Paper 2019/679
Forgery Attacks on FlexAE and FlexAEAD
Maria Eichlseder, Daniel Kales, and Markus Schofnegger
Abstract
FlexAEAD is one of the round-1 candidates in the ongoing NIST Lightweight Cryptography standardization project. In this note, we show several forgery attacks on FlexAEAD with complexity less than the security bound given by the designers, such as a block reordering attack on full FlexAEAD-128 with estimated success probability about $2^{-54}$. Additionally, we show some trivial forgeries and point out domain separation issues.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Publication info
- Preprint. MINOR revision.
- Keywords
- authenticated encryptionforgery attackNIST LWC
- Contact author(s)
- daniel kales @ tugraz at
- History
- 2019-06-11: received
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2019/679
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2019/679, author = {Maria Eichlseder and Daniel Kales and Markus Schofnegger}, title = {Forgery Attacks on FlexAE and FlexAEAD}, howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2019/679}, year = {2019}, note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/679}}, url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/679} }