Paper 2021/819
Cryptanalysis of the GPRS Encryption Algorithms GEA-1 and GEA-2
Christof Beierle, Patrick Derbez, Gregor Leander, Gaëtan Leurent, Håvard Raddum, Yann Rotella, David Rupprecht, and Lukas Stennes
Abstract
This paper presents the first publicly available cryptanalytic attacks on the GEA-1 and GEA-2 algorithms. Instead of providing full 64-bit security, we show that the initial state of GEA-1 can be recovered from as little as 65 bits of known keystream (with at least 24 bits coming from one frame) in time
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Secret-key cryptography
- Publication info
- Published by the IACR in EUROCRYPT 2021
- DOI
- 10.1007/978-3-030-77886-6_6
- Keywords
- GPRS EncryptionStream CipherAlgebraic attacksGEA
- Contact author(s)
-
christof beierle @ rub de
patrick derbez @ irisa fr
gregor leander @ rub de
gaetan leurent @ inria fr
haavardr @ simula no
yann rotella @ uvsq fr
david rupprecht @ rub de
lukas stennes @ rub de - History
- 2021-06-16: received
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2021/819
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2021/819, author = {Christof Beierle and Patrick Derbez and Gregor Leander and Gaëtan Leurent and Håvard Raddum and Yann Rotella and David Rupprecht and Lukas Stennes}, title = {Cryptanalysis of the {GPRS} Encryption Algorithms {GEA}-1 and {GEA}-2}, howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2021/819}, year = {2021}, doi = {10.1007/978-3-030-77886-6_6}, url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2021/819} }