Paper 2021/212
Bit-wise Cryptanalysis on AND-RX Permutation Friet-PC
Ryoma Ito and Rentaro Shiba and Kosei Sakamoto and Fukang Liu and Takanori Isobe
Abstract
This paper presents three attack vectors of bit-wise cryptanalysis including rotational, bit-wise differential, and zero-sum distinguishing attacks on the AND-RX permutation Friet-PC, which is implemented in a lightweight authenticated encryption scheme Friet. First, we propose a generic procedure for a rotational attack on AND-RX cipher with round constants. By applying the proposed attack to Friet-PC, we can construct an 8-round rotational distinguisher with a time complexity of 2^{102}. Next, we explore single- and dual-bit differential biases, which are inspired by the existing study on Salsa and ChaCha, and observe the best bit-wise differential bias with 2^{−9.552}. This bias allows us to practically construct a 9-round bit-wise differential distinguisher with a time complexity of 2^{20.044}. Finally, we construct 13-, 15-, 17-, and 30-round zero-sum distinguishers with time complexities of 2^{31}, 2^{63}, 2^{127}, and 2^{383}, respectively. To summarize our study, we apply three attack vectors of bit-wise cryptanalysis to Friet-PC and show their superiority as effective attacks on AND-RX ciphers.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
- Category
- Secret-key cryptography
- Publication info
- Preprint. MINOR revision.
- Keywords
- Authenticated EncryptionPermutationFriet-PCRotational AttackBit-wise Differential AttackZero-sum Distinguisher
- Contact author(s)
- itorym @ nict go jp,rentaro shiba @ gmail com,k sakamoto0728 @ gmail com,liufukangs @ 163 com,takanori isobe @ ai u-hyogo ac jp
- History
- 2021-03-02: received
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2021/212
- License
-
CC BY