Paper 2022/1709

Dory: Faster Asynchronous BFT with Reduced Communication for Permissioned Blockchains

Zongyang Zhang, Beihang University
You Zhou, Beihang University
Sisi Duan, Tsinghua University
Haibin Zhang, Beijing Institute of Technology
Bin Hu, Beihang University
Licheng Wang, Beijing Institute of Technology
Jianwei Liu, Beihang University

Asynchronous Byzantine fault-tolerance (BFT) protocols (e.g., HoneyBadger and Dumbo family protocols) have received increasing attention as the consensus mechanism of permissioned blockchains, given their particular robustness against timing and performance attacks. However, there is a substantial performance gap before they can be applied in real systems. In this paper, we identify and address two critical issues, and design Dory, an asynchronous BFT consensus protocol with improved efficiency and lower communication compared to the state-of-the-art protocol, sDumbo. At the core of our approach are two new building blocks reducing the communication cost and a novel framework utilizing transactions with quadratic message complexity. We have implemented Dory and sDumbo in a new Golang library. Via a deployment using up to 151 participants on Amazon EC2, we show that Dory consistently outperforms sDumbo during both failure and failure-free scenarios. For instance, Dory has up to 5x the throughput of sDumbo in the failure-free scenario.

Available format(s)
Cryptographic protocols
Publication info
Byzantine fault-toleranceconsensusasynchronousblockchaincommunication complexityfairness
Contact author(s)
zongyangzhang @ buaa edu cn
youzhou @ buaa edu cn
duansisi @ tsinghua edu cn
haibin @ bit edu cn
hubin0205 @ buaa edu cn
lcwang @ bit edu cn
liujianwei @ buaa edu cn
2023-12-20: last of 4 revisions
2022-12-09: received
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      author = {Zongyang Zhang and You Zhou and Sisi Duan and Haibin Zhang and Bin Hu and Licheng Wang and Jianwei Liu},
      title = {Dory: Faster Asynchronous BFT with Reduced Communication for Permissioned Blockchains},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2022/1709},
      year = {2022},
      note = {\url{}},
      url = {}
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