Paper 2023/1334
A Generic Construction of Tightly Secure Password-based Authenticated Key Exchange
, Norwegian University of Science and Technology, Norwegian University of Science and TechnologyAbstract
We propose a generic construction of password-based authenticated key exchange (PAKE) from key encapsulation mechanisms (KEM). Assuming that the KEM is oneway secure against plaintext-checkable attacks (OW-PCA), we prove that our PAKE protocol is \textit{tightly secure} in the Bellare-Pointcheval-Rogaway model (EUROCRYPT 2000). Our tight security proofs require ideal ciphers and random oracles. The OW-PCA security is relatively weak and can be implemented tightly with the Diffie-Hellman assumption, which generalizes the work of Liu et al. (PKC 2023), and ``almost'' tightly with lattice-based assumptions, which tightens the security loss of the work of Beguinet et al. (ACNS 2023) and allows more efficient practical implementation with Kyber. Beyond these, it opens an opportunity of constructing tight PAKE based on various assumptions.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Public-key cryptography
- Publication info
- A minor revision of an IACR publication in ASIACRYPT 2023
- Keywords
- Password-based key exchangegeneric constructionstight securitylattices
- Contact author(s)
-
jiaxin pan @ ntnu no
runzhi zeng @ ntnu no - History
- 2023-09-08: approved
- 2023-09-07: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2023/1334
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2023/1334,
author = {Jiaxin Pan and Runzhi Zeng},
title = {A Generic Construction of Tightly Secure Password-based Authenticated Key Exchange},
howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2023/1334},
year = {2023},
note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/1334}},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/1334}
}
