Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2021/1690

Rotational-Linear Attack: A New Framework of Cryptanalysis on ARX ciphers with Applications to Chaskey

Yaqi Xu and Baofeng Wu and Dongdai Lin

Abstract: In this paper, we formulate a new framework of cryptanalysis called rotational-linear attack on ARX ciphers. We firstly build an efficient distinguisher for the cipher $ E$ consisted of the rotational attack and the linear attack together with some intermediate variables. Then a key recovery technique is introduced with which we can recover some bits of the last whitening key in the related-key scenario. To decrease data complexity of our attack, we also apply a new method, called bit flipping, in the rotational cryptanalysis for the first time and the effective partitioning technique to the key-recovery part. Applying the new framework of attack to the MAC algorithm Chaskey, we build a full-round distinguisher over it. Besides, we have recovered $21$ bits of information of the key in the related-key scenario, for keys belonging to a large weak-key class based on 6-round distinguisher. The data complexity is $2^{38.8}$ and the time complexity is $2^{46.8}$. Before our work, the rotational distinguisher can only be used to reveal key information by checking weak-key conditions. This is the first time it is applied in a last-rounds key-recovery attack. We build a 17-round rotational-linear distinguisher for ChaCha permutation as an improvement compared to single rotational cryptanalysis over it.

Category / Keywords: secret-key cryptography / Rotational-linear attack, ARX cipher, partitioning, key recovery, Chaskey, ChaCha permutation

Original Publication (in the same form): ICICS 2021
DOI:
10.1007/978-3-030-88052-1_12

Date: received 23 Dec 2021

Contact author: xuyaqi at iie ac cn, wubaofeng at iie ac cn

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Version: 20211230:170939 (All versions of this report)

Short URL: ia.cr/2021/1690


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