Analysis and Recommendations for MAC and Key Lengths in Delayed Disclosure GNSS Authentication Protocols

Ignacio Fernández-Hernández; Tomer Ashur; Vincent Rijmen

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Paper 2021/784

Analysis and Recommendations for MAC and Key Lengths in Delayed Disclosure GNSS Authentication Protocols

Ignacio Fernández-Hernández, Tomer Ashur, and Vincent Rijmen

Abstract

Data and signal authentication schemes are being proposed to address Global Navigation Satellite Systems' (GNSS) vulnerability to spoofing. Due to the low power of their signals, the bandwidth available for authentication in GNSS is scarce. Since delayed-disclosure protocols, e.g., TESLA (timed-efficient stream loss-tolerant authentication), are efficient in terms of bandwidth and robust to signal impairments, they have been proposed and implemented by GNSS. The length of message authentication codes (MACs) and cryptographic keys are two crucial aspects of the protocol design as they have an impact on the utilized bandwidth, and therefore on the protocol performance. We analyze both aspects in detail for GNSS-TESLA and present recommendations for efficient yet safe MAC and key lengths. We further complement this analysis by proposing possible authentication success and failure policies and quantify the reduction of the attack surface resulting from employing them. The analysis shows that in some cases it is safe to use MAC and key sizes that are smaller than those proposed in best-practice guidelines. While some of our considerations are general to delayed-disclosure lightweight protocols for data and signal authentication, we particularize them for GNSS-TESLA protocols.

Metadata

Available format(s): PDF
Category: Implementation
Publication info: Published elsewhere. IEEE Transactions on Aerospace and Electronic Systems
DOI: 10.1109/TAES.2021.3053129
Keywords: Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS)GNSS Authentication GNSS spoofing
Contact author(s): t ashur @ tue nl
History: 2021-06-10: received
Short URL: https://ia.cr/2021/784
License: CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2021/784,
      author = {Ignacio Fernández-Hernández and Tomer Ashur and Vincent Rijmen},
      title = {Analysis and Recommendations for MAC and Key Lengths in Delayed Disclosure GNSS Authentication Protocols},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2021/784},
      year = {2021},
      doi = {10.1109/TAES.2021.3053129},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2021/784}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2021/784}
}