Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2019/615

My Gadget Just Cares For Me - How NINA Can Prove Security Against Combined Attacks

Siemen Dhooghe and Svetla Nikova

Abstract: In order to thwart Differential Power Analysis (DPA) and Differential Fault Analysis (DFA) attacks, we require the implemented algorithm to ensure correct output and sensitive variable privacy. We propose security notions to determine an algorithm's security against combined attacks consisting of both faults and probes on circuit wires. To ease verification, help create secure components, and isolate primitives in protocols, we extend our notions to capture secure compositions. We propose the NINA property which forms the link between the established Non-Interference (NI) property and our composable active security property, Non-Accumulation (NA).

To illustrate the NINA property, we prove the security of three multiplication gadgets: an error checking duplication gadget; an error correcting duplication gadget; and an error checking polynomial gadget. Our proofs illustrate that the error detecting gadgets admit to statistical ineffective faults. We also prove the error correcting gadget attains the stronger Independent NINA property meaning that faults do not affect its sensitive variable privacy. Lastly, we prove the combined security of a polynomial based method using the error detecting properties of Shamir's secret sharing.

Category / Keywords: secret-key cryptography / Combined Security, DPA, DFA, SIFA, Masking, Security Models

Date: received 31 May 2019, last revised 5 Jun 2019

Contact author: siemen dhooghe at esat kuleuven be,svetla nikova@esat kuleuven be

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Version: 20190605:063658 (All versions of this report)

Short URL: ia.cr/2019/615


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