Snowball: Another View on Side-Channel Key Recovery Tools

Abstract

The performance of Side-Channel Attacks (SCAs) decays rapidly when considering more sub-keys, making the full-key recovery a very challenging problem. Limited to independent collision information utilization, collision attacks establish the relationship among sub-keys but do not significantly slow down this trend. To solve it, we first exploit the samples from the previously attacked S-boxes to assist attacks on the targeted S-box under an assumption that similar leakage occurs in program loop or code reuse scenarios. The later considered S-boxes are easier to be recovered since more samples participate in this assist attack, which results in the snowball'' effect. We name this scheme as Snowball, which significantly slows down the attenuation rate of attack performance. We further introduce confusion coefficient into the collision attack to construct collision confusion coefficient, and deduce its relationship with correlation coefficient. Based on this relationship, we give two optimizations on our Snowball exploiting the values'' information and rankings'' information of collision correlation coefficients named Least Deviation from Pearson correlation coefficient (PLD) and Least Deviation from confusion coefficient (CLD). Experiments show that the above optimizations significantly improve the performance of our Snowball.

Available format(s)
Category
Applications
Publication info
Preprint.
Keywords
snowball collision attack confusion coefficient key recovery side-channel attack
Contact author(s)
longjiangshan @ whu edu cn
ouchanghai @ whu edu cn
wangzhu @ iie ac cn
shihuizh @ bupt edu cn
yanfei @ whu edu cn
fanzhang @ zju edu cn
assklam @ ntu edu sg
History
2022-06-08: approved
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2022/728

CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2022/728,
author = {Jiangshan Long and Changhai Ou and Zhu Wang and Shihui Zheng and Fei Yan and Fan Zhang and Siew-Kei Lam},
title = {Snowball: Another View on Side-Channel Key Recovery Tools},
howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2022/728},
year = {2022},
note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/728}},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/728}
}
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