Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2019/739

A Survey on Authenticated Encryption -- ASIC Designer's Perspective

Elif Bilge Kavun and Hristina Mihajloska and Tolga Yalcin

Abstract: Authenticated encryption (AE) has been a vital operation in cryptography due to its ability to provide confidentiality, integrity, and authenticity at the same time. Its use has soared in parallel with widespread use of the Internet and has led to several new schemes. There have been studies investigating software performance of various schemes. However, the same is yet to be done for hardware. We present a comprehensive survey of hardware (specifically ASIC) performance of the most commonly used AE schemes in the literature. These schemes include encrypt-then-MAC combination, block cipher based AE modes, and the recently-introduced permutation-based AE scheme. For completeness, we implemented each scheme with various standardized block ciphers and/or hash algorithms, and their lightweight versions. Our evaluation targets minimizing the time-area product while maximizing the throughput on an ASIC platform. We used 45nm NANGATE Open Cell Library for syntheses. We present area, speed, time-area product, throughput, and power figures for both standard and lightweight versions of each scheme. We also provide an unbiased discussion on the impact of the structure and complexity of each scheme on hardware implementation. Our results reveal 13-30% performance boost in permutation-based AE compared to conventional schemes and they can be used as a benchmark in the ongoing AE competition CAESAR.

Category / Keywords: implementation / Authenticated encryption, hardware performance, authenticated encryption mode, CBC-HMAC algorithm, permutation-based authenticated encryption

Original Publication (in the same form): ACM Computing Surveys
DOI:
10.1145/3131276

Date: received 21 Jun 2019

Contact author: e kavun at sheffield ac uk

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Note: Please refer to the original version in ACM Computing Surveys for citations.

Version: 20190621:152330 (All versions of this report)

Short URL: ia.cr/2019/739


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