Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2022/324

Backward-Leak Uni-Directional Updatable Encryption from Public Key Encryption

Yao Jiang Galteland and Jiaxin Pan

Abstract: The understanding of directionality for updatable encryption (UE) schemes is important, but not yet completed in the literature. We show that security in the backward-leak uni-directional key updates setting is equivalent to the no-directional one. Combining with the work of Jiang (ASIACRYPT 2020) and Nishimaki (PKC 2022), it is showed that the backward-leak notion is the strongest one among all known key update notions and more relevant in practice.

We propose two novel generic constructions of UE schemes that are secure in the backward-leak uni-directional key update setting from public key encryption (PKE) schemes: the first one requires a key and message homomorphic PKE scheme and the second one requires a bootstrappable PKE scheme. These PKE can be constructed based on standard assumptions (such as the Decisional Diffie-Hellman and Learning With Errors assumptions). It is in stark contrast to the work of Nishimaki, which uses indistinguishability obfuscations.

Category / Keywords: public-key cryptography / Updatable Encryption, Backward-leak Uni-Directional Key Update, No-Directional Key Update, Standard Assumption

Date: received 8 Mar 2022, last revised 17 Mar 2022

Contact author: yao jiang at ntnu no, jiaxin pan at ntnu no

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Version: 20220317:124313 (All versions of this report)

Short URL: ia.cr/2022/324


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