Paper 2023/1691

Some Results on Related Key-IV Pairs of Espresso

George Teseleanu
Abstract

In this paper, we analyze the Espresso cipher from a related key chosen IV perspective. More precisely, we explain how one can obtain Key-IV pairs such that Espresso's keystreams either have certain identical bits or are shifted versions of each other. For the first case, we show how to obtain such pairs after 232 iterations, while for the second case, we present an algorithm that produces such pairs in 228 iterations. Moreover, we show that by making a minor change in the padding used during the initialization phase, it can lead to a more secure version of the cipher. Specifically, changing the padding increases the complexity of our second attack from 228 to 234. Finally, we show how related IVs can accelerate brute force attacks, resulting in a faster key recovery. Although our work does not have any immediate implications for breaking the Espresso cipher, these observations are relevant in the related-key chosen IV scenario.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Secret-key cryptography
Publication info
Published elsewhere. Major revision. SECITC 2023
Keywords
Espressoslide attackscryptanalysisrelated keys
Contact author(s)
george teseleanu @ yahoo com
History
2023-11-03: approved
2023-11-01: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2023/1691
License
Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike
CC BY-NC-SA

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2023/1691,
      author = {George Teseleanu},
      title = {Some Results on Related Key-{IV} Pairs of Espresso},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2023/1691},
      year = {2023},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/1691}
}
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