Paper 2023/132

Security analysis of DBTRU cryptosystem

Alexandra Ciobanu, Faculty of Computer Science, ”A. I. Cuza” University of Iasi
Marina Stefiuc, Faculty of Computer Science, ”A. I. Cuza” University of Iasi
Abstract

Proposed by Thang and Binh (NICS, 2015 ), DBTRU is a variant of NTRU, where the integer polynomial ring is replaced by two binary truncated polynomial rings GF(2)[x]/(x^n + 1). DBTRU has significant advantages over NTRU in terms of security and performance. NTRU is a probabilistic public key cryptosystem having security related to some hard problems in lattices. In this paper we will present a polynomial-time linear algebra attack on the DBTRU cryptosystem which can break DBTRU for all recommended parameter choices and the plaintext can be obtained in less than one second using a single PC and this specific attack.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Attacks and cryptanalysis
Publication info
Preprint.
Keywords
NTRUCTRUDBTRUpublic key cryptosystemlinear algebra attack
Contact author(s)
alexandra ciobanu2398 @ gmail com
stefiucmarina @ gmail com
History
2023-02-07: approved
2023-02-04: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2023/132
License
Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial
CC BY-NC

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2023/132,
      author = {Alexandra Ciobanu and Marina Stefiuc},
      title = {Security analysis of {DBTRU} cryptosystem},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2023/132},
      year = {2023},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/132}
}
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