Paper 2020/021

eSIDH: the revenge of the SIDH

Daniel Cervantes-Vázquez, Eduardo Ochoa-Jiménez, and Francisco Rodríguez-Henríquez

Abstract

The Supersingular Isogeny-based Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol (SIDH) was introduced by Jao an De Feo in 2011. SIDH operates on supersingular elliptic curves defined over quadratic extension fields of the form GF(p2), where p is a large prime number of the form p=4eA3eB1, where eA,eB are positive integers such that 4eA3eB. In this paper, a variant of the SIDH protocol that we dubbed extended SIDH (eSIDH) is presented. The eSIDH variant makes use of primes of the form, p=4eABeBCeCf1. Here B,C are two small prime numbers; f is a cofactor; and eA,eB and eC are positive integers such that 4eABeBCeC. We show that for many relevant instantiations of the SIDH protocol, this new family of primes enjoys a faster field arithmetic than the one associated to traditional SIDH primes. Furthermore, the proposed eSIDH protocol preserves the length and format of SIDH private/public keys, and its richer opportunities for parallelism yields a noticeable speedup factor when implemented on multi-core platforms. Using a single-core SIDH implementation as a baseline, a parallel eSIDH instantiation yields an acceleration factor of and when implemented on -core processors. In addition, eSIDH yields an acceleration factor of and when both protocols are implemented on -core processors. To our knowledge, this work reports the first multi-core implementation of SIDH.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Public-key cryptography
Publication info
Preprint. MINOR revision.
Keywords
post-quantum cryptographyisogeny-based cryptographySIDHefficient implementation
Contact author(s)
francisco @ cs cinvestav mx
dcervantes @ computacion cs cinvestav mx
History
2020-01-14: last of 6 revisions
2020-01-07: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2020/021
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2020/021,
      author = {Daniel Cervantes-Vázquez and Eduardo Ochoa-Jiménez and Francisco Rodríguez-Henríquez},
      title = {{eSIDH}: the revenge of the {SIDH}},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2020/021},
      year = {2020},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/021}
}
Note: In order to protect the privacy of readers, eprint.iacr.org does not use cookies or embedded third party content.