Unprotected and Masked Hardware Implementations of Spook v2

Charles Momin; Gaëtan Cassiers; François-Xavier Standaert

Paper 2022/254

Unprotected and Masked Hardware Implementations of Spook v2

Charles Momin, Gaëtan Cassiers, and François-Xavier Standaert

Abstract

We describe FPGA implementations of the Spook candidate to the NIST lightweight cryptography competition in two flavors. First, unprotected implementations that exhibit the excellent throughput and energy consumption for the area target specified by the NIST benchmarking initiative. Second, protected implementations leveraging the leveled implementation concept that the Spook design enables and confirming the significant performance gains that it enables.

Metadata

Available format(s): PDF
Category: Implementation
Publication info: Preprint. MINOR revision.
Keywords: Side-Channel Attacks Masking Countermeasure Hardware Implementations
Contact author(s): charles momin @ uclouvain be
gaetan cassiers @ uclouvain be
fstandae @ uclouvain be
History: 2022-03-02: received
Short URL: https://ia.cr/2022/254
License: CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2022/254,
      author = {Charles Momin and Gaëtan Cassiers and François-Xavier Standaert},
      title = {Unprotected and Masked Hardware Implementations of Spook v2},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2022/254},
      year = {2022},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/254}
}