Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2021/212

Bit-wise Cryptanalysis on AND-RX Permutation Friet-PC

Ryoma Ito and Rentaro Shiba and Kosei Sakamoto and Fukang Liu and Takanori Isobe

Abstract: This paper presents three attack vectors of bit-wise cryptanalysis including rotational, bit-wise differential, and zero-sum distinguishing attacks on the AND-RX permutation Friet-PC, which is implemented in a lightweight authenticated encryption scheme Friet. First, we propose a generic procedure for a rotational attack on AND-RX cipher with round constants. By applying the proposed attack to Friet-PC, we can construct an 8-round rotational distinguisher with a time complexity of 2^{102}. Next, we explore single- and dual-bit differential biases, which are inspired by the existing study on Salsa and ChaCha, and observe the best bit-wise differential bias with 2^{−9.552}. This bias allows us to practically construct a 9-round bit-wise differential distinguisher with a time complexity of 2^{20.044}. Finally, we construct 13-, 15-, 17-, and 30-round zero-sum distinguishers with time complexities of 2^{31}, 2^{63}, 2^{127}, and 2^{383}, respectively. To summarize our study, we apply three attack vectors of bit-wise cryptanalysis to Friet-PC and show their superiority as effective attacks on AND-RX ciphers.

Category / Keywords: secret-key cryptography / Authenticated Encryption, Permutation, Friet-PC, Rotational Attack, Bit-wise Differential Attack, Zero-sum Distinguisher

Date: received 25 Feb 2021

Contact author: itorym at nict go jp,rentaro shiba@gmail com,k sakamoto0728@gmail com,liufukangs@163 com,takanori isobe@ai u-hyogo ac jp

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Version: 20210302:145528 (All versions of this report)

Short URL: ia.cr/2021/212


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