Paper 2023/1444
On Time-Space Lower Bounds for Finding Short Collisions in Sponge Hash Functions
Abstract
Sponge paradigm, used in the design of SHA-3, is an alternative hashing technique to the popular Merkle-Damgård paradigm. We revisit the problem of finding $B$-block-long collisions in sponge hash functions in the auxiliary-input random permutation model, in which an attacker gets a piece of $S$-bit advice about the random permutation and makes $T$ (forward or inverse) oracle queries to the random permutation. Recently, significant progress has been made in the Merkle-Damgård setting and optimal bounds are known for a large range of parameters, including all constant values of $B$. However, the sponge setting is widely open: there exist significant gaps between known attacks and security bounds even for $B=1$. Freitag, Ghoshal and Komargodski (CRYPTO 2022) showed a novel attack for $B=1$ that takes advantage of the inverse queries and achieves advantage $\tilde{\Omega}(\min(S^2T^2/2^{2c}$, $ (S^2T/2^{2c})^{2/3})+T^2/2^r)$, where $r$ is bit-rate and $c$ is the capacity of the random permutation. However, they only showed an $\tilde{O}(ST/2^c+T^2/2^r)$ security bound, leaving open an intriguing quadratic gap. For $B=2$, they beat the general security bound by Coretti, Dodis, Guo (CRYPTO 2018) for arbitrary values of $B$. However, their highly non-trivial argument is quite laborious, and no better (than the general) bounds are known for $B\geq 3$. In this work, we study the possibility of proving better security bounds in the sponge setting. To this end, - For $B=1$, we prove an improved $\tilde{O}(S^2T^2/2^{2c}+S/2^c+T/2^c+T^2/2^r)$ bound. Our bound strictly improves the bound by Freitag et al., and is optimal for $ST^2\leq 2^c$. - For $B=2$, we give a considerably simpler and more modular proof, recovering the bound obtained by Freitag et al. - We obtain our bounds by adapting the recent multi-instance technique of Akshima, Guo and Liu (CRYPTO 2022) which bypasses the limitations of prior techniques in the Merkle-Damgård setting. To complement our results, we provably show that the recent multi-instance technique cannot further improve our bounds for $B=1,2$, and the general bound by Correti et al., for $B\geq 3$. Overall, our results yield state-of-the-art security bounds for finding short collisions and fully characterize the power of the multi-instance technique in the sponge setting.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
- Category
- Foundations
- Publication info
- A minor revision of an IACR publication in TCC 2023
- Keywords
- Collisionhash functionsSpongemulti-instancepre-computationauxiliary input
- Contact author(s)
-
akshima @ nyu edu
dogther66 @ gmail com
siyao guo 41 @ gmail com
qipengliu0 @ gmail com - History
- 2023-11-15: revised
- 2023-09-21: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2023/1444
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2023/1444, author = {Akshima and Xiaoqi Duan and Siyao Guo and Qipeng Liu}, title = {On Time-Space Lower Bounds for Finding Short Collisions in Sponge Hash Functions}, howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2023/1444}, year = {2023}, url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/1444} }