Collusion-resistant broadcast encryption
based on hidden RSA subgroups

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Abstract. Public key broadcast encryption enables computations of ciphertexts, in which a single ciphertext is encrypted with regard to a set of recipients, and only the intended recipients can decrypt that ciphertext independently of each other and without interactions. A significant shortcoming of existing broadcast encryption schemes are long decryption keys comprising the public keys of pertaining recipients. Decryption therefore necessitates access to public keys, which requires key management and impacts computational and transmission overhead, accessibility, and storage. Moreover, a user description list referencing the pertaining recipients and their public keys must be appended to each ciphertext, which leads to the privacy implication of disclosing user/content-relations. Predominantly all broadcast encryption schemes are based on bilinear pairings. In this paper, we propose a collusion-resistant broadcast encryption scheme that is the first broadcast encryption scheme based on the factorization problem and hidden RSA subgroups. A novel feature is that the decryption key consists of a single element only, which leads to significantly reduced key management, improved computational efficiency, and elimination of the mentioned privacy issue.

1 Introduction

Broadcast encryption allows a sender to securely share a message to multiple recipients using a single ciphertext, in contrast to conventional encryption where the sender needs to compute a single ciphertext for every recipient. The sender specifies a subset of recipients \( T \subseteq U \), and computes a ciphertext that can only be decrypted by that subset \( T \). A significant feature of broadcast encryption are no synchronisms and no interactions between the sender and recipients, nor among the recipients. Performance goals include minimum transmission overhead, computational effort, storage size, and key management.

Stateful broadcast encryption schemes maintain a state according to changes in group membership, in which the broadcast key must be updated to maintain forward and backward secrecy. With regard to performance, only those key elements that are affected by a user change should be updated, meaning that key

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updates depend on previous states in group membership. For this reason, stateful schemes tend therefore to have a better scalability than stateless broadcast encryption. An inherent disadvantage is that if a user misses an update message, he or she will be left out from subsequent sessions.

In stateless broadcast encryption, ciphertexts are computed for arbitrary composed groups of recipients \( T \subseteq \mathcal{U} \), independently of previous broadcasts as there is no updating of key material due to changes of group memberships. Early approaches were variations on combinatorial tree-based schemes, such as the subset cover framework [23], incurring complex key management and multiple encryptions in accordance with the pertaining user subsets. From 2005 and onwards, bilinear pairs are the predominant basis for stateless broadcast encryption [3, 8, 9, 11, 13, 18–21, 25–27, 29], where usually a single ciphertext header element is computed for a group \( T \) (or a complementary “revoked” subset \( R = \mathcal{U} \setminus T \)), while the decryption algorithm requires application of the private key \( x_i \) of a user \( P_i \) in the target subset \( T \subseteq \mathcal{U} \), the public key \( y_j \) of each of the other users \( P_j \) in \( T \), and some system parameters \( B \):

\[
\text{Dec}(x_i, \{y_j \mid P_j \in (T \setminus \{P_i\})\}, B)
\]

where the decryption key is composed of \((x_i, \{y_j \mid P_j \in (T \setminus \{P_i\})\})\), in which the number of elements equals the size of \( T \). This brings about the following issues:

1. **Complex decryption keys and key management.** Since decryption is only possible with a complete decryption key, all pertaining public keys must be accessible in order to decrypt. This necessity may be inconvenient and impractical in some settings, in particular if one or more such keys are not available at the time of decryption.

2. **Computational overhead.** The decryption key size is linear to the size of \( T \). This increases the storage and computational overhead accordingly.

3. **Transmission overhead.** Due to the complex decryption key, the encryption header must contain a list specifying the recipients \( T \) (or the revoked recipients \( R \)) and their public keys. This increases the transmission overhead accordingly.

4. **Privacy issues.** The list of recipients discloses to both intended and non-intended recipients all intended recipients. This may be just as sensitive information as the encrypted information itself, in particular if the sensitivity of the encrypted content is high.

To illustrate the last point; suppose a secure TV broadcasting scenario where each customer has access to a certain channel using his private key. The problem is that in order to decrypt the customers would have to know who else has paid for the specific subscription, which conflicts with the privacy of the individual subscribers.

**Anonymous broadcast encryption.** A variant of broadcast encryption is anonymous broadcast encryption of which there exist two subcategories: 1) Fully
anonymous broadcast encryption, where the intended recipients are not identi-
fiable by anyone, including intended and non-intended recipients [12]. 2) So-
called outsider anonymous broadcast encryption, where the intended recipients
are identifiable by intended recipients, but not identifiable by non-intended re-
cipients or someone else. Anonymous broadcast encryption schemes are inflicted
with efficiency issues, and in some with long ciphertexts whose number of ele-
ments is linear to $T$ (e.g., [17]).

Cryptographic primitives. Broadcast encryption is predominantly based on bi-
linear pairings and elliptic curve cryptography due to that bilinear pairings
have computational properties consistent with multi-party computations. Bi-
linear pairings has some disadvantages that are often overlooked. Cao et al. [5]
note that bilinear pairings require working parameters in the order of 1024 bits
to offer 80 bits security, in contrast to pure elliptic curve-based cryptographic
schemes, where such parameters are typically 160 bits. Bilinear pairings also
have a high computational load that reduces the advantages gained from the
smaller key sizes. There are furthermore some practical difficulties. Pairing-based
cryptography is considered hard to understand for most engineers and difficult
to implement. Hajny et al. [16] note that there are very few libraries available
supporting pairing-based cryptography, and that papers addressing implementa-
tion aspects of pairing-based cryptography are very rare. In addition to bilinear
mappings, lattices have been proposed as a cryptographic primitive for broad-
cast encryption [14, 28]. However, these schemes produce variable header sizes
and may not be practical. It is thus of great interest to explore the applica-
ability of other cryptographic primitives for broadcast encryption, in particular
well-known number-theoretic primitives. However, number-theoretic primitives
such as discrete logarithms and RSA assumptions have so far been considered
inapplicable to broadcast encryption.

Contributions. In this paper, we propose a fully collusion-resistant public key
broadcast encryption scheme with the following attractive features:

- Simplified key management. Decryption requires a single fixed-size private
  key-element only. This eliminates complex key management, since there is
  no need for other recipients’ public keys in order to decrypt, as is the case
  for previous stateless broadcast encryption schemes.

- Transmission efficiency. Since decryption requires only a single private key-
  element and no complex decryption key, the need for ciphertexts having an
  accompanying recipient list specifying the pertaining recipients and their
  public keys is eliminated. This reduces the transmission overhead accord-
  ingly. Compared to the RSA cryptosystem by having multiple encryptions
  for $N$ recipients, the reduced transmission overhead is in the order of 10-25
times (Table 1).

- Anonymity. Since there is no explicit need for recipient lists, the proposed
  scheme provides user anonymity.
Well-understood security assumption. The proposed broadcast encryption scheme is the first to be based on the factorization problem and hidden RSA subgroups.

Computational efficiency. Decryption requires just a single exponential modular operation.

To the best of our knowledge, our construction is the first collusion-resistant broadcast encryption scheme that is based on RSA subgroup security assumption. This cryptographic primitive is simpler and easier to implement than those based on bilinear pairings. Furthermore, the single-element decryption key is a great improvement compared to other broadcast encryption schemes, avoiding complex key management.

2 Related work

Earlier approaches to stateless broadcast encryption assume tree-based structures. Such an approach utilizing secret user keys is the “subset-cover” framework proposed by Naor et al. [23] in 2001, in which keys of user subsets are derived from a virtual tree structure. In 2002 Dodis et al. [10] proposed a public key broadcast encryption (PKBE) scheme building on [23]. Such solutions have complex key management and requires multiple encryptions for a single message, with one encryption for each relevant user subset.

Boneh, Gentry and Waters [3] proposed the first stateless and fully collusion resistant PKBE scheme that was the first of many subsequent PKBE schemes to rely on bilinear pairings, in which computations are in cyclic groups of fixed order that determines the ciphertext (header) size. The authors proposed a “basic” scheme (BGW\(_1\)) having a decryption key size linear to the number of recipients \(n\) and constant-size ciphertext of one header element, and a generalized variant BGW\(_2\) consisting of parallel instances of BGW\(_1\) achieving a tradeoff of \(O(\sqrt{n})\) decryption key size and \(O(\sqrt{n})\) ciphertext size. Identity-based variants of (BGW\(_1\)), having user identities as public keys, were proposed by Delerablée et al. [8] and Sakai [27] with the same performance properties as (BGW\(_1\)), except shorter public key length due to the identity-orientation. In 2007, Delerablée et al. [9] proposed a dynamic PKBE scheme that allows joining of new users without updating the group keys. The first adaptively secure PKBE scheme was proposed by Gentry and Waters [13], and later schemes are found in [18,20,21,26,29]. Some other PKBE schemes are found in [11,19,25].

All the mentioned schemes (other than tree subset-cover type schemes) are based on bilinear pairings. In addition to bilinear pairings, lattices is another cryptographic primitive that has been proposed for realizing PKBE [14,28].

As a sidenote, multi-receiver encryption (MRE) is different from Broadcast encryption, in which the sender encrypts \(n\) individual plaintexts, one for each recipient, resulting in \(n\) ciphertexts. MRE is probabilistic and its motivation is computational efficiency by reusing the same element of randomness for all ciphertexts [2] instead of generating unique random integers for each ciphertext.
3 Preliminaries

The proposed scheme assumes hidden RSA subgroups, which are realized by the following parameters.

- Let \( n = pq \) be the product of two large secret primes

\[
p = 2p_0 \prod_{j=1}^{[N/2]} p_j + 1 \quad \text{and} \quad q = 2q_0 \prod_{j=\lceil N/2 \rceil + 1}^{N} p_j + 1
\]  

(1)

where \( N \) is the number of recipients, \( \mathcal{P} = \{p_0, q_0, p_j \mid 1 \leq j \leq N \} \) are distinct large secret primes of approximately the same size, and \( (r_p, r_q) \) are optional arbitrary integers. The security level \( \lambda \) is determined by \( \lambda = |p_0| = |q_0| = |p_j| \).

- Let \( g = \alpha^2 \mod n \), where \( \alpha \) is a generator (i.e., primitive element) for a cyclic group in \( \mathbb{Z}_p^* \) and in \( \mathbb{Z}_q^* \).

- Let \( g_i, 1 \leq i \leq N \), denote a generator for the subgroup \( G_i \) of order \( p_0q_0p_i \), where

\[
g_i = g^{\bar{p}_i} \mod n \quad \text{and} \quad \bar{p}_i = \prod_{j=1, i \neq j}^{N} p_j
\]  

(2)

The order of \( G_i \) is hidden, since \( \mathcal{P} \) are secret.

- Select a large random secret integer \( \gamma \), whose bitsize is at least that of \( n \).

Next we present the relevant computational hardness assumptions.

3.1 Security assumptions

Background on subgroups on hidden orders. Groth [15] proposed using small subgroups in \( \mathbb{Z}_n^* \) of hidden orders. The purported motivation was efficiency purposes provided by the smaller subgroups for signature-, commitment- and encryption cryptosystems. In this regard, Groth proposed the decisional RSA security assumption, whose hardness is the difficulty to determine if an element pertains to a subgroup \( G < \mathbb{Z}_n^* \) or to \( \mathbb{Z}_n^* \). A similar decisional RSA subgroup assumption is formulated by Bourse et al. [4]. These assumptions are similar to high-residuosity assumptions, such as [22], and the composite residuosity assumption of the Paillier cryptosystem [24].

Secret subgroups can for instance be useful and convenient when designing cryptosystems and cryptographic protocols that are using secret encryption factors (or blinding factors), since knowing the subgroup order allows elimination of those encryption factors. This is seen in the mentioned Paillier cryptosystem, in which using the private key \( \lambda \) as an exponent to the ciphertext eliminates the encryption factor \( r^n \), due to that its subgroup order is \( \lambda \), i.e., \( (r^n)^\lambda \mod n^2 = 1 \). In our cryptosystem, subgroups of hidden orders are used for preventing disclosure of the secret integer \( \gamma \), as discussed below.
The DDH assumption. In addition to the factorization problem, the security also relies on the decisional Diffie-Hellmann assumption. Let $g$ be a generator for a sufficiently large subgroup $G$ of order $q$. Let $(a, b, c)$ be randomly selected large integers in $[1, \ldots, q]$. Given the triplet $(g, g^a, g^b, z_0)$, where $b$ is a uniform random bit. Let $z_0 = g^{ab}$ and $z_{1-b} = g^c$. The probability that $b$ is correctly determined is at least $\frac{1}{2} + \varepsilon$ for some value $\varepsilon$. If $g^{ab}$ and $g^c$ are indistinguishable, so that $b$ cannot be determined w.r.t. $z_0 = g^{ab}$, then $\varepsilon$ is negligible, meaning that the DDH assumption holds.

Congruences and subgroups of hidden orders. Consider the modular residue $\gamma_i = \gamma \mod p_0 p_q \bar{p}_i$, where $\bar{p}_i$ is defined in Eq. (2). The prime $p_k$ divides $\bar{p}_i$ if $i \neq k$. This implies the congruences $\gamma_i \equiv \gamma_j \pmod{p_k}$, $1 \leq i, j, k \leq N$, $i \neq j \neq k$, since $g$ is an arbitrary integer. Because $\gamma_i \equiv \gamma_j \pmod{p_k}$, we have likewise

\[
g_k \equiv \gamma_i^{\gamma_j} \equiv g_k^\gamma \pmod{n} \quad \text{for} \quad 1 \leq i, j, k \leq N, i \neq j \neq k
\]

where $g_k$ generates a RSA subgroup $G_k$. The congruences hold since the order of $G_k$ is $p_0 p_q p_k$, which divides the moduli of $\gamma_i$ and $\gamma_j$, $i \neq j \neq k$.

In the proposed scheme $\gamma$ is a secret integer. This means that for any two residues $\gamma_i = \gamma \mod p_0 p_q \bar{p}_i$ and $\gamma_j = \gamma \mod p_0 p_q \bar{p}_j$, $\gamma$ can be disclosed by means of the Chinese remainder theorem:

\[
\gamma \equiv \begin{cases} 
\gamma_i \pmod{p_0 p_q \bar{p}_i} \\
\gamma_j \pmod{p_i}
\end{cases}
\]

if and only if $(p_0, q_0, \bar{p}_i, p_i)$ are known. To prevent disclosure of $\gamma$, we use subgroups of hidden orders, in which all primes in $\mathcal{P}$ are secret. This ensures collusion resistance, preventing any subset of colluding users $\mathcal{R}$ from establishing $\gamma$.

On the special RSA moduli and the necessity of $(p_0, q_0)$. The composite modulus $n$ can be factorized more efficiently by utilizing the smaller search space of the subgroup $\mathbb{G}_n < \mathbb{Z}_n^*$ in conjunction with $g_i$ than by factoring methods such as general number field sieves [7]. The secret primes $(p_0, q_0)$, cf. Eq. (1), are necessary to prevent factorization of $n$ in conjunction with $g_i$, since the absence of these primes would allow trivial factorization.

Euler’s theorem states that $a^{\phi(n)} \equiv 1 \pmod{n}$, where $a$ is an arbitrary integer. Recall that $g_i$ is a generator of $G_i$ of order $p_0 p_q \bar{p}_i$. Accordingly, $g_i^{p_0 p_q \bar{p}_i} \equiv a^{\phi(n)} \equiv 1 \pmod{n}$, and $g_i^{p_0 p_q \bar{p}_i} = kn + 1$, where $k$ is a positive integer. Because of the composition of the RSA factor $p$, cf. Eq. (1), none of the primes composing $q$, i.e., $(q_0, \{p_i \mid \frac{\phi(n)}{2} + 1 \leq i \leq N\})$, divide $p - 1$. Thus

\[
g_i^{p_0 p_i} = a^{2p_0 p_i p} = k^i p + 1, \quad \text{where} \quad \left\lfloor \frac{N}{2} \right\rfloor + 1 \leq i \leq N
\]
Table 1: Parameter and header sizes

| $\lambda$ | $N$ | $||c||$ | $\delta$ |
|------------|-----|--------|--------|
| 80         | 10  | 1120   | 9,1    |
| 80         | 20  | 1920   | 10,7   |
| 80         | 50  | 4320   | 11,9   |
| 80         | 100 | 4320   | 12,3   |
| 112        | 10  | 2048*  | 13,1   |
| 112        | 20  | 2688   | 15,2   |
| 112        | 50  | 6048   | 16,9   |
| 112        | 100 | 6048   | 17,6   |
| 128        | 10  | 3072*  | 17,1   |
| 128        | 20  | 3072   | 20,0   |
| 128        | 50  | 6912   | 22,2   |
| 128        | 100 | 6912   | 23,1   |

and $k'$ is a positive integer. Using this fact, $p$ can be found if $p_0$ is known by

$$p = \gcd \left( (g_{p_0}^{p_0} \mod n) - 1, n \right)$$

The RSA security strength $\lambda$ (in number of bits) is therefore essentially equivalent to the size of $(p_0, q_0)$, i.e., $\lambda = ||p_0|| = ||q_0||$. However, consideration has to be taken when selecting an RSA modulus whose prime factors have a unusual composition. For example, the attack of Coron et al. [6] has a computational time and space complexity of $O(\sqrt{p_0})$, which gives the bound $||p_0|| = ||q_0|| \geq 2\lambda$. However, this attack imposes a vast space complexity for moderate security levels. For $\lambda = 100$ bits, the memory requirements amounts to the order of $2^{50} \approx 1.125 \cdot 10^{15}$, which is insurmountable for any practical realizations of the attack.

3.2 Parameter selection and header size

Taking into account the mentioned attack of Coron et al. [6], we suggest that $||p_0|| = ||q_0|| = 2\lambda$, and similarly $||p_j|| = \lambda$, $1 \leq j \leq N$, to ensure a sufficiently large distribution of subgroups and private keys. The header size $||c||$ is confined by the RSA modulus size $||n||$ and proportional the number of recipients $N$ and the security level $\lambda$, so that $||c|| = ||n|| = 4\lambda + N\lambda$. Table 1 shows header size as a function of $\lambda$ and $\lambda$, where $\delta = N||c^*||$ is the transmission efficiency compared to the RSA cryptosystem, i.e., the ratio between the size of $N$ RSA encryptions $||c^*||$ and the header size $||c||$ w.r.t. $N$ recipients for the same $\lambda$.

The number of recipients for an broadcast encryption and an RSA ciphertext for the same security level NIST suggests RSA modulus sizes of 1024 bits for 80 bits security level, 2048 bits for 112 bits security level, and 3072 bits for 128 bits security [1]. The asterisk indicates that the RSA modulus is incremented to match the NIST recommendations for those cases.
3.3 Broadcast encryption algorithms

A trusted authority is necessary for setting up an instance of the proposed scheme by computing long-term user keys. Let $U = \{P_1, \ldots, P_N\}$ denote a set of $N$ users. The scheme proposed consists of the following algorithms:

**Setup** The algorithm $(pk, sk) \leftarrow \text{Setup}(N, \lambda)$ inputs a security parameter $\lambda$ and the number of users $N$, and outputs $pk = (\{g_i, y_i \mid 0 \leq i \leq N\}, n)$ and $sk = \{\gamma_i \mid 1 \leq i \leq N\}$.

**Encryption** For any subset $T \subseteq U$, where $R = U \setminus T$ is the corresponding set of excluded (or revoked) users, the encryption algorithm $(k_T, z) \leftarrow \text{Enc}(\{g_j, y_j \mid P_j \in R\}, n)$ takes the public keys of the revoked users as input, and outputs a broadcast key $k_T$ and an encryption header $z$.

**Decryption** The decryption algorithm $k_T \leftarrow \text{Dec}(\gamma_i, z, n)$ takes the private key $\gamma_i$ (of which $P_i \in T$) and the encryption header $z$ as input, and outputs the broadcast key $k_T$.

The correctness property is met if for any subset $T \subseteq U$ the broadcast keys $(k'_T, z) \leftarrow \text{Enc}(\{g_j, y_j \mid P_j \in R\}, n)$ and $k''_T \leftarrow \text{Dec}(\gamma_i, z, n)$ match, i.e., $k'_T = k''_T$.

3.4 Security model

The security of the proposed scheme can be defined using a game between an adversary $A$ and a challenger $C$. The security model model lets the adversary define an arbitrary set of compromised users $S^*$ that is consistent with a set of revoked users $R = U \setminus T$, in which the adversary is permitted to obtain the private keys of a $S^*$, thus modelling a colluding set of user $R$.

**Setup.** The challenger computes $(pk, sk) \leftarrow \text{Setup}(N, \lambda)$ and obtains $N$ user keys. It then submits $PK$ to the adversary $A$.

**Key query.** The adversary queries the private keys for a subset $S^* \subset S$, where $S = \{1, \ldots, N\}$. The challenger submits $\{\gamma_i \mid i \in S^*\}$ to $A$.

**Challenge.** The challenger invokes $(k_S, z) \leftarrow \text{Enc}(g_j, y_j \mid j \in S^*, n)$. The challenger randomly pick a bit $b \in \{0, 1\}$, and sets $k_b = k_S$ and randomly sets $k_{1-b}$ in the space of possible session keys. It then submits the triplet $(z, k_0, k_1)$ to the adversary.

**Output.** The adversary outputs a bit $b'$. The adversary succeeds if $b = b'$.

The game can be conducted for any subset $S^* \subseteq S$. Let $\Pr(b' = b) = \frac{1}{2}$ be the probability that the adversary correctly outputs $b = b'$ after the game. We say that the broadcast encryption scheme is key indistinguishable if $|\Pr(b' = b) - \frac{1}{2}| \leq \varepsilon$, where $\varepsilon$ is negligible due to the difficulty of correctly distinguishing keys.
4 Public key broadcast encryption

A trusted authority (TA) is necessary for setting up system parameters and long-term user keys.

Setup. The TA conducts the following tasks to set up an instance of the system.

1. Compute \( n = pq \), where \( p \) and \( q \) are two large random secret primes selected in agreement with Eq. (1). The security parameter \( \lambda \) determines the minimum subgroup order \( \lambda = \min(p \in \mathbb{P}) \).
2. Select a large random secret integer \( \gamma \) whose size is larger than \( n \).
3. The private keys for \( P_i \in \mathcal{U} \) are computed as
   \[
   \gamma_i = \gamma \mod p_0 q_0 \bar{p}_i, \quad \text{where} \quad \bar{p}_i = \prod_{j=1}^{N} p_j
   \]
4. Let \( g \) be a generator of the multiplicative groups modulo \( p \) and \( q \). The corresponding public keys are computed as
   \[
   g_i = g^{\bar{p}_i} \mod n, \quad y_i = g_i^\gamma \mod n, \quad 0 \leq i \leq N
   \]

Each user \( P_i \in \mathcal{U} \) is assigned the key tuple \( (\gamma_i, g_i, y_i) \). Note that \( (g_0, y_0) \) are generic and to be applied for the special case \( \mathcal{R} = \emptyset \).

Encryption. Select a set of recipients \( T \subseteq \mathcal{U} \) that is the target for a secure broadcast, in which \( \mathcal{R} = \mathcal{U} \setminus T \) denotes a set of so-called revoked users. Generate a random secret integer \( r \in \mathbb{Z}_n^* \), and compute the encryption key
   \[
   k_T = \left( \prod_{j \in \mathcal{R}} g_j \right)^r \mod n
   \]
and the encryption header
   \[
   z = \left( \prod_{j \in \mathcal{R}} g_j \right)^r \mod n
   \]
For the special case \( \mathcal{R} = \emptyset \) then \( k_T = k_U = y_0^r \) and \( z = g_0^r \). Then the plaintext is encrypted using \( k_T \).

Decryption. At the receipt of \( z \), each user \( P_i \in T \) is able to restore \( k_T \) by the modular exponentiation
   \[
   k_T = z^{\gamma_i} \mod n
   \]
Note that there is only one public key element and private key element (for each user), and the header is only element.
4.1 Correctness

The following shows that the output of decryption algorithm (Eq. (5a)) is consistent with the output of the encryption algorithm (Eq. (5d)):

\[
k_{T,i} \equiv z^{\gamma_i} \equiv (\prod_{k \in R} g_k)^{\gamma_i} \equiv \prod_{k \in R} g_k^{\gamma_i} \equiv \prod_{k \in R} y_k^{\gamma_i} \equiv k_T \quad (5a)
\]

for \(\gamma_i, i \notin R\), in agreement with Eq. (3). The congruences hold since the order of the subgroup \(G_k\) generated by \(g_k\) is \(p_0q_0p_k\), and \(p_0q_0p_k\) divides the modulus \(p_0q_0p_k\) of \(\gamma_i\) for \(i \neq k\). Therefore, two users \(P_i, P_j \in T\), holding two distinct private keys \((\gamma_i, \gamma_j)\), will compute the same key \(k_T\).

**Example.** Let \(N = 3\) and \(n = (2p_0p_1+1)(2q_0p_2p_3+1)\). Then \(\gamma_1 = \gamma \mod p_0q_0p_2p_3\) and \(\gamma_2 = \gamma \mod p_0q_0p_1p_3\). Let \(P_3 \in R\) be a revoked user realized by means of \(g_3\) in the encryption step. The following expressions are in \(\mathbb{Z}_n^*\), and show that

\[
g_3^{\gamma_1} = g^{p_1p_3\gamma_1} = g^{p_1p_3(\gamma \mod p_0q_0p_2p_3)} \equiv g^{p_1p_3\gamma \mod p_0q_0p_2p_3} = g^{p_3\gamma}
\]

and

\[
g_3^{\gamma_2} = g^{p_1p_2\gamma_2} = g^{p_1p_2(\gamma \mod p_0q_0p_1p_3)} \equiv g^{p_1p_2\gamma \mod p_0q_0p_1p_3} = g^{p_1p_2\gamma}
\]

are hence equivalent. However, \(g_3^{\gamma_3}\) results in the incongruence

\[
g_3^{\gamma_3} = g^{p_1p_2\gamma_3} = g^{p_1p_2(\gamma \mod p_0q_0p_1p_2)} \neq g^{p_1p_2\gamma}
\]

This prevents \(P_3 \in R\) from computing the broadcast key.

5 Security analysis

In this section, we provide a security proof in the standard model.

**Theorem 1.** The proposed scheme is secure assuming that \(\lambda\) is sufficiently large.

**Proof.** The proof models interaction between an adversary \(A\) and a challenger \(C\), and proves collusion resistance concerning revoked users \(R = U\setminus T\).

**Setup.** A challenger \(C\) sets up an instance of the cryptosystem, and computes the public keys \(PK = \{g_i, y_i | 0 \leq i \leq N\}, n\) and private keys \(\{\gamma_i | 0 \leq i \leq N\}\) by invoking Setup\((N, \lambda)\). Since the random values \((\gamma, \mathcal{P})\) are chosen uniformly,
the keys have a distribution to that of an actual construction. \( C \) submits \( PK \) to \( A \).

**Key query.** \( A \) queries private user keys for a subset \( S^* \subset \{ 1, \ldots, N \} \). \( C \) submits \( \{ \gamma_i \mid i \in S^* \} \) to \( A \).

**Challenge.** Let \( \hat{g} = \prod_{j \in S^*} g_j \). The challenger invokes \( (k_S, z) \leftarrow \text{Enc}(g_j, y_j \mid j \in S^*, n) \), where \( k_S = \hat{g}^{y_r} \) and \( z = \hat{g}^c \).

The challenger randomly picks a bit \( b \in \{0, 1\} \), and sets \( k_0 = k_S \) and \( k_1 = \hat{g}^c \), where \( c \) is a large secret integer. It then submits the triplet \((z, k_0, k_1)\) to the adversary. This agree with the DDH challenge

\[
(\hat{g}, \hat{g}^\gamma, \hat{g}^r, \hat{g}^c)
\]

where \( \hat{g}^\gamma = \prod_{j \in S^*} y_j \), and \( \hat{g}^\gamma \) is a valid encryption key and \( \hat{g}^r \) is a valid header.

**Output.** Given

\[
(\hat{g}, \hat{g}^\gamma, z = \hat{g}^r, k_0 = \hat{g}^r, k_1 = \hat{g}^c)
\]

where \( \hat{g}^\gamma = \prod_{j \in S^*} y_j \). The computational problem of \( A \) is to determine if \( k_S \) is \( k_0 \) or \( k_1 \) with more than \( \frac{1}{2} + \epsilon \) probability, where \( \epsilon \) is a negligible probability. If the adversary succeeds at this, it is equivalent to that the adversary can solve the DDH problem in polynomial time. If the subgroups is sufficiently, this is known to be a computationally intractable problem.

Otherwise, given \((\hat{g}, \gamma)\) the adversary can compute \( \hat{g}^\gamma \). But since \( \gamma \) is secret and not known by the adversary, he can compute \( \gamma \) using the private keys/residues \((y_i, y_j \mid i, j \in S)\) according to

\[
\gamma \equiv \begin{cases} 
\gamma_i \pmod{p_0 q_0 \bar{p}_i} \\
\gamma_j \pmod{p_i}
\end{cases}
\]

in agreement with Eq. (4) and the Chinese remainder theorem. Since this requires \((p_0, q_0, \bar{p}_i, p_i)\), which are secret and unknown to the adversary. This requires that the adversary finds the exact subgroup orders and/or decomposes the the secret primes \((p, q)\), which means that the adversary will be able to solve the factorization problem. Assuming that \( \lambda \) and \( n \) are sufficiently large, this is known to be a computationally intractable problem. The adversary output a bit \( b' \), where the probability that \( b = b' \) is \( \frac{1}{2} + \epsilon \). Thus, the proposed scheme is secure assuming that \( \lambda \) is sufficiently large. \( \square \)

### 6 Conclusion

Existing stateless broadcast encryption schemes have some shortcomings, such as complex decryption keys, privacy issues, key management, and some transmission overhead. In this paper, we have proposed a novel broadcast encryption scheme that is based on the factorization problem and hidden RSA subgroups. The proposed scheme has some unique features. The decryption key consists only of a single-private key element, and no public keys of other recipients are needed
for decryption. An implication of the single-element decryption key is anonymity, since there is no need to attach a recipient list referencing their public keys to the ciphertexts, as is the case for schemes based on bilinear pairings. Hence, key management is utterly simplified, and transmission overhead is in this regard reduced. Future work includes to consider how other privacy-preserving group-oriented security applications can be built on hidden RSA subgroups, such as attribute-based broadcast encryption and group authentication.

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References


