Paper 2023/1393

OpenVoting: Recoverability from Failures in Dual Voting

Prashant Agrawal, Indian Institute of Technology Delhi
Kabir Tomer, University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign, Indian Institute of Technology Delhi
Abhinav Nakarmi, University of Michigan–Ann Arbor, Ashoka University
Mahabir Prasad Jhanwar, Ashoka University
Subodh Sharma, IIT Delhi
Subhashis Banerjee, Ashoka University, IIT Delhi
Abstract

In this paper we address the problem of recovery from failures without re-running entire elections when elections fail to verify. We consider the setting of $\textit{dual voting}$ protocols, where the cryptographic guarantees of end-to-end verifiable voting (E2E-V) are combined with the simplicity of audit using voter-verified paper records (VVPR). We first consider the design requirements of such a system and then suggest a protocol called $\textit{OpenVoting}$, which identifies a verifiable subset of error-free votes consistent with the VVPRs, and the polling booths corresponding to the votes that fail to verify with possible reasons for the failures.

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Available format(s)
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Category
Applications
Publication info
Published elsewhere. EVOTE-ID 2023
Keywords
electronic votingrecoverabilitydual voting
Contact author(s)
prashant @ cse iitd ac in
ktomer2 @ illinois edu
nakarmi @ umich edu
mahavir jhawar @ ashoka edu in
svs @ cse iitd ac in
suban @ ashoka edu in
History
2023-09-18: approved
2023-09-18: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2023/1393
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2023/1393,
      author = {Prashant Agrawal and Kabir Tomer and Abhinav Nakarmi and Mahabir Prasad Jhanwar and Subodh Sharma and Subhashis Banerjee},
      title = {OpenVoting: Recoverability from Failures in Dual Voting},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2023/1393},
      year = {2023},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/1393}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/1393}
}
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