Paper 2023/1578

A Scalable Coercion-resistant Voting Scheme for Blockchain Decision-making

Zeyuan Yin, The State Key Laboratory of Blockchain and Data Security, Zhejiang University
Bingsheng Zhang, The State Key Laboratory of Blockchain and Data Security, Zhejiang University
Andrii Nastenko, IOG Singapore Pte Ltd
Roman Oliynykov, IOG Singapore Pte Ltd, V.N.Karazin Kharkiv National University, Ukraine
Kui Ren, The State Key Laboratory of Blockchain and Data Security, Zhejiang University
Abstract

Typically, a decentralized collaborative blockchain decision-making mechanism is realized by remote voting. To date, a number of blockchain voting schemes have been proposed; however, to the best of our knowledge, none of these schemes achieve coercion-resistance. In particular, for most blockchain voting schemes, the randomness used by the voting client can be viewed as a witness/proof of the actual vote, which enables improper behaviors such as coercion and vote-buying. Unfortunately, the existing coercion-resistant voting schemes cannot be directly adopted in the blockchain context. In this work, we design the first scalable coercion-resistant blockchain voting scheme that supports private differential voting power and 1-layer liquid democracy as introduced by Zhang et al. (NDSS '19). Its overall complexity is $O(n)$, where $n$ is the number of voters. Moreover, the ballot size is reduced from Zhang et al.'s $\Theta(m)$ to $\Theta(1)$, where $m$ is the number of experts and/or candidates. We formally prove that our scheme has ballot privacy, verifiability, and coercion-resistance. We implement a prototype of the scheme and the evaluation result shows that our scheme's tally procedure is more than 6x faster than VoteAgain (USENIX '20) in an election with over 10,000 voters and over 50\% extra ballot rate. Note: This work has been submitted to the IEEE for possible publication. Copyright may be transferred without notice, after which this version may no longer be accessible.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Cryptographic protocols
Publication info
Preprint.
Keywords
Coercion resistant votingBlockchainLiquid democracy
Contact author(s)
zeyuanyin @ zju edu cn
bingsheng @ zju edu cn
andrii nastenko @ iohk io
roman oliynykov @ iohk io
kuiren @ zju edu cn
History
2024-07-05: last of 3 revisions
2023-10-12: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2023/1578
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2023/1578,
      author = {Zeyuan Yin and Bingsheng Zhang and Andrii Nastenko and Roman Oliynykov and Kui Ren},
      title = {A Scalable Coercion-resistant Voting Scheme for Blockchain Decision-making},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2023/1578},
      year = {2023},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/1578}
}
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