Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2021/1622

Roulette: Breaking Kyber with Diverse Fault Injection Setups

Jeroen Delvaux and Santos Merino Del Pozo

Abstract: At Indocrypt 2021, Hermelink, Pessl, and Pöppelmann presented a fault injection attack against Kyber’s decapsulation module. The attack can thwart countermeasures such as masking, shuffling, and double executions, but is not overly easy to perform. In this work, we extend and facilitate the attack in two ways, thereby admitting a larger variety of fault injection setups. Firstly, the attack surface is enlarged: originally, the two input operands of the polynomial comparison are covered, and we additionally cover encryption modules such as binomial sampling, butterflies in the last layer of the inverse number-theoretic transform (NTT), modular reduction, and ciphertext compression. Secondly, the fault model is relaxed: originally, precise bit flips are required, and we additionally support set-to-0 faults, set-to-1 faults, random faults, arbitrary bit flips, instruction skips, etc. A notable feature of our attack is that masking and certain forms of blinding help the attack. If finite field elements are visualized in a circular manner, our attack is analogous to the casino game roulette: randomization-based countermeasures spin the wheel, and the attacker only needs to wait for a certain set of pockets.

Category / Keywords: implementation / Fault Attack, Kyber, Key-Encapsulation Mechanism, Lattice-Based Cryptography, Post-Quantum Cryptography

Date: received 13 Dec 2021

Contact author: Jeroen Delvaux at tii ae

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Version: 20211214:094244 (All versions of this report)

Short URL: ia.cr/2021/1622


[ Cryptology ePrint archive ]