Paper 2022/254

Unprotected and Masked Hardware Implementations of Spook v2

Charles Momin, Gaëtan Cassiers, and François-Xavier Standaert

Abstract

We describe FPGA implementations of the Spook candidate to the NIST lightweight cryptography competition in two flavors. First, unprotected implementations that exhibit the excellent throughput and energy consumption for the area target specified by the NIST benchmarking initiative. Second, protected implementations leveraging the leveled implementation concept that the Spook design enables and confirming the significant performance gains that it enables.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Implementation
Publication info
Preprint. Minor revision.
Keywords
Side-Channel AttacksMasking CountermeasureHardware Implementations
Contact author(s)
charles momin @ uclouvain be
gaetan cassiers @ uclouvain be
fstandae @ uclouvain be
History
2022-03-02: received
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2022/254
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2022/254,
      author = {Charles Momin and Gaëtan Cassiers and François-Xavier Standaert},
      title = {Unprotected and Masked Hardware Implementations of Spook v2},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2022/254},
      year = {2022},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/254}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/254}
}
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