Paper 2019/530
Speed-up of SCA attacks on 32-bit multiplications
Robert Nguyen, Adrien Facon, Sylvain Guilley, Guillaume Gautier, and Safwan El Assad
Abstract
Many crypto-algorithms, Deep-Learning, DSP compute on words larger than 8-bit. SCA attacks can easily be done on Boolean operations like XOR, AND, OR, and substitution operations like s-box, p-box or q-box, as 8-bit hypothesis or less are enough to forge attacks. However, attacking larger hypothesis word increases exponentially required resources: memory and computation power. Considering multiplication, 32-bit operation implies $2^{32}$ hypothesis. Then a direct SCA attack cannot be efficiently performed. We propose to perform instead 4 small 8-bit SCA attacks. 32-bit attack complexity is reduced to 8-bit only complexity.
Note: It is precised how the divide-and-conquer is performed
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Implementation
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. Minor revision. C2SI 2019
- DOI
- 10.1007/978-3-030-16458-4_3
- Keywords
- SCAarithmetic multiplication32-bitdivide-and-conquer8-bitreduce partition size
- Contact author(s)
- sylvain guilley @ secure-ic com
- History
- 2019-05-21: received
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2019/530
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2019/530,
author = {Robert Nguyen and Adrien Facon and Sylvain Guilley and Guillaume Gautier and Safwan El Assad},
title = {Speed-up of {SCA} attacks on 32-bit multiplications},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2019/530},
year = {2019},
doi = {10.1007/978-3-030-16458-4_3},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/530}
}
