Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2019/461

Experimental Evaluation of Deep Neural Network Resistance Against Fault Injection Attacks

Xiaolu Hou and Jakub Breier and Dirmanto Jap and Lei Ma and Shivam Bhasin and Yang Liu

Abstract: Deep learning is becoming a basis of decision making systems in many application domains, such as autonomous vehicles, health systems, etc., where the risk of misclassification can lead to serious consequences. It is necessary to know to which extent are Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) robust against various types of adversarial conditions.

In this paper, we experimentally evaluate DNNs implemented in embedded device by using laser fault injection, a physical attack technique that is mostly used in security and reliability communities to test robustness of various systems. We show practical results on four activation functions, ReLu, softmax, sigmoid, and tanh. Our results point out the misclassification possibilities for DNNs achieved by injecting faults into the hidden layers of the network. We evaluate DNNs by using several different attack strategies to show which are the most efficient in terms of misclassification success rates. Protection techniques against these attacks are also presented. Outcomes of this work should be taken into account when deploying devices running DNNs in environments where malicious attacker could tamper with the environmental parameters that would bring the device into unstable conditions, resulting into faults.

Category / Keywords: implementation / fault attack, neural network, deep learning

Date: received 6 May 2019

Contact author: jakub breier at gmail com

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Version: 20190510:122337 (All versions of this report)

Short URL: ia.cr/2019/461


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