, Vienna, Austria
Mladen Kovačević, University of Novi Sad, Serbia

The idea of balancing the side-channel leakage in software was proposed more than a decade ago. Just like with other hiding-based countermeasures, the goal is not to hide the leakage completely but to significantly increase the effort required for the attack. Previous approaches focused on two directions: either balancing the Hamming weight of the processed data or deriving the code by using stochastic leakage profiling. In this brief, we build upon these results by proposing a novel approach that combines the two directions. We provide the theory behind our encoding scheme backed by experimental results on a 32-bit ARM Cortex-M4 microcontroller. Our results show that such a combination gives better side-channel resistance properties than each of the two methods separately.

Available format(s)
Attacks and cryptanalysis
Publication info
side-channel attackscountermeasuresencodingcoding schemes
Contact author(s)
houxiaolu email @ gmail com
jbreier @ jbreier com
kmladen @ uns ac rs
2023-11-03: approved
2023-11-02: received
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Creative Commons Attribution


      author = {Xiaolu Hou and Jakub Breier and Mladen Kovačević},
      title = {Another Look at Side-Channel Resistant Encoding Schemes},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2023/1698},
      year = {2023},
      note = {\url{}},
      url = {}
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