Paper 2019/530

Speed-up of SCA attacks on 32-bit multiplications

Robert Nguyen, Adrien Facon, Sylvain Guilley, Guillaume Gautier, and Safwan El Assad

Abstract

Many crypto-algorithms, Deep-Learning, DSP compute on words larger than 8-bit. SCA attacks can easily be done on Boolean operations like XOR, AND, OR, and substitution operations like s-box, p-box or q-box, as 8-bit hypothesis or less are enough to forge attacks. However, attacking larger hypothesis word increases exponentially required resources: memory and computation power. Considering multiplication, 32-bit operation implies $2^{32}$ hypothesis. Then a direct SCA attack cannot be efficiently performed. We propose to perform instead 4 small 8-bit SCA attacks. 32-bit attack complexity is reduced to 8-bit only complexity.

Note: It is precised how the divide-and-conquer is performed

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Implementation
Publication info
Published elsewhere. Minor revision.C2SI 2019
DOI
10.1007/978-3-030-16458-4_3
Keywords
SCAarithmetic multiplication32-bitdivide-and-conquer8-bitreduce partition size
Contact author(s)
sylvain guilley @ secure-ic com
History
2019-05-21: received
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2019/530
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2019/530,
      author = {Robert Nguyen and Adrien Facon and Sylvain Guilley and Guillaume Gautier and Safwan El Assad},
      title = {Speed-up of SCA attacks on 32-bit multiplications},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2019/530},
      year = {2019},
      doi = {10.1007/978-3-030-16458-4_3},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/530}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/530}
}
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