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Paper 2019/730
PQDH: A Quantum-Safe Replacement for Diffie-Hellman based on SIDH
Vladimir Soukharev and Basil Hess
Abstract
We present a post-quantum key agreement scheme that does not require distinguishing between the initiator and the responder. This scheme is based on elliptic curve isogenies and can be viewed as a variant of the well-known SIDH protocol. Then, we present an efficient countermeasure against a side-channel attack that applies to both static and ephemeral versions of SIDH and our scheme. Finally, we show how to obtain an isogeny-based password-authenticated key exchange protocol based on our scheme by applying a construction based on SIDH. Security and computational complexities summaries are also presented.
Note: Revised version to appear
Metadata
- Available format(s)
- Category
- Public-key cryptography
- Publication info
- Preprint. MINOR revision.
- Keywords
- isogenieskey agreementside-channel attackcountermeasurepassword-authenticated key exchangepost-quantum cryptographyelliptic curves
- Contact author(s)
- Vladimir Soukharev @ infosecglobal com,Basil Hess @ infosecglobal com
- History
- 2019-07-18: revised
- 2019-06-20: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2019/730
- License
-
CC BY