Paper 2023/1636

Unbalanced Circuit-PSI from Oblivious Key-Value Retrieval

Meng Hao
Weiran Liu
Liqiang Peng
Hongwei Li
Cong Zhang
Hanxiao Chen
Tianwei Zhang
Abstract

Circuit-based Private Set Intersection (circuit-PSI) empowers two parties, a client and a server, each with input sets $X$ and $Y$, to securely compute a function $f$ on the intersection $X \cap Y$ while preserving the confidentiality of $X \cap Y$ from both parties. Despite the recent proposals of computationally efficient circuit-PSI protocols, they primarily focus on the balanced scenario where $|X|$ is similar to $|Y|$. However, in many practical situations, a circuit-PSI protocol may be applied in an unbalanced context, where $|X|$ is significantly smaller than $|Y|$. Directly applying existing protocols to this scenario poses notable efficiency challenges due to the communication complexity of these protocols scaling at least linearly with the size of the larger set, i.e., $\max(|X|, |Y|)$. In this work, we put forth efficient constructions for unbalanced circuit-PSI, demonstrating sublinear communication complexity in the size of the larger set. Our key insight lies in formalizing unbalanced circuit-PSI as the process of obliviously retrieving values corresponding to keys from a set of key-value pairs. To achieve this, we propose a new functionality named Oblivious Key-Value Retrieval (OKVR) and design the OKVR protocol based on a new notion termed sparse Oblivious Key-Value Store (sparse OKVS). We conduct comprehensive experiments and the results showcase substantial improvements over the state-of-the-art circuit-PSI schemes, i.e., $1.84 \sim 48.86 \times$ communication improvement and $1.50 \sim39.81 \times$ faster computation. Compared to a very recent unbalanced circuit-PSI work, our constructions outperform them by $1.18 \sim 15.99 \times$ and $1.22 \sim 10.44 \times$ in communication and computation overhead, respectively, depending on set sizes and network environments.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Cryptographic protocols
Publication info
Published elsewhere. Minor revision. USENIX Security 2024
Keywords
Unbalanced Circuit-PSI
Contact author(s)
menghao303 @ gmail com
weiran lwr @ alibaba-inc com
History
2024-03-06: revised
2023-10-21: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2023/1636
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2023/1636,
      author = {Meng Hao and Weiran Liu and Liqiang Peng and Hongwei Li and Cong Zhang and Hanxiao Chen and Tianwei Zhang},
      title = {Unbalanced Circuit-PSI from Oblivious Key-Value Retrieval},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2023/1636},
      year = {2023},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/1636}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/1636}
}
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