Paper 2019/730

PQDH: A Quantum-Safe Replacement for Diffie-Hellman based on SIDH

Vladimir Soukharev and Basil Hess


We present a post-quantum key agreement scheme that does not require distinguishing between the initiator and the responder. This scheme is based on elliptic curve isogenies and can be viewed as a variant of the well-known SIDH protocol. Then, we present an efficient countermeasure against a side-channel attack that applies to both static and ephemeral versions of SIDH and our scheme. Finally, we show how to obtain an isogeny-based password-authenticated key exchange protocol based on our scheme by applying a construction based on SIDH. Security and computational complexities summaries are also presented.

Note: Revised version to appear

Available format(s)
Public-key cryptography
Publication info
Preprint. MINOR revision.
isogenieskey agreementside-channel attackcountermeasurepassword-authenticated key exchangepost-quantum cryptographyelliptic curves
Contact author(s)
Vladimir Soukharev @ infosecglobal com
Basil Hess @ infosecglobal com
2019-07-18: revised
2019-06-20: received
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Creative Commons Attribution


      author = {Vladimir Soukharev and Basil Hess},
      title = {PQDH: A Quantum-Safe Replacement for Diffie-Hellman based on SIDH},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2019/730},
      year = {2019},
      note = {\url{}},
      url = {}
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