CINI MINIS: Domain Isolation for Fault and Combined Security

Jakob Feldtkeller; Jan Richter-Brockmann; Pascal Sasdrich; Tim Güneysu

Paper 2022/1131

CINI MINIS: Domain Isolation for Fault and Combined Security

Jakob Feldtkeller

, Ruhr University Bochum

Jan Richter-Brockmann

, Ruhr University Bochum

Pascal Sasdrich

, Ruhr University Bochum

Tim Güneysu

, Ruhr University Bochum

Abstract

Observation and manipulation of physical characteristics are well-known and powerful threats to cryptographic devices. While countermeasures against passive side-channel and active fault-injection attacks are well understood individually, combined attacks, i.e., the combination of fault injection and side-channel analysis, is a mostly unexplored area. Naturally, the complexity of analysis and secure construction increases with the sophistication of the adversary, making the combined scenario especially challenging. To tackle complexity, the side-channel community has converged on the construction of small building blocks, which maintain security properties even when composed. In this regard, Probe-Isolating Non-Interference (PINI) is a widely used notion for secure composition in the presence of side-channel attacks due to its efficiency and elegance. In this work, we transfer the core ideas behind PINI to the context of fault and combined security and, from that, construct the first trivially composable gadgets in the presence of a combined adversary.

Metadata

Available format(s): PDF
Category: Implementation
Publication info: Published elsewhere. ACM CCS 2022
DOI: 10.1145/3548606.3560614
Keywords: Side-Channel Analysis Fault-Injection Analysis Combined Attacks Gadgets Probe-Isolating Non-Interference
Contact author(s): jakob feldtkeller @ rub de
jan richter-brockmann @ rub de
pascal sasdrich @ rub de
tim gueneysu @ rub de
History: 2022-08-31: approved; 2022-08-30: received; See all versions
Short URL: https://ia.cr/2022/1131
License: CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2022/1131,
      author = {Jakob Feldtkeller and Jan Richter-Brockmann and Pascal Sasdrich and Tim Güneysu},
      title = {{CINI} {MINIS}: Domain Isolation for Fault and Combined Security},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2022/1131},
      year = {2022},
      doi = {10.1145/3548606.3560614},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/1131}
}