Ascon PRF, MAC, and Short-Input MAC

Christoph Dobraunig; Maria Eichlseder; Florian Mendel; Martin Schläffer

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Paper 2021/1574

Ascon PRF, MAC, and Short-Input MAC

Christoph Dobraunig, Maria Eichlseder, Florian Mendel, and Martin Schläffer

Abstract

The cipher suite Ascon v1.2 already provides authenticated encryption schemes, hash, and extendable output functions. Furthermore, the underlying permutation is also used in two instances of Isap v2.0, an authenticated encryption scheme designed to provide enhanced robustness against side-channel and fault attacks. In this paper, we enrich the functionality one can get out of Ascon's permutation by providing efficient Pseudorandom Functions (PRFs), a Message Authentication Code (MAC) and a fast short-input PRF for messages up to 128 bits.

Metadata

Available format(s): PDF
Category: Secret-key cryptography
Publication info: Preprint. MINOR revision.
Keywords: Pseudorandom function MAC Ascon
Contact author(s): ascon @ iaik tugraz at
History: 2021-12-03: received
Short URL: https://ia.cr/2021/1574
License: CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2021/1574,
      author = {Christoph Dobraunig and Maria Eichlseder and Florian Mendel and Martin Schläffer},
      title = {Ascon PRF, MAC, and Short-Input MAC},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2021/1574},
      year = {2021},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2021/1574}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2021/1574}
}