Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2020/912

Magnifying Side-Channel Leakage of Lattice-Based Cryptosystems with Chosen Ciphertexts: The Case Study of Kyber

Zhuang Xu and Owen Pemberton and Sujoy Sinha Roy and David Oswald

Abstract: In this paper, we propose EM side-channel attacks with carefully constructed ciphertext on Kyber, a lattice-based key encapsulation mechanism, which is a candidate of NIST Post-Quantum Cryptography standardization project. We demonstrate that specially chosen ciphertexts allow an adversary to modulate the leakage of a target device and enable full key extraction with a small number of traces through simple power analysis. Compared to prior research, our techniques require a lower number of traces and avoid the need for template attacks. We practically evaluate our methods using both a clean reference implementation of Kyber and the ARM-optimized pqm4 library. For the reference implementation, we target the leakage of the output of the inverse NTT computation and recover the full key with only four traces. For the pqm4 implementation, we develop a message-recovery attack that leads to extraction of the full secret-key with between eight and 960 traces (or 184 traces for recovering 98% of the secret-key), depending on the compiler optimization level. We discuss the relevance of our findings to other lattice-based schemes and explore potential countermeasures.

Category / Keywords: public-key cryptography / Lattice-based cryptography, Kyber, Side-channel analysis, Chosen-ciphertext attack

Date: received 21 Jul 2020

Contact author: xu_zhuang at buaa edu cn,zhuang xu@hotmail com

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Version: 20200723:010025 (All versions of this report)

Short URL: ia.cr/2020/912


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