Backward-Leak Uni-Directional Updatable Encryption from Public Key Encryption

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Abstract. The understanding of directionality for updatable encryption (UE) schemes is important, but not yet completed in the literature. We show that security in the backward-leak uni-directional key updates setting is equivalent to the no-directional one. Combining with the work of Jiang (ASIACRYPT 2020) and Nishimaki (PKC 2022), it is showed that the backward-leak notion is the strongest one among all known key update notions and more relevant in practice.

We propose two novel generic constructions of UE schemes that are secure in the backward-leak uni-directional key update setting from public key encryption (PKE) schemes: the first one requires a key and message homomorphic PKE scheme and the second one requires a bootstrap-able PKE scheme. These PKE can be constructed based on standard assumptions (such as the Decisional Diffie-Hellman and Learning With Errors assumptions). It is in stark contrast to the work of Nishimaki, which uses indistinguishability obfuscations, and Slamanig and Striecks (Cryptology ePrint Archive, 2021/268), which requires pairings.

Keywords: Updatable Encryption · Public Key Encryption · Backward-leak Uni-Directional Key Update · No-Directional Key Update · Standard Assumption

1 Introduction

To mitigate key compromise over time, a data subject wishes to periodically update her outsourced data on a data host. The outsourced data is expected to be refreshed from the old key to the new key without changing the underlying massage. During this process, it is also reasonable to expect that no information of plaintexts are leaked while updating.

Updatable encryption (UE) schemes [2, 3, 4, 6, 10, 11, 13, 15] are a special kind of encryption schemes that allow the data host to update ciphertexts with

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the help of a data subject generated updating material, namely update token. Update tokens can rotate ciphertexts or keys, which makes UE schemes particularly interesting for outsourced data storage. However, leaked tokens together with key corruption an adversary may break confidentiality of the future or past epoch by upgrading or downgrading keys or ciphertexts, which is captured by the directionality of UE schemes. The study of UE mainly focuses on the security notions and efficient constructions. Directionality for UE schemes is important to study since it plays a central role in influencing the security result. The challenge is that there are two types of ciphertext update settings and four types of key update settings in the literature, and a combination of these settings results in eight different types of update settings for UE schemes to analyze.

**Directionality of Ciphertext Updates.** If an update token can only update a ciphertext under a key in the past to a ciphertext under a new key without changing the encrypted message, it is in the forward direction, then we call that such a UE scheme has uni-directional ciphertext updates; and if an update token can additionally update a ciphertext to another ciphertext under a key in the past, we call such a UE scheme with bi-directional ciphertext updates.

**Directionality of Key Updates.** Secret key leakage is a serious security threat to encryption. For instance, there is no security guarantee for standard encryption schemes if their secret keys are leaked. However, for UE schemes, the update token offers a potential to preserve confidentiality, since the update token allows us to update a secret key and the corresponding ciphertexts. Realizing this fully is very challenging and requires careful treatments, since the update token may also leak information about the key.

Directionality of key update is used to capture which information adversaries can learn about the secret keys given the update token. Roughly speaking, there are four key update settings given by the literature [8, 11, 13]. For a precise description, let $e$ be an epoch, namely, the index of a time period. In the forward-leak uni-directional key update setting\(^1\) [11], given a key $k_e$ and an update token $\Delta_{e+1}$ adversaries can only learn a key $k_{e+1}$ in the forward direction. Similarly, in the backward-leak uni-directional key update setting [13], adversaries can only learn a key $k_e$ in the backward direction, given $k_{e+1}$ and $\Delta_{e+1}$. If both forward-leak and backward-leak are satisfied in a setting, then it is called bi-directional key update. In contrary, if an update token leaks nothing about any secret key, then this setting is called no-directional key update [8].

**Security Implications among Different Key Update Settings.** Security of a UE scheme is defined with respect to the aforementioned key update settings. Roughly speaking, UE security guarantees confidentiality if the trivial win conditions are not triggered. The trivial win conditions are defined differently in each key update setting, and more information leaked about keys leads to more trivial win

\(^1\) This was called uni-directional key updates in [11], but here we follow the more precise terminology of Nishimaki [13] and call it forward-leak uni-directional key updates.
conditions in the confidentiality game for UE schemes. With more trivial win conditions, it seems harder for an adversary to win the confidentiality, since it is easier for it to trigger the trivial win conditions. Thus, intuitively, a setting with less key leakage seems to give stronger security.

This intuition partially holds true, according to the work of Jiang [8] and Nishimaki [13]. More precisely, in [8] it has been showed that security in the no-directional setting is strictly stronger than that in the bi-directional setting, and security in the bi-directional key update setting is equivalent to that in the forward-leak setting. To further complete the work of Jiang, Nishimaki [13] proposed the backward-leak uni-directional setting and showed that UE schemes in prior works [4, 8, 11] are secure in the bi-directional setting but insecure in the backward-leak uni-directional setting. Here we consider that an update token can only update a ciphertext in the forward direction, since if the ciphertext updates are bi-directional then all four settings are equivalent as shown in [8]. The implications among these four key update settings are shown figuratively in Figure 1.

![Figure 1: Security implications among different key update settings assuming uni-directional ciphertext updates.](image)

X → Y means that security in the X setting implies that in the Y setting, and X ↛ Y means that security in the X setting does not imply that in the Y setting, and X ↔ Y = (X → Y) ∧ (Y → X). Contribution in this paper is marked with red.

To sum up the discussions above, it is currently unclear that the relation between the no-directional and backward-leak uni-directional key update settings, although they both are stronger than the bi-directional and forward-leak setting.

Our Goal: UE schemes with Strong Security from Weak Assumptions. We aim at constructing UE schemes with strong security from weak assumptions. In achieving our goal, we first need to decide which notion is the strongest among the above four settings. Jumping ahead, our first contribution is proving the no-directional and backward-leak settings are equivalent. Given our equivalence result, we suppose it is more desirable to construct a UE scheme that is secure in the backward-leak uni-directional key update setting for the following reasons.

Firstly, UE schemes secure in the backward-leak setting are technically more promising to construct based on weak assumptions, since the existing UE schemes [13, 15] with no-directional key updates are based on strong assumptions. Namely, the scheme in [13] requires a rather strong and impractical primitive, indistin-
guishability obfuscation, and the scheme in [15] requires ciphertext puncturable encryption schemes which can only be constructed using pairings.

Secondly, although there is a backward-leak UE scheme based on the Learning With Errors (LWE) assumption proposed by Nishimaki [13], it is unknown whether backward-leak UE schemes can be constructed from a wider class of weak assumptions, for instance, the Diffie-Hellman assumption without pairings. We are particularly interested in constructing UE schemes generically from public-key encryption (PKE), since this not only is theoretically interesting, but also can give us UE schemes from rather weak assumptions. Recently, Alamati, Montgomery, and Patranabis [1] have proved that ciphertext-independent UE implies PKE, but the implication in the other direction is unknown.

Finally, we stress that the backward-leak setting is relevant for practice, as discussed in [13]. In practice, the purpose of updating our keys is mostly because the current key and those in the past may be leaked. In such a scenario, UE schemes in the backward-leak uni-directional key update setting are required, since they can provide confidentiality in an epoch, even though all previous keys and tokens are corrupted. Moreover, backward-leak UE schemes remain secure even if the data host forgets to delete older keys and tokens, while this is not the case for forward-leak UE schemes, since with the older keys an adversary can learn the keys in the future.

1.1 Our Contributions

Intuition behind security definitions. Our first contribution is providing an intuitive understanding of trivial win conditions, firewalls, directionality and security notions. Explanations of all these topics exists in [3, 4, 8, 10, 11, 13], however, we aim to provide an simple description to show the relations among these definitions. We consider two classes of UE schemes (discussed in Section 3.2 and 3.3): the first class of UE schemes have update settings such that keys cannot upgrade and ciphertexts cannot downgrade, the second class of UE schemes have update settings where keys and ciphertexts both can leak information in the forward direction. We observe that the first class of UE schemes (including UE schemes with backward-leak uni-directional key updates and no-directional key updates) can achieve the strongest confidentiality notion (with post-compromise security). Thus, it is only necessary to analyze two classes of UE schemes, and these two classes of UE schemes matches with the equivalence result in the literature [8, 13] and our work. That is, the eight variants of confidentiality notions can be seen as only two classes of confidentiality notions. We will show that notions in the same class are equivalent and one class is strictly stronger that the other.

Equivalence result. Our second contribution is proving that security in the backward-leak uni-directional key update and uni-directional ciphertext update setting is equivalent to that in the no-directional key update and uni-directional ciphertext update setting. All our UE schemes have uni-directional ciphertext updates, and for simplicity, we do not mention it explicitly in the remaining of this section. This means that UE schemes with no-directional key updates do not
provide stronger security than UE schemes with backward-leak uni-directional
key update. Our result suggests that constructing UE schemes with backward-
leak uni-directional key update is equivalent to constructing UE schemes with
no-directional key update.

Generic Constructions of UE from PKE. Our third contribution is constructing
two generic constructions of UE schemes with backward-leak uni-directional key
update from PKE schemes. Our constructions require additional properties of
the underlying PKE schemes. Our first construction requires key and message
homomorphic for PKE schemes. Such PKE schemes can be instantiated under
the Decisional Diffie-Hellman (using the ElGamal encryption) and LWE (using
the Regev encryption [14]) assumptions. Combining with our equivalence result,
the aforementioned two schemes provide us with the first no-directional secure
UE schemes without pairings in the Diffie-Hellman setting and based on a post-
quantum assumption, respectively.

Our second generic construction uses a bootstrappable PKE [7] that can be
implemented using the LWE assumption, which again gives us a post-quantum
UE scheme with security in the no-directional key update setting.

Of independent interest, we propose a generic construction of bi-directional
UE scheme from a key homomorphic PKE scheme. Our generic construction
abstracts the constructions of RISE [11] and LWEUE [8]. We stress that our
notion of key homomorphic PKE is inspired by the key homomorphic PRF of
Boneh et al. [3] but different to theirs. More precisely, our key homomorphic
property is defined with respect to a public key and a secret key, while theirs is
with respect to two secret keys.

Technical Overview. Here we provide a brief technical overview of our generic
backward-leak UE constructions from PKEs. The full descriptions of our schemes
can be found in Sections 5.3 and 6. The update token plays an important role
in a UE scheme, and therefore we mostly focus on it in the following.

In our first construction, its key contains a pair of secret and public keys
from the PKE scheme. The update token contains the difference between the old
and new secret keys. In addition, the token includes an independently generated
public key, which will play a central role for the confidentiality in the next epoch.
To update a ciphertext, we have two steps: Firstly, by the key homomorphic
property of the PKE, the difference between the old and new secret keys can
be used to modify the ciphertext under the old key to one under the new key.
Secondly, we randomize this ciphertext so that it is indistinguishable to a freshly
generated ciphertext under the new key. In doing this, we use the aforementioned
independent public key to encrypt a randomness to homomorphically randomize
the ciphertext, since our PKE is further message homomorphic. In the security
proof, we can show that message is hidden by the randomness and confidentiality
in the new epoch is preserved.

In our second construction, the update token is an encryption of the old secret
key under the new public key. This token will not reveal any information about
the new secret key even with the knowledge of the old secret key. To update a
ciphertext, we evaluate the decryption circuit on the encryption of the old key (that is the token) and the encryption of the old ciphertext. The bootstrapping property states that this output is statistically close to a fresh ciphertext under the new key.

Concurrent Work. We note a recent work from Miao, Patranabis, and Watson [12] which has a construction of backward-leak uni-directional UE similar to ours, while our work contains a formal proof about the equivalence between backward-leak and no-directional UE.

1.2 More Discussion

Ciphertext-Dependent v.s. Ciphertext-Independent. We call a UE scheme is ciphertext-dependent [2, 3, 5, 6] if the token generation process depends on the old ciphertext. If the token generation process is independent of the ciphertext to be updated, then the UE scheme is called ciphertext-independent [4, 8, 10, 11, 13, 15]. A ciphertext-independent UE scheme is usually more efficient, and, thus, we focus on such schemes in this paper.

Deterministic Update. The update algorithm in UE schemes can be deterministic or randomized. UE schemes with randomized update algorithm provide stronger security, in which the updated ciphertext can be in the same distribution of a fresh encryption. However, the work of Klooß et al. [10] shows that such UE schemes with randomized update cannot achieve ciphertext integrity and security against chosen-ciphertext attacks (CCA), but replayable CCA security. For instance, SHINE [4] and E&M [10] are UE schemes with deterministic update that have ciphertext integrity and CCA security. Klooß et al.’s result also means that our constructions cannot be CCA secure, but it is promising to make it RCCA secure. We leave constructing this as an open problem.

Security Notions. Boneh et al. [3] presented the first security notion for UE schemes. After that, the works in [4, 8, 10, 11] proposed more realistic security notion by providing more capability to an adversary. For instance, it can adaptively corrupt epoch keys or update tokens at any point within the security game. Jiang [8] first discussed the directionality of security notions and showed that security notions with forward-leak uni- and bi-directional updates are equivalent in the current state-of-the-art UE security notion of Boyd et al. [4]. In addition, Jiang [8] proved that confidentiality notions with no-directional key updates are strictly stronger than uni- and bi-directional update variants of the corresponding notions. Nishimaki [13] defined a new type of key update, backward-leak uni-directional key update, which is not covered in the work of [8]. We will prove the relation between the backward-leak uni-directional key update variant of a confidentiality notion with other update variants of the same confidentiality notion. We will show that confidentiality notions with backward-leak uni-directional key update is equivalent to no-directional key updates variants of the corresponding notions. Which means the backward-leak uni-directional key update variant
of notions are the strongest notions. Slamanig and Striecks [15] introduced a stronger model for UE schemes, where they consider an “expiry epoch”, $e_{\text{exp}}$. If a ciphertext is updated to an epoch $e$, where $e \geq e_{\text{exp}}$ and $e_{\text{exp}}$ is this ciphertext’s expiry epoch, then this ciphertext can no longer be decryptable. Due to this stronger notion, a forward-leak uni-directional key update is desirable. Note that Jiang’s equivalence theorem [8] is hold under the setting that no expiry date for ciphertexts, i.e. $e_{\text{exp}} = \infty$. We consider the case for $e_{\text{exp}} = \infty$ in this paper.

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2 Preliminaries
In this section we describe the notation used in this paper and present the necessary background material of updatable encryption. Due to space limitations, we provide the preliminaries for public key encryption in App. A.

2.1 Notations
In this paper, $\lambda$ denotes the security parameter and $\text{negl}$ denotes a negligible function. For distributions $X$ and $Y$, $X \approx Y$ means $X$ is statistically indistinguishable from $Y$.

2.2 Updatable Encryption and Confidentiality Notions
Updatable encryption (UE) schemes [3, 4, 10, 11] are a special kind of encryption schemes with an additional functionality where ciphertexts under one key can be transferred to ciphertexts under another key by an update token.

Definition 1 (UE). An updatable encryption scheme UE is parameterized by a tuple of algorithms $(\text{Setup}, \text{Next}, \text{Enc}, \text{Dec}, \text{Upd})$ that operates over epochs such that

- The setup algorithm $\text{Setup}(\lambda)$ takes a security parameter $\lambda$ as input, and outputs an initial epoch key $k_1$.
- The next algorithm $\text{Next}(k_e)$ takes an epoch key $k_e$ as input, and outputs a new key $k_{e+1}$ and an update token $\Delta_{e+1}$, the update token can be used to update ciphertexts from epoch $e$ to $e + 1$.
- The encryption algorithm $\text{Enc}(k_e, m)$ takes an epoch key $k_e$ and a message $m$ as input, and outputs a ciphertext $c_e$.
- The decryption algorithm $\text{Dec}(k_e, c_e)$ takes an epoch key $k_e$ and a ciphertext $c_e$ as input, and outputs a message $m$.
- The update algorithm $\text{Upd}(\Delta_{e+1}, c_e)$ takes an update token $\Delta_{e+1}$ and a ciphertext $c_e$ as input, and outputs an updated ciphertext $c_{e+1}$.
UE is correct if for any message $m$, any $k_1 \leftarrow \text{Setup}(\lambda)$, any $(k_j, \Delta_j) \leftarrow \text{Next}(k_{j-1})$ for $j = 2, \ldots, e$, and any $c_i \leftarrow \text{Enc}(k_i, m)$ with $i \in \{1, \ldots, e\}$, we have $m = \text{Dec}(k_e, c_e)$ where $c_j \leftarrow \text{Upd}(\Delta_j, c_{j-1})$ for $j = i+1, \ldots, e$.

Security notions for UE schemes includes confidentiality and integrity. We do not consider integrity notions in this paper, see the paper by Jiang [8] for details. We review the confidentiality notion for UE schemes in Definition 2 and extend the six variants of security notions for UE schemes given by [8], in which the backward-leak uni-directional key update [13] variants are not included.

The confidentiality game is played between a challenger and an adversary, the adversary aims to distinguish a fresh encryption from an updated ciphertext. It is allowed for the adversary to adaptively corrupt keys and tokens, if any trivial win condition is triggered during the game the adversary will always lose. We will provide technical and high level understanding of trivial win conditions in Section 2.3 and 3.

**Definition 2 ([4, 8])**. Let $\text{UE} = (\text{Setup}, \text{Next}, \text{Enc}, \text{Dec}, \text{Upd})$ be an updatable encryption scheme. Then the $(kk, cc)$-xxlND-UE-atk advantage, for $kk \in \{\text{no, f-uni, b-uni, bi}\}$, $cc \in \{\text{uni, bi}\}$, $xx \in \{\text{det, rand}\}$ and atk $\in \{\text{CPA, CCA}\}$, of an adversary $\mathcal{A}$ against $\text{UE}$ is defined as

$$\text{Adv}^{(kk, cc)\text{-xxlND-UE-atk}}_{\text{UE}, \mathcal{A}}(\lambda) = \Pr[\text{Exp}^{(kk, cc)\text{-xxlND-UE-atk-0}}_{\text{UE}, \mathcal{A}} = 1] - \Pr[\text{Exp}^{(kk, cc)\text{-xxlND-UE-atk-1}}_{\text{UE}, \mathcal{A}} = 1],$$

where the experiment $\text{Exp}^{(kk, cc)\text{-xxlND-UE-atk}}_{\text{UE}, \mathcal{A}}$ is given in Fig. 2.

### 2.3 Leakage Sets and Trivial Win Conditions

In this section, we review the definition of leakage sets and trivial win discussions [4, 8, 10, 11], the leaked information can be used to help an adversary trivially win the confidentiality game.

**Trivial Win via Key and Ciphertext Leakage.** If an adversary knows both the key and the challenge-equal ciphertext in the same epoch period $e$, then the adversary can use this key to decrypt the challenge-equal ciphertext and obtain the underlying plaintext to win the confidentiality game. We use leakage sets to identify if this trivial win condition (“$\mathcal{K}^* \cap \mathcal{C}^* \neq \emptyset$”) is triggered.

Leakage sets [8, 10, 11] are defined to track epochs in which the adversary knows a key, a token, or learned a version of challenge ciphertext. The direct leakage sets $\mathcal{K}, \mathcal{T}, \mathcal{C}$ are describe as follows. Furthermore, $\mathcal{K}^*, \mathcal{T}^*$ and $\mathcal{C}^*$ are defined as the extended sets of $\mathcal{K}$, $\mathcal{T}$ and $\mathcal{C}$ to track the indirect leakage.

- $\mathcal{K}$: Set of epochs in which the adversary corrupted the key (from $O.Corr$).
- $\mathcal{T}$: Set of epochs in which the adversary corrupted the token (from $O.Corr$).
\textbf{Exp}_{\text{UE},A}^{\text{CondND-UE-atk-b}}:
\begin{enumerate}
\item \textbf{Setup(\lambda)}: \quad k_1 \xleftarrow{} \text{Setup(\lambda)}
\quad \Delta_1 \leftarrow \top; e, c, \text{twf} \leftarrow 0
\quad \mathcal{L}, \hat{L}, C, \mathcal{K}, \mathcal{T} \leftarrow \emptyset
\end{enumerate}

\begin{align*}
\mathcal{O}.\text{Enc}(m) : & \quad c \leftarrow c + 1 \\
& \quad c_e \leftarrow \text{Enc}(k_e, m) \\
& \quad \mathcal{L} \leftarrow \mathcal{L} \cup \{(c, c_e, e; m)\} \\
& \quad \text{return } c_e
\end{align*}

\begin{align*}
\mathcal{O}.\text{Dec}(c) : & \quad m' \text{ or } \top \leftarrow \text{Dec}(k_e, c) \\
& \quad \text{if } \{(x = \text{det and } (c, e) \in \hat{L}_{kk,cc}) \text{ or } (x = \text{rand and } (m', e) \in \hat{q}_{kk,cc})\} \text{ then} \\
& \quad \text{twf} \leftarrow 1 \\
& \quad \text{return } m' \text{ or } \top
\end{align*}

\begin{align*}
\mathcal{O}.\text{Next}() : & \quad (\Delta_{e+1}, k_{e+1}) \leftarrow \text{Next}(k_e) \\
& \quad \text{if phase } = 1 \text{ then} \\
& \quad \tilde{c}_{e+1} \leftarrow \text{Upd}(\Delta_{e+1}, \tilde{c}_e) \\
& \quad e \leftarrow e + 1
\end{align*}

\begin{align*}
\mathcal{O}.\text{Upd}(c_{e-1}) : & \quad \text{if } (j, c_{e-1}, e - 1; m) \notin \mathcal{L} \text{ then} \\
& \quad \text{return } \perp \\
& \quad c_e \leftarrow \text{Upd}(\Delta_e, c_{e-1}) \\
& \quad \mathcal{L} \leftarrow \mathcal{L} \cup \{(j, c_e, e; m)\} \\
& \quad \text{return } c_e
\end{align*}

\begin{align*}
\mathcal{O}.\text{Corr}(\text{inp}, \tilde{e}) : & \quad \text{if } \tilde{e} > e \text{ then} \\
& \quad \text{return } \perp \\
& \quad \text{if } \text{inp} = \text{key} \text{ then} \\
& \quad \mathcal{K} \leftarrow \mathcal{K} \cup \{\tilde{e}\} \\
& \quad \text{return } \tilde{c}_e \\
& \quad \text{if } \text{inp} = \text{token} \text{ then} \\
& \quad \mathcal{T} \leftarrow \mathcal{T} \cup \{\tilde{e}\} \\
& \quad \text{return } \Delta_e
\end{align*}

\begin{align*}
\mathcal{O}.\text{Chall}(\bar{m}, \bar{e}) : & \quad \text{if phase } = 1 \text{ then} \\
& \quad \text{return } \perp \\
& \quad \text{phase} \leftarrow 1; \tilde{e} \leftarrow e \\
& \quad \text{if } \langle \cdot, \tilde{e} \rangle \notin \mathcal{L} \text{ then} \\
& \quad \text{return } \perp \\
& \quad \text{if } b = 0 \text{ then} \\
& \quad \tilde{c}_e \leftarrow \text{Enc}(k_e, \bar{m}) \\
& \quad \text{else} \\
& \quad \tilde{c}_e \leftarrow \text{Upd}(\Delta_e, \tilde{c}_e) \\
& \quad \hat{L} \leftarrow \hat{L} \cup \{\tilde{c}_e\} \\
& \quad \text{return } \tilde{c}_e
\end{align*}

\begin{align*}
\mathcal{O}.\text{Upd}\tilde{C} : & \quad \text{if phase } \neq 1 \text{ then} \\
& \quad \text{return } \perp \\
& \quad \hat{C} \leftarrow \hat{C} \cup \{\tilde{e}\} \\
& \quad \hat{L} \leftarrow \hat{L} \cup \{\tilde{c}_e, \tilde{e}\} \\
& \quad \text{return } \tilde{c}_e
\end{align*}

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{fig2}
\caption{The confidentiality experiment \textbf{Exp}_{\text{UE},A}^{(kk,cc)-\text{CondND-UE-atk-b}} for updatable encryption scheme UE and adversary \textbf{A}, for kk \in \{\text{no}, \text{f-uni}, \text{b-uni}, \text{bi}\}, cc \in \{\text{uni}, \text{bi}\}, xx \in \{\text{det, rand}\} and \text{atk} \in \{\text{CPA, CCA}\}. The flag phase tracks whether or not \textbf{A} has queried the \textbf{O}.Chall oracle, \tilde{e} denotes the epoch in which the \textbf{O}.Chall oracle happens, and \textbf{twf} tracks if the trivial win conditions are triggered. Oracles an adversary can query are \textbf{O}.Enc, \textbf{O}.Next, \textbf{O}.Upd, \textbf{O}.Corr, \textbf{O}.Chall and \textbf{O}.Upd\tilde{C} if \textbf{atk} = \text{CPA}. If \textbf{atk} = \text{CCA}, \textbf{O}.Dec is included in the oracles. Leakage sets \hat{C}, \mathcal{K}, \mathcal{T}, \mathcal{K}_{kk}^*, \mathcal{T}_{kk}^*, \hat{q}_{kk,cc}^*, \hat{L}_{kk,cc}^*, \hat{q}_{kk,cc}^* are discussed in Section 2.3.}
\end{figure}

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Key Leakage. The size of the key leakage set $K^*$ can be influenced by the key update direction of UE schemes. In the no-directional key update setting [8], the adversary does not have more information about keys except for set $K$. In the forward-leak uni-directional key update setting, if the adversary knows a key $k_e$ and an update token $\Delta e+1$ then it can infer the next key $k_{e+1}$. In the backward-leak [13] uni-directional key update setting, if the adversary knows a key $k_{e+1}$ and an update token $\Delta e+1$ then it can infer the previous key $k_e$.

The notations $f$-uni and $b$-uni denote forward-leak uni and backward-leak uni, resp.. In the $kk\in\{\text{no, } f\text{-uni, } b\text{-uni, } bi\}$ directional key update setting, for $kk\in\{\text{no, } f\text{-uni, } b\text{-uni, } bi\}$, denote the set $K_{kk}^*$ as the extended set of corrupted key epochs. We compute these sets as follows, where the boxed part is only computed for $kk\in\{b\text{-uni, } bi\}$,

$$K_{kk}^* \leftarrow \{ e \in \{0, \ldots, l\}| \text{CorrK}(e) = \text{true} \}$$

$$\text{true} \leftarrow \text{CorrK}(e) \iff (e \in K) \vee (\text{CorrK}(e+1) \land e+1 \in T) \vee \text{CorrK}(e-1) \land e \in \bar{T}.$$  \hspace{1cm} (1)

Token Leakage. The adversary directly learns all corrupted tokens, it can also compute a token from two consecutive epoch keys. Hence, for $kk\in\{\text{no, } f\text{-uni, } b\text{-uni, } bi\}$, denote $T_{kk}$ as the extended set of corrupted token epochs.

$$T_{kk}^* \leftarrow \{ e \in \{0, \ldots, l\}| (e \in T) \vee (e \in K_{kk}^* \land e-1 \in K_{kk}^*) \}.$$  \hspace{1cm} (2)

Challenge-Equal Ciphertext Leakage. The adversary learned all versions of challenge ciphertexts in epochs in $C$. Additionally, the adversary can compute challenge-equal ciphertexts via tokens. In the uni-directional ciphertext update setting, the adversary can upgrade ciphertexts. In the bi-directional ciphertext update setting, the adversary can additionally downgrade ciphertexts.

For $kk\in\{\text{no, } f\text{-uni, } b\text{-uni, } bi\}$ and $cc\in\{uni, bi\}$, denote the set $C_{kk,cc}^*$ as the extended set of challenge-equal epochs. We compute these sets as follows, where the boxed part is only computed for $cc=bi$.

$$C_{kk,cc}^* \leftarrow \{ e \in \{0, \ldots, l\}| \text{ChallEq}(e) = \text{true} \}$$

$$\text{true} \leftarrow \text{ChallEq}(e) \iff (e \in C) \vee (\text{ChallEq}(e-1) \land e \in T_{kk}^*) \vee \text{ChallEq}(e+1) \land e+1 \in \bar{T}_{kk}.$$  \hspace{1cm} (3)

Trivial Win due to Deterministic Update. In a confidentiality game with deterministic update setting. If the adversary knows the updated version (by

\footnote{A challenge-equal ciphertext is either a challenge ciphertext or an updated ciphertext of the challenge ciphertext.}
either knowing the update token $\Delta_\xi$ or asking for an update oracle $O.\text{Upd}$ on $\vec{c}$) of the challenge input ciphertext $\vec{c}$, it can compare the updated ciphertext with the challenge ciphertext to win the confidentiality game. This trivial win condition is “$e \in T^*$ or $O.\text{Upd}(\vec{c})$ is queried”.

**Trivial Wins via Decryption.** If the adversary submits a challenge-equal ciphertext to the decryption oracle, it can trivially win the confidentiality game by comparing the challenge plaintexts with the decryption output. Hence, the adversary is not allowed to ask for a decryption oracle on such ciphertexts. We use the following sets to track challenge ciphertexts, challenge plaintexts and their updated versions that can be known to the adversary. These sets can be used to identify the above trivial win condition. More precisely, “ $(c, e) \in \hat{L}^*$” is a trivial win condition that is checked by the decryption oracle in the $\text{detIND-UE-CCA}$ game, “ $(m', e) \in \hat{Q}^*$” is a trivial win condition that is checked by the decryption oracle in the $\text{randIND-UE-CCA}$ game.

- $\hat{L}^*$: Set of challenge-equal ciphertexts $(\hat{c}_e, e)$. The adversary learned these ciphertexts from $O.\text{Chall}$ or $O.\text{UpdC}$, or derived these ciphertexts from tokens.
- $\hat{Q}^*$: Set of challenge plaintexts $\{(\hat{m}_e, e), (\hat{m}_1, e)\}$, where $(\hat{m}, \vec{c})$ is the input of challenge query $O.\text{Chall}$ and $\hat{m}_1$ is the underlying message of $\vec{c}$. The adversary learned or was able to compute a challenge-equal ciphertext in epoch $e$ with the underlying message $\hat{m}$ or $\hat{m}_1$.

## 3 Intuitions behind Security Definitions.

In this section, we propose a high level intuitions behind the security notions for UE, such as trivial win conditions, firewalls and directionality.

### 3.1 Intuition of Trivial Wins Conditions

The more information that get leaked in a confidentiality game the more chances the adversary gains to win that game, and trivial win conditions are defined to exclude such winning conditions. Generally speaking, the more update directions a UE scheme has the more information the adversary can infer. That is, the directionality of the update setting influences how much information gets leaked.

Trivial win conditions can be seen as a way of limiting the adversary’s attacking power and this can be used to compare two notions, where two notions for UE schemes are equivalent if they have the same winning probability. Consider a modified confidentiality game where the adversary is not allowed to perform certain actions that will trigger trivial win conditions. If such action happens, the game aborts. The winning probability of the original confidentiality game is the same as this modified confidentiality game. In other words, trivial win conditions are equivalent to an attacking model. Such attacking model defines the restriction to the adversary, for example, the adaptive corruption ability is restricted by not triggering the trivial win conditions. Only when the adversary’s
attack actions does not trigger the trivial win conditions it is possible to win the
game. Informally, a security notion for a system can be seen as stronger if the
system remains secure even if the adversary has more attacking ability.

Combining this with the discussion above, we see that the more update di-
rection a UE scheme has the more key and ciphertext leakage there will be and
more trivial win conditions to evaluate. This means that the adversary will be
limited more in such a confidentiality game. From a security point of view, the
less attacking ability the adversary has the weaker we can regard a security
notion.

3.2 Intuition of Firewalls

The observation of firewalls was introduced in the work of Lehmann and Tack-
mann [11], Kloß et al. [10] provided an extended description of this key insu-
lation technique, and Boyd et al. [4] formally defined it as firewall technique.
Furthermore, Nishimaki [13] proposed a relaxed firewall, where the token on the
left side of the insulated region ($\Delta_{fwl}$) can be corrupted. In any security game,
if the adversary never triggers the trivial win conditions, a cryptographic sepa-
ration (firewalls) exists, for a detailed discussion of the existence of firewalls see
[4, 10, 11, 13].

Definition 3 (Firewalls [4, 10, 11]). An insulated region with firewalls $fwl$ and $fwr$ is a consecutive sequence of epochs ($fwl, \ldots, fwr$) for which:

- no key in the sequence of epochs ($fwl, \ldots, fwr$) is corrupted;
- the tokens $\Delta_{fwl}$ and $\Delta_{fwr+1}$ are not corrupted (if they exist);
- all tokens ($\Delta_{fwl+1}, \ldots, \Delta_{fwr}$) are corrupted (if any exist).

Definition 4 (Relaxed Firewalls [13]). A relaxed insulated region with re-
laxed firewalls $fwl$ and $fwr$ is a consecutive sequence of epochs ($fwl, \ldots, fwr$) for
which:

- no key in the sequence of epochs ($fwl, \ldots, fwr$) is corrupted;
- the token $\Delta_{fwr+1}$ is not corrupted (if it exists);
- all tokens ($\Delta_{fwl+1}, \ldots, \Delta_{fwr}$) are corrupted (if any exist).

The firewall technique is used when proving the security for UE schemes, it
provides a method of describing a cryptographic separation, which is required
in the epoch based model to simulate where keys and ciphertexts are known or
unknown to the adversary. Firewalls, and relaxed firewalls, define a “safe” or
insulated region for keys, where no key within the region can be inferred from
keys outside of this region. We can regard the tokens $\Delta_{fwl}$ and $\Delta_{fwr+1}$ as the
left and right firewalls; the cryptographic separation is created when these two
tokens are unknown to the adversary. In some UE settings, the token $\Delta_{fwl}$ can
be corrupted and the cryptographic separation still holds, which means that the
insulated region can be relaxed even without the left firewall.

The relaxed insulated region is suitable for analyzing security for UE schemes
with update settings such that keys cannot upgrade and ciphertexts cannot
downgrade, namely ciphertext and key will not leak information in the same direction. In UE schemes with uni-directional ciphertext update setting and key update settings without forward-leak direction, we have that the token $\Delta_{f_wl}$ cannot upgrade early epoch keys to learn keys inside the insulated region, it cannot downgrade challenge-equal ciphertexts to learn early challenge-equal ciphertexts outside of the insulated region as well. Hence, keys and ciphertexts inside and outside of the insulated region are separated even when $\Delta_{f_wl}$ is known to the adversary, the insulated region can be relaxed to allow the token $\Delta_{f_wl}$ to be corrupted.

The (original) insulated region is suitable for analyze UE schemes with update settings such that keys and ciphertexts can both leak information in the forward direction, namely ciphertext and key will leak information in the same direction. In UE schemes with ciphertext and key update settings that both have at least forward-leak direction, we have that the token $\Delta_{f_wl}$ can upgrade early corrupted keys to learn keys inside the insulated region. For these UE schemes we have that the token $\Delta_{f_wl}$ can upgrade challenge-equal ciphertexts to an epoch outside the insulated region where the adversary knows a corrupted key. Hence, both tokens $\Delta_{f_wl}$ and $\Delta_{f_wl+1}$ are required to be unknown to the adversary to make a cryptographic separation.

### 3.3 Forward Security and Post-Compromise Security

Forward and post-compromise security for UE schemes were discussed by Lehmann and Tackmann [11]. However, all confidentiality games in their work are restricted by not triggering trivial win conditions, which means there exists a cryptographic separation between the leaked key region and the “safe” region (see the discussion of cryptographic separation in Section 3.2). That is, there exists two tokens one before and one after the epoch where the adversary aims to break the confidentiality such that these tokens cannot be corrupted.

We consider the standard definitions for forward and post-compromise security, in which we do not have the restrictions of tokens which cannot be corrupted. We say a UE scheme have

- **forward security** if the confidentiality in early epochs are not broken even if an adversary compromises keys and tokens in some later epochs.
- **post-compromise security** if the confidentiality in later epochs are not broken even if an adversary compromises keys and tokens in some early epochs.

We observe that only some specific UE schemes can achieve post-compromise security. No UE scheme can achieve forward security.

The first class of UE schemes, discussed in Section 3.2, have update settings such that keys cannot upgrade and ciphertexts cannot downgrade. Since the ciphertext update is forward direction, an adversary can upgrade challenge-equal ciphertexts by the help of tokens to an epoch where the adversary knows a key to break the confidentiality in early epochs. Therefore, such UE schemes cannot achieve forward security. However, an adversary compromises keys and tokens in
some early epochs cannot learn keys to break the confidentiality in later epochs. Additionally, the adversary cannot downgrade a challenge-equal ciphertext to an early epoch where the adversary knows a key to break the confidentiality in later epochs. Hence, such UE schemes can have post-compromise security.

The second class of UE schemes, discussed in Section 3.2, have update settings where keys and ciphertexts both can leak information in the forward direction. An adversary can infer keys by tokens in the forward direction to break the confidentiality in later epochs, therefore, such UE schemes cannot achieve post-compromise security. Moreover, since the ciphertext update is forward direction, similar to the discussion in above paragraph, such UE schemes cannot achieve forward security either.

The above discussion matches with the equivalence results of confidentiality notions (see Section 4). It implies that the first class of UE schemes (including UE schemes with backward-leak uni-directional key updates and no-directional key updates) can achieve the strongest confidentiality notion (with post-compromise security).

### 3.4 Directionality for UE schemes and Confidentiality Notions

We specify that directionality for UE schemes and directionality for confidentiality notions are two different concepts. The update directionality for UE schemes was defined to measure how much keys and ciphertexts are leaked because of update tokens. However, such leakage can be the whole information leakage or just partial information leakage. The partial leakage is not captured in the directionality for UE schemes, there is no definition for partial information leakage. Under current definitions, we consider update direction for UE schemes to be without partial information leakage. However, partial information leakage may be used to break the confidentiality. An adversary may be able to decrypt ciphertexts where it only knows partial information about the corresponding key. Such partial information leakage is considered in the security notion and it can be seen as equivalent to the whole information leakage. For example, suppose tokens in a UE scheme can be used to infer partial key information in both update direction, such UE schemes are considered as a no-directional key update UE scheme. However, if an adversary can use this partially leaked key to break confidentiality, then such UE scheme is not secure in the no-directional update variant of confidentiality, it can at most be secure in the bi-directional update variant of confidentiality. Overall, UE schemes with one kind of update setting do not immediately have the same update direction variant of security.

A specific update variant of security notion is suitable for examining UE schemes with the same update setting. But we stress that our security definitions are not restricted to UE schemes with some particular update setting, such UE schemes are simply insecure in a less updating (or leakage) variant of notion.
4 Relations among Confidentiality Notions

In the work of [9], Jiang showed that all variants of the same integrity notions are equivalent, hence, we do not consider integrity notions in this work and focus on discussing the relations among confidentiality notions in this section. We prove that the backward-leak uni- and no directional key update variant of the same confidentiality notion are equivalent. As a result, UE schemes with backward-leak uni-directional key updates is as strong as UE schemes with no directional key update. It implies that we can construct a less hard (backward-leak uni-directional key updates) UE scheme to achieve the same security result.

4.1 Equivalence for Trivial Win Conditions

We prove four equivalence of the trivial win conditions. The proofs of these equivalence lemmas follow the proof strategy in [8]. The trivial win conditions considered in this section are checked in a confidentiality game. In conclusion, if the trivial win conditions in the backward-leak uni-directional key update setting are triggered then the same trivial win conditions in the no directional key update setting would be triggered. We will use these trivial win equivalences to prove the relation in Theorem 1.

Lemma 1 (Equivalence for Trivial Win Condition “$C^* \cap C^* \neq \emptyset$“). For any sets $\mathcal{K}, \mathcal{T}, \mathcal{C} \subseteq \{0, \ldots, l\}$, we have $K^*_{\text{b-uni}} \cap C^*_{\text{b-uni},}\text{uni} \neq \emptyset \iff K^*_{\text{o-uni}} \cap C^*_{\text{o-uni},}\text{uni} \neq \emptyset$.

Proof. For any $\mathcal{K}, \mathcal{T}, \mathcal{C}$, we compute $K^*_{\text{b-uni}}, K^*_{\text{o-uni}}, C^*_{\text{b-uni},}\text{uni}$ and $C^*_{\text{o-uni,}\text{uni}}$ using Equations (1, 3).

Note that $K^*_{\text{o-uni}} = K \subseteq K^*_{\text{b-uni}}$ and $C^*_{\text{o-uni,}\text{uni}} \subseteq C^*_{\text{b-uni,}\text{uni}}$, so $K^*_{\text{o-uni}} \cap C^*_{\text{o-uni,}\text{uni}} \subseteq K^*_{\text{b-uni}} \cap C^*_{\text{b-uni,}\text{uni}}$. It suffices to prove

$$K^*_{\text{b-uni}} \cap C^*_{\text{b-uni,}\text{uni}} \neq \emptyset \Rightarrow K^*_{\text{o-uni}} \cap C^*_{\text{o-uni,}\text{uni}} \neq \emptyset.$$
1, ..., e₃} ⊆ T) are known to the adversary. Hence, the adversary can update the challenge-equal ciphertext ĉₜ from epoch e to epoch e₃ to know ĉₜ, even in the no directional key update setting. Which means e₃ ∈ K ∩ Cₜ⁺, we have Kₜ⁺ ∩ Cₜ⁺ ≠ ∅.

**Lemma 2 (Equivalence for Trivial Win Condition “* e∈T⁺ or O.Upd(ẽ) is queried”*). For any K, T, C. Suppose Kₜ⁺ ∩ Cₜ⁺ = ∅, where kk ∈ {b-uni, no}, cc = uni, then

*e∈T⁺ or O.Upd(ẽ) is queried* ⇐⇒ *e∈T⁺ or O.Upd(ẽ) is queried.*

**Proof.** The event “O.Upd(ẽ) is queried” is independent of the key and ciphertext updates, so this trivial win condition is either triggered or not triggered in all variants of a security notion. It is sufficient to show that if the challenge token is known to the adversary in the backward-leak uni-directional key update setting, then it is also known to the adversary in the no-directional key update setting.

We know that the challenge epoch ẽ ∈ C, so ẽ ∉ Kₜ⁺ for any kk-key updates, where kk ∈ {b-uni, no}. Since the adversary does not know the key kₜ, which is needed to infer the update token Δₜ, so token Δₜ cannot be inferred by the adversary. Therefore, ẽ ∈ Tkk if and only if ẽ ∈ T. Hence ẽ ∈ T  mãžô ẽ ∈ Tₜ⁺  mãžô ẽ ∈ Tₜ⁺.

**Lemma 3 (Equivalence for Trivial Win Condition “* (c, e) ∈ L⁺*”). For any sets K, T, C ⊆ {0, ..., e}. Suppose Kₜ⁺ ∩ Cₜ⁺ = ∅, then

*(c, e) ∈ L⁺ₜ⁺*  mãžô *(c, e) ∈ L⁺ₜ⁺.*

**Proof.** We have (ĉₜ, e) ∈ L⁺  mãžô e ∈ C⁺. Note that Cₜ⁺ ∩ Cₜ⁺ = ∅. It suffices to prove

* e ∈ Cₜ⁺  mãžô e ∈ Cₜ⁺.*

Suppose e ∉ C, otherwise, we have done the proof. Since e ∈ Cₜ⁺ and Kₜ⁺ ∩ Cₜ⁺ = ∅, so e ∉ Kₜ⁺ and therefore e ∉ K. As a result, token Δₜ is known to the adversary, which is used to infer ĉₜ. Since the adversary does not know the key kₜ, which is needed to infer the update token Δₜ, so token Δₜ cannot be inferred by the adversary, i.e. e ∈ T. If e ∈ T, then we repeat the same discussion as above and have that e − 1 ∈ Cₜ⁺ and e − 1 ∈ T. Iteratively, we know that there exists an epoch before e, say e₄, such that e₄ ∈ C and e₄ + 1, ..., e ∈ T. Hence, the adversary can update the challenge-equal ciphertext ĉₜ from epoch e₄ to epoch e to know ĉₜ, i.e. e ∈ Cₜ⁺.

**Lemma 4 (Equivalence for Trivial Win Condition “* (m', e) ∈ Q⁺*”). For any sets K, T, C ⊆ {0, ..., e}. Kₜ⁺ ∩ Cₜ⁺ = ∅, then *(m', e) ∈ Q⁺ₜ⁺*  mãžô *(m', e) ∈ Q⁺ₜ⁺*. **Proof.** The proof is similar to the proof of Lemma 3. We use the property that *(m', e) ∈ Q⁺  mãžô e ∈ C⁺.*
4.2 Relations among Confidentiality Notions

Jiang [9] showed that the bi-directional key update and the forward-leak uni-directional key update variants of the same confidentiality notions are equivalent, and confidentiality in the no-directional key update is strictly stronger than that in the above mentioned two key update settings. However, the relation between the backward-leak uni-directional key update and the no-directional key update variants of the same confidentiality notion is missing in the previous work. We complete the relations among the eight variants of the same confidentiality notion, they are described as in Fig. 3. This is proven via Theorem 1, given below, and results in [9].

Recall discussions in Section 3.2 and 3.3, where we consider update settings in \{\( (b\text{-uni}, uni) \), \( (no, uni) \) \} are in one class and the rest update settings are in another class. Intuitive observation shows notions in the same class are equivalent and the prior class is strictly stronger than the latter. Interestingly, the result showed in Fig. 3 matches with this intuition and provides a rigorous proof.

\[
(b\text{-uni}, uni)\text{-notion} \xrightarrow{\text{Theorem 1}} (no, uni)\text{-notion} \xrightarrow{\ast} (kk, cc)\text{-notion}
\]

Fig. 3: Relations among the eight variants of the same confidentiality notion, where \( \text{notion} \in \{ \text{detIND-UE-CPA, randIND-UE-CPA, detIND-UE-CCA, randIND-UE-CCA} \} \), \( kk \in \{ \text{no, b-uni, f-uni, bi} \} \) and \( cc \in \{ \text{uni, bi} \} \), the notation of \( (kk, cc) \) are except for values in \{\( (b\text{-uni}, uni) \), \( (no, uni) \)\}. Results in work of [9] are marked with \( \ast \).

In Theorem 1, we compare two types of UE notions: the no-directional key update setting and the backward-leak uni-directional setting. To illustrate the intuition for our equivalence between these two settings we have two scenarios: the first is where the adversary has corrupted a key located in an epoch earlier that the challenge epoch, and the second is where the adversary has corrupted a key located in an epoch later that the challenge epoch. In the first scenario, the adversary cannot update the key even if she had all update token because in both update settings forward key update is impossible. Similarly, the challenge ciphertext cannot be downgraded. Thus, in the first scenario, both update settings are equivalent. For the second scenario, we have that the adversary will win the game in both update settings if she has access to enough tokens, because now the key can either be downgraded, using the tokens, or the challenge ciphertext can be upgraded, using the same tokens. So, in the second scenario, both update settings are equivalent.

**Theorem 1.** Let \( \text{UE} = (\text{Setup}, \text{Next}, \text{Enc}, \text{Dec}, \text{Upd}) \) be an updatable encryption scheme and \( \text{notion} \in \{ \text{detIND-UE-CPA, randIND-UE-CPA, detIND-UE-CCA, randIND-UE-CCA} \} \). For any \( (b\text{-uni}, uni)\text{-notion} \) adversary \( A \) against \( \text{UE} \), there exists a \( (no, uni)\text{-notion} \) adversary \( B_1 \) against \( \text{UE} \) such that

\[
\text{Adv}^{(b\text{-uni}, uni)\text{-notion}}_{\text{UE}, A}(\lambda) = \text{Adv}^{(no, uni)\text{-notion}}_{\text{UE}, B_1}(\lambda).
\]
Proof. The proof follows the same method as the proof of Theorem 3.1 in [9]. We construct a reduction $B_1$ running the (no, uni)-notion experiment which will simulate the responses of queries made by the (b-uni, uni)-notion adversary $A$. The reduction will send all queries received from $A$ to its (no, uni)-notion challenger, and forwarding the responses to $A$. Eventually, the reduction receives a guess from $A$ and forwards it to its own challenger. In the end, the (no, uni)-notion challenger evaluates whether or not the reduction wins, if a trivial win condition was triggered the reduction is considered as losing the game. This final win evaluation will be passed to the adversary $A$.

By the equivalences of trivial win conditions in Section 4.1 (Lemma 1 to 4), if $A$ does not trigger the trivial win conditions in the (b-uni, uni)-notion game, then the reduction will not trigger the trivial win conditions in the (no, uni)-notion game either. If $A$ triggers the trivial win conditions in the (b-uni, uni)-notion game, then the reduction will also trigger the trivial win conditions in the (no, uni)-notion game. Therefore, the reduction perfectly simulates the responses to adversary $A$. And we have $\text{Adv}_{UE, B_1}(\lambda) = \text{Adv}_{UE, A}(\lambda)$.

5 UE from Key Homomorphic PKE

We use key homomorphic PKE schemes to construct UE schemes in this section. The idea of key homomorphic by Boneh et al. [3] inspired this construction idea. Our key homomorphic is more general than the key homomorphic construction presented by Boneh et al. [3], where we can rotate information based on a public value and a secret value instead of two secret values.

5.1 Key Homomorphic PKE

We define key homomorphic PKE in this section, which will be used to build updatable encryption schemes in the later two sections.

Definition 5 (Key Homomorphic PKE). We say public key encryption $\text{PKE} = (\text{KG}, \text{Enc}, \text{Dec})$ is key homomorphic if:

1. there exists an efficiently computable secret key to public key algorithm $[\cdot] : SK \rightarrow PK$ such that for any $(sk, pk) \leftarrow \text{KG}(\lambda)$, the following two pairs of distributions are statistically close:

$$\text{(sk, [sk])} \approx \text{(sk, pk)}.$$

2. $\{(sk_1 \otimes sk_2, [sk_1 \otimes sk_2]) \mid sk_1, sk_2 \leftarrow SK\} \approx \{(sk, [sk]) \mid sk \leftarrow SK\}$. (5)

where $\otimes$ is an operation (which can be addition, multiplication, etc.) over the secret key space.
2. there exists an efficiently computable key homomorphic to key algorithm defined as:
   KHK : \( SK \times PK \rightarrow PK \) takes a secret key and a public key as input and outputs a public key, such that for any secret key \( sk_2 \in SK \) and public key \( pk_1 \in PK \), the following two distributions are statistically close:
   \[
   KHK(sk_2, pk_1) \approx [sk_1 \otimes sk_2],
   \]
   where \( sk_1 \) is the secret key of \( pk_1 \).

3. there exists an efficiently commutable key homomorphic to ciphertext algorithm KHC, defined as:
   KHC : \( SK \times CS \rightarrow CS \) takes a secret value and a ciphertext as input and outputs a ciphertext, such that for any keys \( (sk_1, pk_1) \leftarrow KG \), secret value \( sk_2 \overset{\$}{\leftarrow} SK \), and any message \( m \), the following two distributions are statistically close:
   \[
   (c, KHC(sk_2, c)) \overset{\$}{\approx} (c, Enc([sk_1 \otimes sk_2], m)),
   \]
   where \( c = Enc(pk_1, m) \).

Remark 1. Equation (4) guarantees that we can compute a public key from a secret key. Equation (5) makes sure the distribution generated from the homomorphism of keys is statistically close to the original key distribution. Equation (6) allows us to compute a new public key from a secret key (assume \( sk_2 \)) and an old public key (assume \( pk_1 = [sk_1] \)), the underlying secret key of the newly generated public key matches the output of the homomorphic operation applied to the input secret keys \( (sk_1 \) and \( sk_2 \)). Equation (7) enables us to compute a new ciphertext from one public key to another public key without changing the underlying message.

Examples of key homomorphic public key encryption schemes are ElGamal encryption and LWE-based PKE (for some parameter choice) schemes. The security of such PKE schemes are based on DDH and LWE problems, resp..

- ElGamal encryption: Let \( G \) be a cyclic group of order \( q \) with generator \( g \).
  For any secret key \( x \in Z_q \), the corresponding public key is \( [x] = g^x \). Given any public value \( [y] \) and any secret value \( x \), we can compute \( KHK(x, [y]) = [y]^x = g^{xy} = [x \otimes y] \). Here, \( \otimes \) is multiplication of integers and function \( KHK \) is computed as \( KHK(x, y) = y^x \). For any ciphertext \( c = ([rx], [r] \cdot m) \), any \( (y, [y]) \overset{\$}{\leftarrow} KG \) and a random value \( r' \overset{\$}{\in} Z_q^* \), note that \( [xy] = KHK(y, [x]) = [x]^y \), then \( KHC(y, c) = (c_1' \cdot [xy]^{r'}, [r'] \cdot c_2) = ([r + r']xy), [r + r'] \cdot m \) is a ciphertext encrypted under public key \( [xy] \) with the same underlying message \( m \) of the original ciphertext \( c \).

- Lattice based PKE: Denote \([s] = as + e \), then we can compute \( KHK(s, [t]) = [s] + [t] \approx [s \otimes t] \), the right side public key has a bigger error. Here, \( \otimes \) is group addition. For any ciphertext \( c = (ar, [s]r + e' + m) \) and any \( (t, [t]) \overset{\$}{\leftarrow} KG \), note that \( [s \otimes t] \approx [s] + [t], \) then \( KHC(t, c) = (c_1 + ar', c_2 + c_1t + [s \otimes t]r' + e'' \approx (a(r + r'), [s \otimes t]r' + e' + e'') + m \) is a ciphertext encrypted under public key \([s \otimes t] \).
5.2 Bi-Directional UE from Key Homomorphic PKE

We construct a UE scheme $PKE_{UE}$, which is constructed from a key homomorphic PKE scheme $PKE$, the construction is described in Fig. 4. Note that the next key pair $(sk_{e+1}, pk_{e+1})$ is statistically close to a real key pair generated from $PKE.KG(\lambda)$ by Equation (4) and (5). Note that $RISE$ [11] and $LWE_{UE}$ [8] are constructed by this method, they are built from ElGamal encryption and LWE-based PKE.

**Setup** $(\lambda) :$

$(sk_1, pk_1) \leftarrow PKE.KG(\lambda)$

**Enc** $(pk_e, m) :$

$c_e \leftarrow PKE.ENC(pk_e, m)$

**Dec** $(sk_e, c_e) :$

$m' \leftarrow PKE.DEC(sk_e, c_e)$

**Upd** $(\Delta_{e+1}, c_e) :$

$c_{e+1} \leftarrow PKE.KHC(\Delta_{e+1}, c_e)$

Fig. 4: $PKE_{UE} = (\text{Setup}, \text{Next}, \text{Enc}, \text{Dec}, \text{Upd})$ is a UE scheme constructed from a key homomorphic PKE PKE.

**Correctness.** The correctness of $PKE_{UE}$ follows from the correctness of $PKE$. It is sufficient to prove that the updated ciphertext is a valid ciphertext which keeps the same underlying message as the original ciphertext. Since $PKE$ is key homomorphic (see Definition 5), we have that $c_{e+1} = PKE.KHC(\Delta_{e+1}, c_e) \approx \text{Equation (7)}$

$PKE.ENC([sk_e \otimes \Delta_{e+1}], m) = PKE.ENC(pk_{e+1}, m)$.

Next, we prove that the UE scheme constructed above satisfies the weaker variant of rand-IND-UE security, namely the (bi, bi)-rand-IND-UE security.

**Theorem 2.** Let $PKE_{UE}$ be the updatable encryption scheme described in Fig. 4. For any (bi, bi)-rand-IND-UE adversary $A$ against $PKE_{UE}$, there exists an IND-CPA adversary $B_2$ against $PKE$ such that

$$\text{Adv}_{PKE_{UE}, A}^{\text{bi, bi}-\text{randIND-UE-CPA}}(\lambda) \leq \ell^3 \cdot \text{Adv}_{PKE, B_2}^{\text{IND-CPA}} + \text{negl}(\lambda),$$

where $\ell$ is the upper bound on the last epoch.

**Proof.** In this proof, we use three steps to reach our desired goal. In the first step, we play a hybrid game over epochs, where the reduction constructs one hybrid for each epoch. In hybrid $i$, to the left of epoch $i$ the game returns an updated ciphertext as the challenge output, to the right of epoch $i$ it gives an encryption of the challenge input message as output. Therefore, we can move the (bi, bi)-randIND-UE-CPA game from left to right across the epoch space. In the second step, we apply the firewall technique [4, 10, 11] (recall the discussion in...
Section 3.2) so that we can construct a reduction (in step 3) playing the IND-CPA
game by simulating the hybrid game to the adversary. Due to space limitations,
the detailed security proof is shown in App. B.

5.3 Uni-Directional UE from Key and Message Homomorphic PKE

In this section, we construct a UE scheme with backward-leak uni-directional
key update, which is called UNIUE. The UNIUE scheme is built from a key
and message homomorphic PKE scheme. Recall that key homomorphic PKE is
defined in Definition 5. The message homomorphic PKE is defined as the standard
homomorphic encryption, we name it message homomorphic to distinguish two
types of homomorphism (key homomorphism and message homomorphism) in
this paper.

Definition 6 (Message Homomorphic PKE). We say public key encryption
PKE = (KG, Enc, Dec) is message homomorphic if for any message m_1, m_2 ∈ M
and any public key pk, Enc(pk, m_1) ⊗ Enc(pk, m_2) = Enc(pk, m_1 ⊕ m_2), where ⊗
is an operation over the ciphertext space and ⊕ is an operation over the message
space.

Notation. For a vector A = (a_1, ..., a_n), we define \([A]\) = ([a_1], ..., [a_n]). For
vectors A, B and function f, we define \(f(A, B) = (f(a_1, b_1), ..., f(a_n, b_n))\).

Constructing Uni-Directional UE. We construct a backward-leak uni-directional
key update and uni-directional ciphertext update UE scheme UNIUE from a
key and message homomorphic PKE scheme. The construction is described in
Fig. 5. The idea of this construction is that only the public value pk_{e+1, e+1} is
included in the update token ∆_{e+1}, secret key sk_{e+1, e+1} is not included, in other
words, no information of this secret key can be revealed from the token. We
can deploy this key pair to protect the confidentiality in the new epoch. The
detailed construction is shown in Fig. 5. When epoch period turns into the next
epoch period, the new epoch key will increase one key element. That is, epoch
key k_e has e pairs of secret key and public key, epoch key k_{e+1} has e + 1 pairs of
secret key and public key. To update a ciphertext, we use the difference of sk_e
and sk_{e+1} (except for the last element) to move encryption of random elements
from epoch e to epoch e + 1. Due to PKE is message homomorphic, we can
perform a re-randomization to refresh the underlying random values. Then, we
add an encryption of a new random value, which is encrypted under pk_{e+1, e+1},
to the updated ciphertext. This new random value can be used to hide the
message. Note that if we do not include this additional randomness, the above
construction is bi-directional.

Correctness. It is sufficient to prove that the updated ciphertext is a ciphertext
in epoch e+1, with underlying message m. We compute the updated ciphertext
as follows. \(c^1 = PKE.KHC(\Delta^{sk_e, c_e}_{e+1}, c_e, 1) ≈ PKE.Enc([sk_e \otimes \Delta^{sk_{e+1}}_{e+1}], R_e)\)
\textbf{Setup}(\lambda) :
\[
\begin{align*}
(s_{k1,1}, p_{k1,1}) &\leftarrow \text{PKE.KG}(\lambda) \\
\text{return} &\left(s_{k1,1}, p_{k1,1}\right)
\end{align*}
\]

\textbf{Next}(sk_e):
\[
\begin{align*}
\text{parse} &\ sk_e = (s_{k_e,1}, \ldots, s_{k_e,e}) \\
\text{for} &\ i \in \{1, \ldots, e\} \text{ do} \\
(\Delta_i, |\Delta_i|) &\leftarrow \text{PKE.KG}(\lambda) \\
s_{k_e+1,i} &\leftarrow s_{k_e,i} \oplus \Delta_i \\
p_{k_e+1,i} &\leftarrow [s_{k_e+1,i}] \\
(s_{k_e+1,e+1}, p_{k_e+1,e+1}) &\leftarrow \text{PKE.KG}(\lambda) \\
s_{k_e+1} &\leftarrow (s_{k_e+1,1}, \ldots, s_{k_e+1,e+1}) \\
p_{k_e+1} &\leftarrow (p_{k_e+1,1}, \ldots, p_{k_e+1,e+1}) \\
\Delta^0_{e+1} &\leftarrow (\Delta_1, \ldots, \Delta_e) \\
\Delta_{e+1} &\leftarrow (\Delta^0_{e+1}, p_{k_e+1,e+1}) \\
\text{return} &\ (s_{k_e+1}, p_{k_e+1})
\end{align*}
\]

\textbf{Enc}(pk_e, m):
\[
\begin{align*}
R_e &\leftarrow \mathcal{M}^{e+1} \\
\text{parse} &\ R_e = (r_{e,1}, \ldots, r_{e,e}) \\
c_{e,1} &\leftarrow \text{PKE.Enc}(pk_e, R_e) \\
c_{e,2} &\leftarrow r_{e,1} \oplus \cdots \oplus r_{e,e} \oplus m \\
\text{return} &\ (c_{e,1}, c_{e,2})
\end{align*}
\]

\textbf{Dec}(sk_e, c_e):
\[
\begin{align*}
\text{parse} &\ c_e = (c_{e,1}, c_{e,2}) \\
R_e &\leftarrow \text{PKE.Dec}(sk_e, c_{e,1}) \\
\text{parse} &\ R_e = (r_{e,1}, \ldots, r_{e,e}) \\
m' &\leftarrow c_{e,2} \oplus^{-1} (r_{e,1} \oplus \cdots \oplus r_{e,e}) \\
\text{return} &\ m'
\end{align*}
\]

\textbf{Upd}(\Delta_{e+1}, c_e):
\[
\begin{align*}
\text{parse} &\ \Delta_{e+1} = (\Delta^0_{e+1}, p_{k_e+1}) \\
\text{parse} &\ c_e = (c_{e,1}, c_{e,2}) \\
R &\leftarrow \mathcal{M}^{(e+1)\times 1} \\
c^e &\leftarrow \text{PKE.KHC}(\Delta^0_{e+1}, c_{e,1}) \\
c_{e+1,1} &\leftarrow (c^e, 0) + \text{PKE.Enc}(pk_{e+1,1}, R) \\
p_{e+1} &\leftarrow (r_{e,1}, \ldots, r_{e,e}) \\
c_{e+1,2} &\leftarrow c_{e,2} \oplus r_{1} \oplus \cdots \oplus r_{e,e} \\
c_{e+1} &\leftarrow (c_{e+1,1}, c_{e+1,2}) \\
\text{return} &\ c_{e+1}
\end{align*}
\]

**Fig. 5:** UNIUE = (Setup, Next, Enc, Dec, Upd) is a UE scheme built from a key and message homomorphic PKE scheme PKE. \oplus is an operation on the message space and assume its inverse operation exists.

and \(c_{e+1,1} \leftarrow (c^1, 0) + \text{PKE.Enc}(pk_{e+1,1}, R) = \text{PKE.Enc}(pk_{e+1,1}, (R_e, 0) + R)\). Denote \(R_{e+1} = (r_{e,1,1}, \ldots, r_{e,1,e+1}) = (R_e, 0) + R\), due to the randomness of \(R\) we know \(R_{e+1}\) is a random vector. Furthermore, \(c_{e+1,2} \leftarrow c_{e,2} \oplus r_{1} \oplus \cdots \oplus r_{e+1} = r_{e,1} + \cdots + r_{e,1,e+1} \oplus m\). Therefore, the updated ciphertext \(c_{e+1}\) is a valid ciphertext in epoch \(e+1\). Note that we consider epoch bounded UE, which implies that the noise in lattice-based constructions will not grow too large.

**Backward-Leak Uni-Directional Key Updates.** Any new key \(sk_{e+1}\) has a random key element \(s_{k_{e+1,1}}, e+1\) which is independent from the update token \(\Delta_{e+1}\) and the previous key \(sk_e\); hence, any adversary cannot upgrade keys.

**Uni-Directional Ciphertext Updates.** If there exists an adversary \(A\) which can infer a valid previous ciphertext \(c_e\) from token \(\Delta_{e+1}\) and ciphertext \(c_{e+1}\). Then we claim that \(A\) can use this ability to win the IND$-$CPA game for PKE. Initially, \(A\) receives a public key \(pk_{e+1,e+1}\) from its IND$-$CPA challenger. \(A\) generates a secret key \(sk_e\) and a token \(\Delta_{e+1}\) as algorithms of UNIUE specify. \(A\) computes the public key \(pk_{e+1}\) and token \(\Delta_{e+1}\) by embedding the public key \(pk_{e+1,e+1}\). Suppose \(A\) asks for a challenge query with input \(r_{e+1,e+1}\), it gets the challenge ciphertext \(\hat{c}\). Then \(A\) uses \(r_{e+1,e+1}\) and \(\hat{c}\) to create a ciphertext in epoch \(e+1\), say \(\hat{c}_{e+1}\). \(A\) can move the ciphertext \(\hat{c}_{e+1}\) to a ciphertext \(\hat{c}\) by the token \(\Delta_{e+1}\).
and then decrypt $\tilde{c}_e$ by the secret key $sk_e$. Eventually, $A$ compares the message with the message used when it creates $\tilde{c}_{e+1}$. If they are the same then $A$ guesses it received a real encryption from its IND$^-$CPA challenger, otherwise, it guesses it received a random ciphertext from its IND$^-$CPA challenger. The advantage of $A$ winning the IND$^-$CPA game is equal to the probability of $A$ successfully downgrades the ciphertext $c_{e+1}$ to a ciphertext $c_e$ by the token $\Delta_{e+1}$.

Next, we prove that the UE scheme constructed in Fig. 5 satisfies the stronger variant of rand-IND-UE security, namely the (b-uni, uni)-rand-IND-UE security.

**Theorem 3.** Let UNIUE be the updatable encryption scheme described in Fig. 5. For any (b-uni, uni)-rand-IND-UE adversary $A$ against UNIUE, there exists an IND$^-$CPA adversary $B_3$ against PKE such that

$$Adv_{(b,\text{uni}),\text{uni}}^{\text{rand-IND-UE}}_A(\lambda) \leq 2l^2 \cdot Adv_{\text{PKE},B_3}^{\text{IND-CPA}} + \text{negl}(\lambda),$$

where $l$ is the upper bound on the last epoch.

**Remark 2.** The difference between proving a UE scheme is (b-uni, uni)-rand-IND-UE secure and (b, bi)-rand-IND-UE secure are trivial win conditions, and how the reduction runs the simulation.

Consider the backward-leak uni-directional key updates variant of a confidentiality notion, there will exist a relaxed insulated region (recall the discussion in Section 3.2). Assume $\tilde{e}$ is the challenge epoch, where key in this epoch should not be corrupted. Hence, there exists an epoch after $\tilde{e}$, say $\text{fwr}$, such that keys in epoch $\{\tilde{e}, \ldots, \text{fwr}\}$ and token in epoch $\text{fwr} + 1$ are not corrupted, in addition, tokens in epoch $\{\tilde{e} + 1, \ldots, \text{fwr}\}$ are corrupted. By Definition 4, we know that epoch region $\{\tilde{e}, \ldots, \text{fwr}\}$ is a relaxed insulated region. Tokens and keys before $\tilde{e}$ can be corrupted, which will not trigger the trivial win condition. Because knowing any token and any key before epoch $\tilde{e}$ will not break the confidentiality in epoch $\tilde{e}$, the key element $sk_{\tilde{e}, \tilde{e}}$ in $sk_{\tilde{e}}$ is an independent and random value compared to all previous update tokens and keys, hence, ciphertexts in epoch $\tilde{e}$ are random looking without the knowledge of the key element $sk_{\tilde{e}, \tilde{e}}$.

**Proof.** The proof is similar to the proof in Theorem 2. We construct hybrid games and apply the firewall technique on relaxed insulated regions.

**Step 1.** In the initial hybrid games, we move challenges from real to random over epochs. We construct a sequence of hybrid games $H_1, \ldots, H_l$. For $b \in \{0, 1\}$, experiment $H^b$ is defined as follows, if the adversary asks for a challenge-equal ciphertext by the $O.$Chall query or a $O.$UpdC query, with challenge input $(\bar{m}, \bar{c})$, in epoch $j$:

- if $j \leq i$, for $b = 1$ return an updated ciphertext of $\bar{c}$, for $b = 0$ return (an updated ciphertext which is updated from) an encrypted ciphertext of $\bar{m}$.
- if $j > i$, return a random ciphertext.
Thus $H^1_i$ is $\text{Exp}^{\text{(b-uni,uni)}}\cdot \text{randIND-UE-CPA}^{-1}$, i.e. all challenge responses are challenge-equal ciphertexts of $\text{Upd}(\hat{c})$. And $H^0_i$ is $\text{Exp}^{\text{(b-uni,uni)}}\cdot \text{randIND-UE-CPA}^0$, i.e. all challenge responses are challenge-equal ciphertexts of $\text{Enc}(\tilde{m})$. Notice that $H^0_0 = H^0_1$, in which all challenge ciphertexts are random ciphertexts. We have

$$\text{Adv}^{\text{(b-uni,uni)}}\cdot \text{randIND-UE-CPA} = |\text{Pr}[H^1_i = 1] - \text{Pr}[H^0_i = 1]|$$

$$\leq \sum_{i=1}^l |\text{Pr}[H^1_i = 1] - \text{Pr}[H^0_{i-1} = 1]| + \sum_{i=1}^l |\text{Pr}[H^0_i = 1] - \text{Pr}[H^0_{i-1} = 1]|.$$  

**Step 2.** We define a new game $G_i$, that is the same as game $H_i$, except for the game randomly picks a number $\text{fwr} \sim \mathbb{Z} \rightarrow \{0, \ldots, l\}$. If the adversary corrupts a key in the sequence of epochs $(i, \ldots, \text{fwr})$ or a token in epoch $\text{fwr} + 1$, the game aborts. This loss is upper bounded by $l$.

Then we have $|\text{Pr}[H^b_i = 1] - \text{Pr}[H^b_{i-1} = 1]| \leq l|\text{Pr}[G^b_i = 1] - \text{Pr}[G^b_{i-1} = 1]|$.

**Step 3.** In this step, we prove that $|\text{Pr}[G^b_i = 1] - \text{Pr}[G^b_{i-1} = 1]| = \text{Adv}^{\text{IND$\$$-CPA}}_\text{PKE,B_3} + \text{negl}(\lambda)$. Assume $\mathcal{A}_i$ is an adversary attempting to distinguish $G^b_i$ from $G^b_{i-1}$. We construct a reduction $\mathcal{B}_3$, detailed in Fig. 6, playing the IND$\$$-CPA game by simulating the responses to adversary $\mathcal{A}_i$.

Initially, the reduction guesses a number $\text{fwr}$. If $\mathcal{A}_i$ corrupts $k_i, \ldots, k_{\text{fwr}}$, or $\Delta_{\text{fwr}+1}$ the reduction aborts the game.

A summary of the technical simulations are as follows.

- In the setup phrase, $\mathcal{B}_3$ generates all keys and tokens, except for $k_i, \ldots, k_{\text{fwr}}$, $\Delta_{\text{fwr}+1}$, as follows.
  - The key pairs and tokens outside of the relaxed insulated regions are generated as in $G_i$.
  - The public keys within relaxed firewalls are generated by embedding public key $pk$ to the $i$-th term of $pk_i$, where $pk$ is the public key received from its IND$\$$-CPA game.
- To simulate non-challenge ciphertexts: $\mathcal{B}_3$ uses public keys to simulate encrypted ciphertexts and updated ciphertexts.
- To simulate challenge-equal ciphertexts in an epoch that is:
  - $j < i$: $\mathcal{B}_3$ uses public keys to simulate encryption and updating.
  - $j = i$: $\mathcal{B}_3$ embeds the challenge ciphertext $\hat{c}$ received from its IND$\$$-CPA challenger to the challenge-equal ciphertext in epoch $i$. More precisely, suppose $\mathcal{B}_3$ receives a challenge query $\mathcal{O}$.Chall with input $(\tilde{m}_0, \tilde{e})$ in challenge epoch $\hat{e}$, where the underlying message of $\tilde{e}$ is $\tilde{m}_1$. $\mathcal{B}_3$ sends a random value $r_i$ to its IND$\$$-CPA challenger and obtains $\hat{c}_3$. $\mathcal{B}_3$ embeds $\hat{c}_3$ to the $i$-th term of the challenge ciphertext and uses $r_i$ and $m_i$ to compute the last term of the challenge ciphertext. Afterwards, $\mathcal{B}_3$ returns $\tilde{c}_i$.
For $b \in \{0, 1\}$ $B_3$ plays
\[\text{INDS-CPA game by running } A_i:\]
\begin{align*}
\text{receive } pk \\
\text{do } b' \leftarrow A^\text{randex}_{\text{setup}}(\lambda) \\
\text{if ABORT occurred or } C^n \cap K^n \neq \emptyset \\
\text{or } i > \text{fwr} \text{ then} \\
\text{return } b' \\
\end{align*}
\[\text{Setup}(\lambda)\]
\begin{align*}
\Delta_i &\leftarrow U; \ e \leftarrow 1; \ \text{phase, twf} \leftarrow 0; \\
\mathcal{L}, \tilde{\mathcal{L}}, C, K, T &\leftarrow \emptyset \\
\text{fwr} &\leftarrow \{0, \ldots, i\} \\
(sk_1, pk_{1,1}) &\leftarrow \text{PKE.KG}(\lambda) \\
\text{for } j \in \{2, \ldots, i-1\} &\text{ do} \\text{Next}(sk_{j-1}) \\
\text{for } j \in \{1, \ldots, \text{fwr}\} &\text{ do} \\
\text{parse } pk_{j,1} = (pk_{j,1,1}, \ldots, pk_{j,1,j-1}) &\text{ for } t \in \{1, \ldots, j-1\} \text{ do} \\text{PK.E.KG}(\lambda) \\
pk_{j,t} &\leftarrow \text{KHK}(\Delta_i, pk_{j-1,t}) \\
\text{if } j = i &\text{ then} \\
pk_{i,i} &\leftarrow pk \\
\text{else} &\text{ for } t \in \{1, \ldots, \text{fwr}+1\} \text{ do} \\
\Delta_{j}^k &\leftarrow (\Delta_1, \ldots, \Delta_{j-1}) \\
pk_i &\leftarrow (pk_{j,1}, \ldots, pk_{j,i}) \\
\text{for } j = \text{fwr}+1 &\text{ do} \\text{PK.E.KG}(\lambda) \\
\text{for } t \in \{1, \ldots, \text{fwr}+1\} &\text{ do} \\
(sk_{\text{fwr}+1,1}, pk_{\text{fwr}+1,1}) &\leftarrow \text{PKE.KG}(\lambda) \\
sk_{\text{fwr}+1} &\leftarrow (sk_{\text{fwr}+1,1}, \ldots, sk_{\text{fwr}+1,\text{fwr}+1}) \\
pk_{\text{fwr}+1} &\leftarrow (pk_{\text{fwr}+1,1}, \ldots, pk_{\text{fwr}+1,\text{fwr}+1}) \\
\text{for } j \in \{\text{fwr}+2, \ldots, i\} &\text{ do} \\text{Next}(sk_{j-1}) \\
\Delta_{j}(sk_{j}, pk_{j}) &\leftarrow \text{UNIQUE.Next}(sk_{j-1})
\end{align*}
\[\text{O.Enc}(m):\]
\begin{align*}
c_e &\leftarrow \text{UNIQUE.Enc}(pk_{i}, m) \\
\mathcal{L} &\leftarrow \mathcal{L} \cup \{(\cdot, c_e, e; m)\} \\
\text{return } c_e
\end{align*}
\[\text{O.Next}:\]
\begin{align*}
e &\leftarrow e+1
\end{align*}
\[\text{O.Upd}(c_{-1}):\]
\begin{align*}
\text{if } (\cdot, c_{-1}, e; 1; m) \notin \mathcal{L} &\text{ then} \\
\text{return } \perp \\
c_e &\leftarrow \text{UNIQUE.Enc}(pk_{i}, m) \\
\mathcal{L} &\leftarrow \mathcal{L} \cup \{(\cdot, c_e, e; m)\} \\
\text{return } c_e
\end{align*}
\[\text{O.Corr}(\text{inp}, \bar{e}):\]
\begin{align*}
\text{if } (\text{inp} = \text{key} \text{ and } \bar{e} \in \{i, \ldots, \text{fwr}\}) &\text{ or } (\text{inp} = \text{token} \text{ and } \bar{e} = \text{fwr}+1) \text{ then} \\
\text{ABORT} \\
\text{else} &\text{ do as } O.\text{Corr}(\text{inp}, \bar{e}) \text{ specifies}
\end{align*}
\[\text{O.Chall}(r_i, \tilde{c}_i):\]
\begin{align*}
\text{if } \text{phase} = 1 &\text{ then} \\
\text{return } \perp \\\n\text{phase} &\leftarrow 1; \tilde{e} \leftarrow e \\
\text{if } (\cdot, \tilde{e}, \bar{e}; 1; m_1) \notin \mathcal{L} &\text{ then} \\
\text{return } \perp \\
\text{for } j \in \{1, \ldots, i-1\} &\text{ do} \\
\tilde{c}_j &\leftarrow \text{UNIQUE.Enc}(pk_j, m_b) \\
\text{for } j = i &\text{ do} \\
r_i &\leftarrow \mathcal{M} \\
\text{Send } r_i \text{ to the IND$\delta$-CPA challenger,} \\
\text{get } \tilde{c}_b &\text{ parse } pk_i = (pk_{i,1}, \ldots, pk_{i,i}) \\
(\tilde{c}_{1,i}, \tilde{c}_{1,2}) &\leftarrow \text{UNIQUE.Enc}(pk_i, m_b) \\
\tilde{c}_{1,1} &\leftarrow (\tilde{c}_{1,i}, \tilde{c}_{1,2}) \\
\tilde{c}_{i,2} &\leftarrow \tilde{c}_{i,1} \oplus r_i \\
\tilde{c}_i &\leftarrow (\tilde{c}_{i,1}, \tilde{c}_{i,2}) \\
\text{for } j \in \{i+1, \ldots, i\} &\text{ do} \\
\tilde{c}_j &\leftarrow \mathcal{C} \cup \{j\} \\
\tilde{\mathcal{L}} &\leftarrow \tilde{\mathcal{L}} \cup \{\tilde{c}_j, j\} \\
\text{return } \tilde{c}_b
\end{align*}
\[\text{O.Upd}(\tilde{C}):\]
\begin{align*}
\text{if } \text{phase} = 1 &\text{ then} \\
\text{return } \perp \\
\tilde{\mathcal{L}} &\leftarrow \tilde{\mathcal{L}} \cup \{\tilde{c}_b\} \\
\text{return } \tilde{c}_b
\end{align*}

Fig. 6: Reduction $B_3$ for proof of Theorem 3.
to the adversary $A$. Again, by Equation (7), $B_3$ perfectly simulate the challenge ciphertexts in game $G_{i-1+\beta}$ except for a negligible probability $\text{negl}(\lambda)$.

- $j > i$: $B_3$ outputs random ciphertext as challenge ciphertext.

Eventually, $B_3$ receives the output bit from $A_i$ and if $A_i$ guesses it is playing $G_i$ (suppose it represents the guess response of $A_i$ is 1), then $B_3$ guesses it received a real encryption and sends 1 to its IND$^\text{-CPA}$ challenger. Otherwise, sends 0 to its IND$^\text{-CPA}$ challenger. We have $|\Pr[G_i = 1] - \Pr[G_i-1 = 1]| = \text{Adv}_{\text{PKE}}^\text{IND$^\text{-CPA}$} + \text{negl}(\lambda)$.

6 UE from Bootstrappable PKE

Bootstrappability can be used to refresh ciphertexts without revealing the underlying message, which implies updatable encryption.

**Definition 7 (Bootstrappable PKE).** We say a public key encryption $\text{BPKE} = (\text{KG}, \text{Enc}, \text{Dec})$ is bootstrappable if it can evaluate its own decryption circuit $D$. More precisely, there exists a re-encryption algorithm $\text{Recrypt}$ that takes a public key, the decryption circuit $D$, an encryption of a secret key and a ciphertext as input and outputs a new ciphertext, such that for any keys $(sk_1, pk_1), (sk_2, pk_2) \leftarrow \text{KG}(\lambda)$ and any message $m$, the following two distributions are statistically close:

$$(c, \text{Recrypt}(pk_2, D, \text{Enc}(pk_2, sk_1), c)) \approx (c, \text{Enc}(pk_2, m)),$$

where $c = \text{Enc}(pk_1, m)$.

Gentry [7, Chapter 4] constructed a re-encryption algorithm $\text{Recrypt}$ (see Fig. 7), which allows us to update a ciphertext under $pk_1$ to a ciphertext under $pk_2$.

**Recrypt**$(pk_2, D, (sk_{k,1}), c_1)$:

$\sigma_{k,1} \leftarrow \text{BPKE.Enc}(pk_2, c_1, j)$

$c_2 \leftarrow \text{BPKE.Evaluate}(pk_2, D, (sk_{k,1})'(\sigma_{k,1}))$

return $c_2$

Fig. 7: Recrypt algorithm. For any key pairs $(sk_1, pk_1), (sk_2, pk_2) \leftarrow \text{KG}(\lambda)$. Let $sk_{k,1}$ be the $j$-th bit of $sk_1$ and $sk_{k,1}' = \text{Enc}(pk_2, sk_{k,1})$. For any plaintext $m \in \mathcal{M}$, let $c_1 = \text{Enc}(pk_1, m)$, and $c_{1,j}$ denote the $j$-th bit of $c_1$. The output $c_2$ is an encryption of $\text{Dec}(sk_1, c_1) = m$ under $pk_2$.

The $\text{Recrypt}$ algorithm can be used to update ciphertext, where the update token is the encryption of the current secret key $sk_e$ under the next public key $pk_{e+1}$. We construct an updatable encryption scheme $\text{BPKEUE}$ from $\text{BPKE}$, which is shown in Fig. 8.
Setup(λ) :
\((sk_1, pk_1) \leftarrow \text{BPKE} . \text{KG}(\lambda)\)
\text{return } (sk_1, pk_1)

Next(sk_e) :
\((sk_{e+1}, pk_{e+1}) \leftarrow \text{BPKE} . \text{KG}(\lambda)\)
\Delta_{e+1} \leftarrow \text{BPKE} . \text{Enc}(pk_{e+1}, sk_e)
\text{return } \Delta_{e+1}, (sk_{e+1}, pk_{e+1})

Enc(pk_e, m) :
\(c_e \leftarrow \text{BPKE} . \text{Enc}(pk_e, m)\)
\text{return } c_e

Dec(sk_e, c_e) :
\(m' \leftarrow \text{BPKE} . \text{Dec}(sk_e, c_e)\)
\text{return } m'

Upd(\Delta_{e+1}, c_e) :
\(c_{e+1} \leftarrow \text{BPKE} . \text{Recrypt}(pk_{e+1}, D, \Delta_{e+1}, c_e)\)
\text{return } c_{e+1}

Fig. 8: BPKEUE = (Setup, Next, Enc, Dec, Upd) is a UE scheme constructed from a bootstrappable PKE scheme BPKE.

**Correctness.** The correctness of encrypting then decrypting follows the correctness of the underlying PKE scheme. The correctness of encrypting then updating then decrypting is because of the bootstrappability of BPKE scheme, the re-encrypted ciphertext is a new ciphertext encrypted under the new public key with the same message. Note that we consider epoch bounded UE, which implies that the noise will not grow too large.

**Backward-Leak Uni-Directional Key Updates.** We can see the earlier key sk_e and token \(\Delta_{e+1}\) as a plaintext and the corresponding ciphertext under public key \(pk_{e+1}\). Hence, any adversary can not obtain the secret key \(sk_{e+1}\).

**Uni-Directional Ciphertext Updates.** If there exists an adversary which can infer a valid previous ciphertext \(c_e\) from token \(\Delta_{e+1}\) and ciphertext \(c_{e+1}\). Then we claim that the adversary can use this ability to win the IND-CPA game for BPKE.

Initially, the adversary receives a public key \(pk_{e+1}\) from its IND-CPA challenger. The adversary generates a secret key \(sk_e\) and computes the token \(\Delta_{e+1}\) by the knowledge of the public key \(pk_{e+1}\) and the secret key \(sk_e\). Then the adversary can move the challenge ciphertext \(\tilde{c}_{e+1}\) (encrypted under \(pk_{e+1}\)) to a ciphertext \(\tilde{c}_e\) by the token \(\Delta_{e+1}\). Note that \(\tilde{c}_{e+1}\) and \(\tilde{c}_e\) have the same underlying message. Therefore, the adversary can decrypt \(\tilde{c}_e\) by \(sk_e\) and then compare the output with the challenge messages to win the IND-CPA game.

**Remark 3.** Nishimaki [13] observed that if the update token \(\Delta_{e+1}\) is generated by the old secret key \(sk_e\) and the new public key \(pk_{e+1}\), such UE schemes may have backward-leak uni-directional key updates. The reason is that it will be difficult to break the confidentiality in epoch \(e + 1\) with only the knowledge of \(pk_{e+1}, \Delta_{e+1}\) and \(sk_e\), no information about \(sk_{e+1}\) is revealed.

We observed that such UE schemes may have uni-directional ciphertext updates as well. The proof idea is similar to the proof of BPKEUE has uni-directional ciphertext updates. We claim that if such UE schemes do not have uni-directional ciphertext updates, then any adversary can break the confidentiality of such UE schemes without the knowledge of any epoch key. If an adversary aims to attack the confidentiality in epoch \(e + 1\), it can generate a new secret key in epoch \(e\).
Then the adversary computes the token \( \Delta_{e+1} \) by the generated secret key \( sk_e \) and the public key \( pk_{e+1} \). It can move ciphertexts from epoch \( e + 1 \) to epoch \( e \) by token \( \Delta_{e+1} \) and then decrypt it by \( sk_e \) to win the confidentiality in epoch \( e + 1 \).

Next, we prove that the UE scheme constructed in Fig. 8 is secure under the \((b\text{-}uni, uni)\)-rand-IND-UE notion.

**Theorem 4.** Let \( \text{BPKEUE} \) be the UE scheme described in Fig. 8. For any \((b\text{-}uni, uni)\)-rand-IND-UE adversary \( \mathcal{A} \) against \( \text{BPKEUE} \), there exists an IND-CPA adversary \( \mathcal{B}_4 \) against \( \text{BPKE} \) such that

\[
\text{Adv}_{\text{BPKEUE}, \mathcal{A}}^{(b\text{-}uni, uni)\text{-randIND-UE-CPA}}(\lambda) \leq 2l^3 \cdot \text{Adv}_{\text{BPKE}, \mathcal{B}_4}^{\text{IND-CPA}} + \text{negl}(l),
\]

where \( l \) is the upper bound on the last epoch.

Before proving the above theorem, we prove a lemma first. In the IND game, any adversary can only ask for tokens and encryption oracles.

**Lemma 5.** Let \( \text{BPKEUE} \) be the UE scheme described in Fig. 8. For any IND adversary \( \mathcal{A} \) against \( \text{BPKEUE} \), there exists an IND-CPA adversary \( \mathcal{B}_5 \) against \( \text{BPKE} \) such that

\[
\text{Adv}_{\text{BPKEUE}, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{IND}}(\lambda) \leq 2l \cdot \text{Adv}_{\text{BPKE}, \mathcal{B}_5}^{\text{IND-CPA}},
\]

where \( l \) is the upper bound on the last epoch.

**Proof (of Lemma 5).** The proof is similar to the proof of Theorem 4.2.3 in [7].

We use a hybrid games to move tokens from real to random. In hybrid \( i \), the last \( l - i \) tokens are random from the real keys. More precisely, for \( i \in \{1, \ldots, l\} \) let \( \mathcal{G}_i \) be a game that is identical to the IND game against \( \text{BPKEUE} \), except for all \( j > i \):

\[
(sk_j', pk_j') \xleftarrow{\$} \text{KG}(\lambda), \Delta_j \xleftarrow{\$} \text{Enc}(pk_j, sk_{j-1}').
\]

Note that the last \( l - i \) tokens are not related to the real keys.

We have that \( \mathcal{G}_i \) is the IND game and the advantage of any adversary winning \( \mathcal{G}_0 \) is upper bounded by \( l \cdot \text{Adv}_{\text{BPKE}, \mathcal{B}_4}^{\text{IND-CPA}} \). Next, we claim that for any \( i \in \{1, \ldots, l\} \),

\[
\Pr[\mathcal{G}_i = 1] - \Pr[\mathcal{G}_{i-1} = 1] = \text{Adv}_{\text{BPKE}, \mathcal{B}_4}^{\text{IND-CPA}}.
\]

Suppose \( \mathcal{A} \) is an adversary aiming to distinguish \( \mathcal{G}_i \) from \( \mathcal{G}_{i-1} \). We construct a reduction \( \mathcal{B}_5 \) playing the IND-CPA game (against \( \text{BPKE} \)) and simulating the response to \( \mathcal{A} \). Initially, \( \mathcal{B}_5 \) receives a public key \( pk \) from its IND-CPA challenger. \( \mathcal{B}_5 \) generates key pairs as in \( \mathcal{G}_i \) except for it embeds \( pk \) to \( pk_i \). It generates a random key pair \( (sk'_i, pk'_i) \xleftarrow{\$} \text{KG}(\lambda) \), sets \( (m_0, m_1) = (sk'_{i-1}, sk_{i-1}) \) and sends \( (m_0, m_1) \) to its challenger. The challenger flips a coin \( \beta \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\} \) and returns the encryption of \( m_\beta \). \( \mathcal{B}_5 \) sets the received challenge ciphertext as \( \Delta_i \). Note that \( \mathcal{B}_5 \) perfectly simulates public keys and tokens in \( \mathcal{G}_{i-1+\beta} \) to \( \mathcal{A} \). When \( \mathcal{A} \) asks for a challenge query on \( (\tilde{m}_0, \tilde{m}_1) \), \( \mathcal{B}_5 \) flips a coin \( b \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\} \) and sends the encryptions of \( \tilde{m}_b \) to \( \mathcal{A} \). Eventually, \( \mathcal{A} \) submit a guess, if \( \mathcal{A} \) guesses it is \( \mathcal{G}_i \) then \( \mathcal{B}_5 \) returns 1 to its challenger, otherwise, \( \mathcal{B}_5 \) returns 0.
Since $B_5$ perfectly simulate $G_{i-1+\beta}$ to $A$. The probability of $A$ is able to distinguish which game it is playing is equal to $\text{Adv}^{\text{IND-CPA}}_{\text{BPKE}B_5}$.

Proof (of Theorem 4). We use firewall technique and construct a sequence of hybrid games to move challenges from left to right over the relaxed insulated regions. Define game $G_i$ as $(b\text{-uni}, \text{uni})\text{-randIND-UE-CPA}$ game, except for

- The game randomly choose a number $fwr \leftarrow \{0, ..., l\}$. If $fwr$ is not the i-th right firewall, returns a random bit for $b'$. This loss is upper bounded by $l$.
- To the left side of epoch $fwr$, the game returns a ciphertext with respect to $\overline{c}$, to the right side of epoch $fwr$ returns a encryption of $\overline{m}$.

If $fwr$ is guessed correct, then $G_0$ is $\text{Exp}^{(b\text{-uni}, \text{uni})\text{-randIND-UE-CPA}-0}_{\text{BPKEUE}}$ and $G_l$ is $\text{Exp}^{(b\text{-uni}, \text{uni})\text{-randIND-UE-CPA}-1}_{\text{BPKEUE}}$. So we can bound the $(b\text{-uni}, \text{uni})\text{-randIND-UE-CPA}$ advantage by the advantage of distinguishing $G_0$ and $G_l$.

\[ \text{Adv}^{(b\text{-uni}, \text{uni})\text{-randIND-UE-CPA}}_{\text{BPKEUE}, A}(\lambda) \leq \sum_{i=1}^{l} |\Pr[G_i = 1] - \Pr[G_{i-1} = 1]|. \]

Notice that if $G_{i-1}$ and $G_i$ have the same right firewall $fwr$, then they are the same game, hence, we assume $G_{i-1}$ and $G_i$ have different right firewall. Suppose $A_i$ is an adversary attempting to distinguish $G_{i-1}$ from $G_i$. For all queries concerning epochs outside of the i-th relaxed insulated region ($\{i, ..., fwr\}$) the responses will be equal in either game. We construct a reduction $B_4$ playing the IND game (within the epoch region $\{i, ..., fwr\}$) for BPKEUE and will simulate the responses of queries made by $A_i$. Initially, the reduction guesses a numbers $fwr$. If $A_i$ corrupts $k_i, ..., k_{fwr}, \Delta_{fwr+1}$ the reduction aborts the game. A summary of the technical simulations are as follows.

- In the setup phrase, $B_4$ generates all keys and tokens, except for $k_i, ..., k_{fwr}, \Delta_{fwr+1}$, as follows.
  - The key pairs and tokens outside of the relaxed insulated regions are generated as in $G_i$.
  - The public key within firewalls are generated by embedding public keys $(pk_i, ..., pk_{fwr})$ and tokens $(\Delta_{i+1}, ..., \Delta_{fwr})$, which are received from the IND challenger.
- To simulate non-challenge ciphertexts: $B_4$ uses public keys to simulate encrypted ciphertexts and updated ciphertexts. Due to updated ciphertext is statistically close to the fresh encryption of the same underlying message, the adversary notice this change with negligible probability.
- To simulate challenge-equal ciphertexts in an epoch that is:
  - $j < i$ or $j > fwr$: $B_4$ uses public keys to simulate encryption and updating.
  - $j \in \{i, ..., fwr\}$: $B_4$ sends $(\overline{m_0}, \overline{m_1})$ to its IND challenger and forwards the response to $A_i$, where $\overline{m_1}$ is the underlying message of $\overline{c}$.
Eventually, $\mathcal{A}_i$ sends a guess. If $\mathcal{A}_i$ guesses it is playing $\mathcal{G}_{i-1}$ then $\mathcal{B}_4$ guesses 0 to its IND challenger. Otherwise, $\mathcal{B}_4$ sends 1 to its IND challenger. Note that $\mathcal{B}_4$ perfectly simulates $\mathcal{G}_{i-1}$ to $\mathcal{A}_i$ when its challenger encrypts $\bar{m}_0$ and perfectly simulates $\mathcal{G}_i$ to $\mathcal{A}_i$ when its challenger encrypts $\bar{m}_1$.

\[
\text{Adv}^{(b\text{-}\text{uni, uni})\text{-rand} \text{IND-UE-CPA}}(\lambda) \leq l^2 \cdot \text{Adv}^{\text{IND-BPKEUE}, \mathcal{B}_4} + \text{negl}(l),
\]

Combing the result of Lemma 5, we have the desired result.

References


A Public Key Encryption

We define public key encryption (PKE) and describe two variants (left or right and real or random) of indistinguishability under chosen-plaintext attack (IND-CPA and IND$-CPA) for PKE. Note that IND$-CPA implies IND-CPA.

Definition 8 (PKE). A public key encryption scheme PKE consists of three PPT algorithms (KG, Enc, Dec) such that

- The key generation algorithm KG(λ) takes a security parameter λ as input, and outputs a secret and public key pair (sk, pk).
- The encryption algorithm Enc(pk, m) takes a public key pk and a message m as input, and outputs a ciphertext c.
- The decryption algorithm Dec(sk, c) takes a secret key sk and a ciphertext c as input, and outputs a message m.

PKE is correct if for any (sk, pk) ← KG(λ) and any message m, we have

\[ m = \text{Dec}(sk, \text{Enc}(pk, m)) \]

Definition 9 (The IND-CPA Notion for PKE). Let PKE = (KG, Enc, Dec) be a public key encryption scheme. The IND-CPA advantage of any adversary A against PKE is

\[ \text{Adv}_{\text{IND-CPA}, PKE, A}(\lambda) = \left| \Pr[\text{Exp}_{\text{IND-CPA}, PKE, A}^1] - \Pr[\text{Exp}_{\text{IND-CPA}, PKE, A}^0] \right|, \]

where the experiment \text{Exp}_{\text{IND-CPA}, PKE, A}^b is given in Figure 9.

Definition 10 (The IND$-CPA Notion for PKE). Let PKE = (KG, Enc, Dec) be a public key encryption scheme. The IND$-CPA advantage of any adversary A against PKE is

\[ \text{Adv}_{\text{IND$-CPA}, PKE, A}(\lambda) = \left| \Pr[\text{Exp}_{\text{IND$-CPA}, PKE, A}^1] - \Pr[\text{Exp}_{\text{IND$-CPA}, PKE, A}^0] \right|, \]

where the experiment \text{Exp}_{\text{IND$-CPA}, PKE, A}^b is given in Figure 10.

\[ \exp_{\text{IND-CPA}, PKE, A}^b : \]
\[ (sk, pk) \leftarrow KG(\lambda) \]
\[ (m_0, m_1, \text{state}) \leftarrow A(pk) \]
\[ c_b \leftarrow \text{Enc}(pk, m_b) \]
\[ b' \leftarrow A(\text{state}, c_b) \]
\[ \text{return } b' \]

Fig. 9: The experiment \text{Exp}_{\text{IND-CPA}, PKE, A}^b for a PKE scheme PKE.

\[ \exp_{\text{IND$-CPA}, PKE, A}^b : \]
\[ (sk, pk) \leftarrow KG(\lambda) \]
\[ (m, \text{state}) \leftarrow A(pk) \]
\[ \text{if } b = 1 \text{ then} \]
\[ c_1 \leftarrow \text{Enc}(pk, m) \]
\[ \text{else} \]
\[ c_0 \leftarrow CS \]
\[ b' \leftarrow A(\text{state}, c_b) \]
\[ \text{return } b' \]

Fig. 10: The experiment \text{Exp}_{\text{IND$-CPA}, PKE, A}^b for a PKE scheme PKE.
B Security Proof of Theorem 2

We prove Theorem 2 by three steps.

Step 1. We construct a sequence of hybrid games \( H_1, ..., H_i \). For \( b \in \{0,1\} \), experiment \( H_i^b \) is defined as follows, if the adversary asks for a challenge-equal ciphertext by the \( O \).Chall query or a \( O \).UpdC query, with challenge input \( (\bar{m}, \bar{c}) \), in epoch \( j \):
- if \( j < i \), return an updated ciphertext of \( \bar{c} \),
- if \( j > i \), return (an updated ciphertext which is updated from) an encrypted ciphertext of \( \bar{m} \),
- if \( j = i \), for \( b = 1 \) return an updated ciphertext of \( \bar{c} \), for \( b = 0 \) return (an updated ciphertext which is updated from) an encrypted ciphertext of \( \bar{m} \).

Thus \( H_i^1 \) is \( \text{Exp}_{\text{PKEUE}, \mathcal{A}}^{(b, bi)\cdot \text{randIND-UE-CPA}-1} \), i.e. all challenge responses are challenge-equal ciphertexts of \( \text{Upd}(\bar{c}) \). And \( H_i^0 \) is \( \text{Exp}_{\text{PKEUE}, \mathcal{A}}^{(b, bi)\cdot \text{randIND-UE-CPA}-0} \), i.e. all challenge responses are challenge-equal ciphertexts of \( \text{Enc}(\bar{m}) \). Notice that \( H_{i+1}^1 = H_i^1 \). We have

\[
\text{Adv}_{\text{PKEUE}, \mathcal{A}}^{(b, bi)\cdot \text{randIND-UE-CPA}}(\lambda) = |\text{Pr}[H_i^1 = 1] - \text{Pr}[H_i^0 = 1]| = |\sum_{i=1}^l (\text{Pr}[H_i^1 = 1] - \text{Pr}[H_i^0 = 1])| \\
\leq \sum_{i=1}^l |\text{Pr}[H_i^1 = 1] - \text{Pr}[H_i^0 = 1]|.
\]

Step 2. In hybrid game \( H_i \), let \( \mathcal{A}'_i \) be an adversary trying to distinguish \( H_i^0 \) from \( H_i^1 \). For all queries concerning epochs other than \( i \) the responses will be equal in either game, so we assume that \( \mathcal{A}'_i \) asks for a challenge-equal ciphertext in epoch \( i \). Therefore, in the bi-directional variant of confidentiality notion there exist two epochs (denote \( \text{fwl}, \text{fwr} \)) around the epoch \( i \) such that no key in the sequence of epochs \( (\text{fwl}, ..., \text{fwr}) \) and no token in epochs \( \text{fwl} \) and \( \text{fwr} + 1 \) are corrupted.

Define a new game \( \mathcal{G}_i \) that is the same as game \( H_i \), except for the game randomly picks two numbers \( \text{fwl}, \text{fwr} \sim \{1, ..., l\} \). If the adversary corrupts a key in the sequence of epochs \( (\text{fwl}, ..., \text{fwr}) \) or a token in epochs \( \text{fwl} \) and \( \text{fwr} + 1 \), the game aborts. This loss is upper bounded by \( l^2 \). Then we have

\[
|\text{Pr}[H_i^1 = 1] - \text{Pr}[H_i^0 = 1]| \leq l^2 |\text{Pr}[G_i^1 = 1] - \text{Pr}[G_i^0 = 1]|.
\]

Step 3. In this step, we prove that \( |\text{Pr}[G_i^1 = 1] - \text{Pr}[G_i^0 = 1]| = \text{Adv}_{\text{PKE}}^{\text{IND-CPA}} \). Assume \( \mathcal{A}_i \) is an adversary trying to distinguish \( G_i^1 \) from \( G_i^0 \). We construct a reduction \( \mathcal{B}_2 \), detailed in Fig. 11, that is playing the \( \text{IND-CPA} \) game and will simulate the responses of queries made by adversary \( \mathcal{A}_i \) in \( \mathcal{G}_i \).

Initially, the reduction guesses two numbers \( \text{fwl}, \text{fwr} \). If \( \mathcal{A}_i \) corrupts \( k_{\text{fwl}}, ..., k_{\text{fwr}}, \Delta_{\text{fwl}}, \Delta_{\text{fwr}+1} \) the reduction aborts the game. A summary of the technical simulations are as follows.
\( B_2 \) plays IND-CPA game by running \( A_i \):

receive \( pk \)
do Setup
\( b' \leftarrow A_i^{\text{oracles}}(\lambda) \)
if ABORT occurred or \( C^* \cap K^* \neq \emptyset \) or \( i \notin \{\text{fwl}, \ldots, \text{fwr}\} \) then
\( b' \leftarrow \{0, 1\} \)
return \( b' \)

\( \text{Setup}(\lambda) \)
\( \Delta_j \leftarrow \perp; \ e \leftarrow 1; \ \text{phase, twf} \leftarrow 0; \ \mathcal{L}, \tilde{\mathcal{L}}, \tilde{\mathcal{C}}, \rho, \mathcal{T} \leftarrow \emptyset \)
\( \text{fwl}, \text{fwr} \leftarrow \{0, \ldots, l\} \)
\( pk_{\text{fwr}} \leftarrow pk \)
for \( j \in \{\text{fwl}+1, \ldots, \text{fwr}\} \) do
\( \Delta_j \leftarrow \perp \)
\( pk_j \leftarrow \text{PKE.KHC}(\Delta_j, pk_{j-1}) \)
for \( j \in \{1, \ldots, \text{fwl}\} \cup \{\text{fwr}+1, \ldots, l\} \) do
\( (sk_j, pk_j) \leftarrow \text{PKE.KG}(\lambda) \)

\( O_{\text{Enc}}(m) : \)
\( c_0 \leftarrow \text{PKE.Enc}(pk_e, m) \)
\( \mathcal{L} \leftarrow \mathcal{L} \cup \{(\cdot, c_0, e; m)\} \)
return \( c_0 \)

\( O_{\text{Next}} : \)
\( e \leftarrow e+1 \)

\( O_{\text{Upd}}(c_{e-1}) : \)
if \((\cdot, c_{e-1}, e-1; m) \notin \mathcal{L} \) then
return \( \perp \)
\( c_e \leftarrow \text{PKE.Enc}(pk_e, m) \)
\( \mathcal{L} \leftarrow \mathcal{L} \cup \{(\cdot, c_e, e; m)\} \)
return \( c_e \)

\( O_{\text{Corr}}(\text{inp}, \hat{e}) : \)
if \((\text{inp}=\text{key} \text{ and } \hat{e} \in \{\text{fwl}, \ldots, \text{fwr}\}) \text{ or} \)
\((\text{inp}=\text{token} \text{ and } \hat{e} \in \{\text{fwl}, \text{fwr}+1\}) \) then
ABORT
else
do as \( O_{\text{Corr}}(\text{inp}, \hat{e}) \) specifies

\( O_{\text{Chall}}(\check{m}_0, \check{c}) : \)
if \( \text{phase} = 1 \) then
return \( \perp \)
\( \text{phase} \leftarrow 1; \ \hat{e} \leftarrow e \)
if \( (\cdot, \check{c}, \check{e}-1; \check{m}_1) \notin \mathcal{L} \) then
return \( \perp \)
send \((\check{m}_0, \check{m}_1)\) to the IND-CPA challenger, get \( \hat{e}_{\text{fwr}} \)
for \( j \in \{\text{fwl}+1, \ldots, l\} \) do
\( \hat{e}_j \leftarrow \text{PKE.Enc}(pk_j, \hat{m}_1) \)
\( \tilde{\mathcal{L}} \leftarrow \tilde{\mathcal{L}} \cup \{(\hat{e}_j, i)\} \)
for \( j \in \{1, \ldots, i\} \) do
\( \hat{e}_j \leftarrow \text{PKE.Enc}(pk_j, \check{m}_1) \)
\( \mathcal{L} \leftarrow \mathcal{L} \cup \{(\check{e}_j, j)\} \)
for \( j \in \{i+1, \ldots, l\} \) do
\( \hat{e}_j \leftarrow \text{PKE.Enc}(pk_j, \check{m}_0) \)
\( \mathcal{L} \leftarrow \mathcal{L} \cup \{(\check{e}_j, j)\} \)
return \( \hat{e}_a \)

\( O_{\text{Upd}}(\check{c}_a) : \)
if \( \text{phase} \neq 1 \) then
return \( \perp \)
\( \mathcal{L} \leftarrow \mathcal{L} \cup \{(\check{c}_a, e)\} \)
return \( \check{c}_a \)

Fig. 11: Reduction \( B_2 \) for proof of Theorem 2.
– In the setup phrase, $B_2$ generates all keys and tokens, except for $k_{fwl}, \ldots, k_{fwr}$, $\Delta_{fwl}, \Delta_{fwr+1}$, as follows.
  - The key pairs outside of firewalls are generated as running $\text{PKE.KG}(\lambda)$.
  - The public key within firewalls are generated as follows, $pk_{fwl} \leftarrow pk$,
    $pk_{j+1} \leftarrow \text{KHK}(\Delta_j+1, pk_j)$, where $pk$ is the public key received from its
    $\text{IND-CPA}$ challenger and $j \in \{fwl, \ldots, fwr-1\}$.

Equation (4), (5) and (6) makes sure the simulated key pairs $(sk_1, pk_1), \ldots, (sk_l, pk_l)$ are statistically close to the same key distributions in the game $G_i$. Hence, the adversary notices this change with negligible probability.

– To simulate non-challenge ciphertexts: $B_2$ uses public keys to simulate encrypted ciphertexts and updated ciphertexts. By Equation (7), we have that the distribution of updated ciphertexts is statistically close to the distribution of fresh encryption. Hence, $B_2$ perfectly simulate the non-challenge ciphertexts in game $G_i$ except for a negligible probability $\text{negl}(\lambda)$.

– To simulate challenge-equal ciphertexts in an epoch that is:
  - $j \neq i$: $B_2$ uses public keys to simulate encryption and updating.
  - $j = i$: $B_2$ embeds the challenge ciphertext $\tilde{c}$ received from its $\text{IND-CPA}$ challenger to the challenge-equal ciphertext in epoch $i$. More precisely, suppose $B_2$ receives a challenge query $\mathcal{O}\text{Chall}$ with input $(\bar{m}_0, \bar{c})$ in challenge epoch $\tilde{e}$, where the underlying message of $\bar{c}$ is $\bar{m}_1$. $B_2$ sends $(\bar{m}_0, \bar{m}_1)$ to its $\text{IND-CPA}$ challenger and obtains $\tilde{c}$. $B_2$ updates $\tilde{c}$ from epoch $fwl$ to $i$ and returns $\tilde{c}$ to the adversary $A$. Again, by Equation (7), $B_2$ perfectly simulate the challenge ciphertexts in game $G_i$ except for a negligible probability $\text{negl}(\lambda)$.

Eventually, $B_2$ receives the output bit from $A_i$ and forward it to its $\text{IND-CPA}$ challenger. Note that $B_2$ perfectly simulates the responses of queries made by adversary $A_i$ in game $G_i$ except for a negligible probability $\text{negl}(\lambda)$. We have $|\Pr[G_i^1 = 1] - \Pr[G_i^0 = 1]| = \text{Adv}^{\text{IND-CPA}}_{\text{PKE}} + \text{negl}(\lambda)$. 

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