### On Security Notions for Encryption in a Quantum World

##### Abstract

Indistinguishability against adaptive chosen-ciphertext attacks (IND-CCA2) is usually considered the most desirable security notion for classical encryption. In this work, we investigate its adaptation in the quantum world, when an adversary can perform superposition queries. The security of quantum-secure classical encryption has first been studied by Boneh and Zhandry (CRYPTO'13), but they restricted the adversary to classical challenge queries, which makes the indistinguishability only hold for classical messages (IND-qCCA2). We extend their work by giving the first security notions for fully quantum indistinguishability under quantum adaptive chosen-ciphertext attacks, where the indistinguishability holds for superposition of plaintexts (qIND-qCCA2).

Available format(s)
Category
Foundations
Publication info
Preprint.
Keywords
encryption quantum security
Contact author(s)
celine chevalier @ ens fr
ehsan ebrahimi @ uni lu
qhvu @ ens fr
History
2022-09-03: last of 2 revisions
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2020/237

CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2020/237,
author = {Céline Chevalier and Ehsan Ebrahimi and Quoc-Huy Vu},
title = {On Security Notions for Encryption in a Quantum World},
howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2020/237},
year = {2020},
note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/237}},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/237}
}

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