Paper 2022/1519
Collusion-resistant broadcast encryption based on hidden RSA subgroups
Abstract
Public key broadcast encryption enables computations of ciphertexts, in which a single ciphertext is encrypted with regard to a set of recipients, and only the intended recipients can decrypt that ciphertext independently of each other and without interactions. A significant shortcoming of existing broadcast encryption schemes are long decryption keys comprising the public keys of pertaining recipients. Decryption therefore necessitates access to public keys, which requires key management and impacts computational and transmission overhead, accessibility, and storage. Moreover, a user description list referencing the pertaining recipients and their public keys must be appended to each ciphertext, which leads to the privacy implication of disclosing user/content-relations. Predominantly all broadcast encryption schemes are based on bilinear pairings. In this paper, we propose a collusion-resistant broadcast encryption scheme that is the first broadcast encryption scheme based on the factorization problem and hidden RSA subgroups. A novel feature is that the decryption key consists of a single element only, which leads to significantly reduced key management, improved computational efficiency, and elimination of the mentioned privacy issue.
Note: Postprint version
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Foundations
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. SECRYPT 2022
- Keywords
- Broadcast Encryption Public Key Cryptography RSA Subgroups
- Contact author(s)
- sigurd @ nr no
- History
- 2022-11-07: approved
- 2022-11-03: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2022/1519
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2022/1519,
author = {Sigurd Eskeland},
title = {Collusion-resistant broadcast encryption based on hidden RSA subgroups},
howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2022/1519},
year = {2022},
note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/1519}},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/1519}
}
