Paper 2023/1063

DiStefano: Decentralized Infrastructure for Sharing Trusted Encrypted Facts and Nothing More

Sofía Celi, Brave Software
Alex Davidson, NOVA LINCS & DI, FCT, Universidade NOVA de Lisboa,
Hamed Haddadi, Brave Software, Imperial College London
Gonçalo Pestana, Hashmatter
Joe Rowell, Information Security Group, Royal Holloway, University of London
Abstract

We design DiStefano: an efficient framework for generating private commitments over TLS-encrypted web traffic for a designated, untrusted third-party. DiStefano provides many improvements over previous TLS commitment systems, including: a modular security model that is applicable to TLS 1.3 traffic, and support for generating verifiable claims using applicable zero-knowledge systems; inherent 1-out-of-n privacy for the TLS server that the client communicates with; and various cryptographic optimisations to ensure fast online performance of the TLS session. We build an open-source implementation of DiStefano integrated into the BoringSSL cryptographic library, that is used within Chromium-based Internet browsers. We show that DiStefano is practical for committing to facts in arbitrary TLS traffic, with online times that are comparable with existing TLS 1.2 solutions. We also make improvements to certain cryptographic primitives used inside DiStefano, leading to 3x and 2x improvements in online computation time and bandwidth in specific situations.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Applications
Publication info
Preprint.
Keywords
TLSMPSprivacy
Contact author(s)
cherenkov @ riseup net
a davidson @ fct unl pt
hamed @ brave com
gpestana @ hashmatter com
joe rowell @ rhul ac uk
History
2023-07-11: approved
2023-07-07: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2023/1063
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2023/1063,
      author = {Sofía Celi and Alex Davidson and Hamed Haddadi and Gonçalo Pestana and Joe Rowell},
      title = {DiStefano: Decentralized Infrastructure for Sharing Trusted Encrypted Facts and Nothing More},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2023/1063},
      year = {2023},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/1063}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/1063}
}
Note: In order to protect the privacy of readers, eprint.iacr.org does not use cookies or embedded third party content.