BlindPerm: Efficient MEV Mitigation with an Encrypted Mempool and Permutation

Alireza Kavousi; Duc V. Le; Philipp Jovanovic; George Danezis

Paper 2023/1061

BlindPerm: Efficient MEV Mitigation with an Encrypted Mempool and Permutation

Alireza Kavousi, University College London

Duc V. Le, Visa Research

Philipp Jovanovic, University College London

George Danezis, Mysten Labs, University College London

Abstract

To mitigate the negative effects of Maximal Extraction Value (MEV), we propose and explore techniques that utilize randomized permutation to shuffle the order of transactions in a committed block before they are executed. We also show that existing MEV mitigation approaches based on encrypted mempools can be extended by permutation-based techniques to provide multi-layer protection. With a focus on BFT style consensus we then propose $\textsf{BlindPerm}$, a framework enhancing an encrypted mempool with permutation at essentially no overheads and present various optimizations. Our protocol neither adds any extra latency nor requires any additional services. Finally, we demonstrate how to extend our mitigation technique to support PoW longest-chain consensus protocols.

Metadata

Available format(s): PDF
Category: Cryptographic protocols
Publication info: Preprint.
Keywords: Maximal Extractable Value MEV Order Fairness
Contact author(s): alireza kavousi 21 @ ucl ac uk
duc le @ visa com
p jovanovic @ ucl ac uk
george @ mystenlabs com
History: 2023-09-22: revised; 2023-07-07: received; See all versions
Short URL: https://ia.cr/2023/1061
License: CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2023/1061,
      author = {Alireza Kavousi and Duc V. Le and Philipp Jovanovic and George Danezis},
      title = {BlindPerm: Efficient MEV Mitigation with an Encrypted Mempool and Permutation},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2023/1061},
      year = {2023},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/1061}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/1061}
}