Paper 2022/461

Information Leakage in Code-based Masking: A Systematic Evaluation by Higher-Order Attacks

Wei Cheng, Sylvain Guilley, and Jean-Luc Danger

Abstract

Code-based masking is a recent line of research on masking schemes aiming at provably counteracting side-channel attacks. It generalizes and unifies many masking schemes within a coding-theoretic formalization. In code-based masking schemes, the tuning parameters are the underlying linear codes, whose choice significantly affects the side-channel resilience. In this paper, we investigate the exploitability of the information leakage in code-based masking and present attack-based evaluation results of higher-order optimal distinguisher (HOOD). Particularly, we consider two representative instances of code-based masking, namely inner product masking (IPM) and Shamir's secret sharing (SSS) based masking. Our results do confirm the state-of-the-art theoretical derivatives in an empirical manner with numerically simulated measurements. Specifically, theoretical results are based on quantifying information leakage; we further complete the panorama with attack-based evaluations by investigating the exploitability of the leakage. Moreover, we classify all possible candidates of linear codes in IPM with 2 and 3 shares and (3,1)-SSS based masking, and highlight both optimal and worst codes for them. Relying on our empirical evaluations, we therefore recommend investigating the coding-theoretic properties to find the best linear codes in strengthening instances of code-based masking. As for applications, our attack-based evaluation directly empowers designers, by employing optimal linear codes, to enhance the protection of code-based masking. Our framework leverages simulated leakage traces, hence allowing for source code validation or patching in case it is found to be attackable.

Note: Adding DOI of this paper and fixing two formatting issues in the published version.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Implementation
Publication info
Published elsewhere. Minor revision.IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security
DOI
10.1109/TIFS.2022.3167914
Keywords
Side-Channel AttacksCountermeasuresLeakage ExploitationMutual InformationInner Product MaskingShamir's Secret SharingCode-based MaskingPre-silicon Simulation-based Evaluation
Contact author(s)
wei cheng @ telecom-paris fr
sylvain guilley @ secure-ic com
History
2022-05-16: last of 2 revisions
2022-04-22: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2022/461
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2022/461,
      author = {Wei Cheng and Sylvain Guilley and Jean-Luc Danger},
      title = {Information Leakage in Code-based Masking: A Systematic Evaluation by Higher-Order Attacks},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2022/461},
      year = {2022},
      doi = {10.1109/TIFS.2022.3167914},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/461}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/461}
}
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