Paper 2023/1697
Full Round Distinguishing and Key-Recovery Attacks on SAND-2 (Full version)
Abstract
This paper presents full round distinguishing and key recovery attacks on lightweight block cipher SAND-2 with 64-bit block size and 128-bit key size, which appears to be a mixture of the AND-Rotation-XOR (AND-RX) based ciphers SAND and ANT. However, the security arguments against linear and some other attacks are not fully provided. In this paper, we find that the combination of a SAND-like nibble-based round function and ANT-like bit-based permutations will cause dependencies and lead to iterative linear and differential trails with high probabilities. By exploiting these, full round distinguishing attacks on SAND-2 work with
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Attacks and cryptanalysis
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. Major revision. Inscrypt 2023
- Keywords
- Linear CryptanalysisDifferential CryptanalysisDistinguishing AttackKey Recovery AttackSAND-2
- Contact author(s)
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zhuolongzhang @ mail sdu edu cn
shiyao chen @ ntu edu sg
weiwangsdu @ sdu edu cn
mqwang @ sdu edu cn - History
- 2023-11-03: approved
- 2023-11-02: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2023/1697
- License
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CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2023/1697, author = {Zhuolong Zhang and Shiyao Chen and Wei Wang and Meiqin Wang}, title = {Full Round Distinguishing and Key-Recovery Attacks on {SAND}-2 (Full version)}, howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2023/1697}, year = {2023}, url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/1697} }