Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2022/047

Short Pairing-Free Blind Signatures with Exponential Security

Stefano Tessaro and Chenzhi Zhu

Abstract: This paper proposes the first practical pairing-free three-move blind signature schemes that (1) are concurrently secure, (2) produce short signatures (i.e., three or four group elements/scalars), and (3) are provably secure either in the generic group model (GGM) or the algebraic group model (AGM) under the (plain or one-more) discrete logarithm assumption (beyond additionally assuming random oracles). We also propose a partially blind version of one of our schemes. Our schemes do not rely on the hardness of the ROS problem (which can be broken in polynomial time) or of the mROS problem (which admits sub-exponential attacks). The only prior work with these properties is Abe’s signature scheme (EUROCRYPT ’02), which was recently proved to be secure in the AGM by Kastner et al. (PKC ’22), but which also produces signatures twice as long as those from our scheme. The core of our proofs of security is a new problem, called weighted fractional ROS (WFROS), for which we prove (unconditional) exponential lower bounds.

Category / Keywords: public-key cryptography / Blind Signatures, Digital Signatures

Date: received 13 Jan 2022, last revised 14 Jan 2022

Contact author: tessaro at cs washington edu, zhucz20 at cs washington edu

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Version: 20220114:191237 (All versions of this report)

Short URL: ia.cr/2022/047


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