Paper 2023/1612

Mitigating MEV via Multiparty Delay Encryption

Amirhossein Khajehpour, University of British Columbia
Hanzaleh Akbarinodehi, University of Minnesota
Mohammad Jahanara, Scroll Foundation
Chen Feng, University of British Columbia
Abstract

Ethereum is a decentralized and permissionless network offering several attractive features. However, block proposers in Ethereum can exploit the order of transactions to extract value. This phenomenon, known as maximal extractable value (MEV), not only disrupts the optimal functioning of different protocols but also undermines the stability of the underlying consensus mechanism. In this work, we present a new method to alleviate the MEV problem by separating transaction inclusion and execution, keeping transactions encrypted before execution. We formulate the notion of multiparty delay encryption (MDE) and construct a practical MDE scheme based on time-lock puzzles. Unlike other encryption-based methods, our method excels in scalability (in terms of transaction decryption), efficiency (minimizing communication and storage overhead), and security (with minimal trust assumptions). To demonstrate the effectiveness of our MDE scheme, we have implemented it on a local Ethereum testnet. We also prove that with the presence of just one honest attestation aggregator per slot, the MEV threat can be significantly mitigated in a practical way.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Cryptographic protocols
Publication info
Preprint.
Keywords
Maximal Extractable ValueTime-lock PuzzleMultiparty Computation
Contact author(s)
akhajehp @ mail ubc ca
akbar066 @ umn edu
mohammad @ scroll io
chen feng @ ubc ca
History
2023-10-20: approved
2023-10-17: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2023/1612
License
Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike
CC BY-SA

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2023/1612,
      author = {Amirhossein Khajehpour and Hanzaleh Akbarinodehi and Mohammad Jahanara and Chen Feng},
      title = {Mitigating {MEV} via Multiparty Delay Encryption},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2023/1612},
      year = {2023},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/1612}
}
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