Paper 2021/194
Misuse-Free Key-Recovery and Distinguishing Attacks on 7-Round Ascon
Raghvendra Rohit, Kai Hu, Sumanta Sarkar, and Siwei Sun
Abstract
Being one of the winning algorithms of the CAESAR competition and currently
a second round candidate of the NIST lightweight cryptography standardization project,
the authenticated encryption scheme Ascon (designed by Dobraunig, Eichlseder,
Mendel, and Schl{ä}ffer) has withstood extensive
self and third-party cryptanalysis.
The best known attack on Ascon could only penetrate up to
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Secret-key cryptography
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. IACR-ToSC 2021 (Issue 1)
- Keywords
- AsconAuthenticated encryptionCube attackDivision propertyPartial polynomial multiplication
- Contact author(s)
-
raghvendra-singh rohit @ irisa fr
hukai @ mail sdu edu cn
sumanta sarkar1 @ tcs com
siweisun isaac @ gmail com - History
- 2021-02-24: received
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2021/194
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2021/194, author = {Raghvendra Rohit and Kai Hu and Sumanta Sarkar and Siwei Sun}, title = {Misuse-Free Key-Recovery and Distinguishing Attacks on 7-Round Ascon}, howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2021/194}, year = {2021}, url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2021/194} }