Paper 2020/1517
Constructing Locally Leakage-resilient Linear Secret-sharing Schemes
Hemanta Maji, Anat Paskin-Cherniavsky, Tom Suad, and Mingyuan Wang
Abstract
Innovative side-channel attacks have repeatedly falsified the assumption that cryptographic implementations are opaque black-boxes. Therefore, it is essential to ensure cryptographic constructions' security even when information leaks via unforeseen avenues. One such fundamental cryptographic primitive is the secret-sharing schemes, which underlies nearly all threshold cryptography. Our understanding of the leakage-resilience of secret-sharing schemes is still in its preliminary stage.
This work studies locally leakage-resilient linear secret-sharing schemes. An adversary can leak
Note: The title was changed. The previous title was "On Leakage-Resilient Secret Sharing".
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Foundations
- Publication info
- A minor revision of an IACR publication in CRYPTO 2021
- Keywords
- Random maximum distance separable codesSecret sharingLocal leakage resilienceDiscrete Fourier analysis.
- Contact author(s)
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anps83 @ gmail com
hemanta maji @ gmail com - History
- 2021-06-28: revised
- 2020-12-04: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2020/1517
- License
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CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2020/1517, author = {Hemanta Maji and Anat Paskin-Cherniavsky and Tom Suad and Mingyuan Wang}, title = {Constructing Locally Leakage-resilient Linear Secret-sharing Schemes}, howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2020/1517}, year = {2020}, url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/1517} }