Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2020/108

Practical Forgeries for ORANGE

Christoph Dobraunig and Florian Mendel and Bart Mennink

Abstract: We analyze the authenticated encryption algorithm of ORANGE, a submission to the NIST lightweight cryptography standardization process. We show that it is practically possible to craft forgeries out of two observed transmitted messages that encrypt the same plaintext. The authors of ORANGE have confirmed the attack, and they discuss a fix for this attack in their second-round submission of ORANGE to the NIST lightweight cryptography competition.

Category / Keywords: secret-key cryptography / authenticated encryption, symmetric cryptography, cryptanalysis, NIST lightweight, ORANGE

Date: received 3 Feb 2020

Contact author: christoph at dobraunig com

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Version: 20200204:161840 (All versions of this report)

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