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Paper 2023/1198

A Methodology to Achieve Provable Side-Channel Security in Real-World Implementations

Sonia Belaïd, CryptoExperts (France)
Gaëtan Cassiers, TU Graz
Camille Mutschler, NinjaLab (France), LIRMM, Univ. Montpellier, CNRS, Montpellier, France
Matthieu Rivain, CryptoExperts (France)
Thomas Roche, NinjaLab (France)
François-Xavier Standaert, UCLouvain, ICTEAM, Crypto Group, Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium
Abdul Rahman Taleb, CryptoExperts (France), Sorbonne University
Abstract

Physical side-channel attacks exploit a device's emanations to compromise the security of cryptographic implementations. Many countermeasures have been proposed against these attacks, especially the widely-used and efficient masking countermeasure. While theoretical models offer formal security proofs, they often rest on unrealistic assumptions, leading current approaches to prove the security of masked implementations to primarily rely on empirical verification. Consequently, the literature still lacks a well-defined framework for implementing proven secure constructions on physical devices. In this paper, we present a comprehensive methodology to transform an abstract circuit into a physical implementation secure against side-channel attacks. We introduce new tools for adapting the ideal noisy leakage model to practical scenarios. We also highlight the design objectives for embedded devices to achieve high levels of security, while acknowledging the limitations and challenges in applying leakage models in practice. Our aim is to demonstrate the possibility of bridging theory and practice, encouraging further research to achieve practical implementations proven secure against side-channel attacks without relying on ideal assumptions about the leakage.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Publication info
Preprint.
Keywords
maskingprovable side-channel securityrandom probing modelnoisy leakage modelmethodologyphysical assumptions
Contact author(s)
sonia belaid @ cryptoexperts com
gaetan cassiers @ iaik tugraz at
camille @ ninjalab io
matthieu rivain @ cryptoexperts com
thomas @ ninjalab io
francois-xavier standaert @ uclouvain be
abdul taleb @ cryptoexperts com
History
2023-10-18: revised
2023-08-07: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2023/1198
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2023/1198,
      author = {Sonia Belaïd and Gaëtan Cassiers and Camille Mutschler and Matthieu Rivain and Thomas Roche and François-Xavier Standaert and Abdul Rahman Taleb},
      title = {A Methodology to Achieve Provable Side-Channel Security in Real-World Implementations},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2023/1198},
      year = {2023},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/1198}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/1198}
}
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