### Algebraic Techniques for Short(er) Exact Lattice-Based Zero-Knowledge Proofs

Jonathan Bootle, Vadim Lyubashevsky, and Gregor Seiler

##### Abstract

A key component of many lattice-based protocols is a zero-knowledge proof of knowledge of a vector $\vec{s}$ with small coefficients satisfying $A\vec{s}=\vec{u}\bmod\,q$. While there exist fairly efficient proofs for a relaxed version of this equation which prove the knowledge of $\vec{s}'$ and $c$ satisfying $A\vec{s}'=\vec{u}c$ where $\|\vec{s}'\|\gg\|\vec{s}\|$ and $c$ is some small element in the ring over which the proof is performed, the proofs for the exact version of the equation are considerably less practical. The best such proof technique is an adaptation of Stern's protocol (Crypto '93), for proving knowledge of nearby codewords, to larger moduli. The scheme is a $\Sigma$-protocol, each of whose iterations has soundness error $2/3$, and thus requires over $200$ repetitions to obtain soundness error of $2^{-128}$, which is the main culprit behind the large size of the proofs produced. In this paper, we propose the first lattice-based proof system that significantly outperforms Stern-type proofs for proving knowledge of a short $\vec{s}$ satisfying $A\vec{s}=\vec{u}\bmod\,q$. Unlike Stern's proof, which is combinatorial in nature, our proof is more algebraic and uses various relaxed zero-knowledge proofs as sub-routines. The main savings in our proof system comes from the fact that each round has soundness error of $1/n$, where $n$ is the number of columns of $A$. For typical applications, $n$ is a few thousand, and therefore our proof needs to be repeated around $10$ times to achieve a soundness error of $2^{-128}$. For concrete parameters, it produces proofs that are around an order of magnitude smaller than those produced using Stern's approach.

Available format(s)
Category
Public-key cryptography
Publication info
Keywords
LatticesZero-Knowledge ProofsCommitments
Contact author(s)
jbt @ zurich ibm com
gregor seiler @ inf ethz ch
History
2019-06-28: revised
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2019/642 CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2019/642,
author = {Jonathan Bootle and Vadim Lyubashevsky and Gregor Seiler},
title = {Algebraic Techniques for Short(er) Exact Lattice-Based Zero-Knowledge Proofs},
howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2019/642},
year = {2019},
note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/642}},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/642}
} Note: In order to protect the privacy of readers, eprint.iacr.org does not use cookies or embedded third party content.