Paper 2019/257

Uncloneable Quantum Encryption via Oracles

Anne Broadbent and Sébastien Lord

Abstract

Quantum information is well-known to achieve cryptographic feats that are unattainable using classical information alone. Here, we add to this repertoire by introducing a new cryptographic functionality called uncloneable encryption. This functionality allows the encryption of a classical message such that two collaborating but isolated adversaries are prevented from simultaneously recovering the message, even when the encryption key is revealed. Clearly, such functionality is unattainable using classical information alone. We formally define uncloneable encryption, and show how to achieve it using Wiesner's conjugate coding, combined with a quantum-secure pseudorandom function (qPRF). Modelling the qPRF as an oracle, we show security by adapting techniques from the quantum one-way-to-hiding lemma, as well as using bounds from quantum monogamy-of-entanglement games.

Note: 34 pages, 4 figures. Some technical details modified. New applications.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Foundations
Publication info
Published elsewhere. Major revision. TQC 2020 - 15th Conference on the Theory of Quantum Computation, Communication and Cryptography
DOI
10.4230/LIPIcs.TQC.2020.4
Keywords
Quantum CryptographyEncryptionUncloneabilityConjugate CodingMonogamy-of- EntanglementQuantum Random Oracle
Contact author(s)
slord050 @ uottawa ca
History
2021-06-25: last of 2 revisions
2019-03-01: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2019/257
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2019/257,
      author = {Anne Broadbent and Sébastien Lord},
      title = {Uncloneable Quantum Encryption via Oracles},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2019/257},
      year = {2019},
      doi = {10.4230/LIPIcs.TQC.2020.4},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/257}
}
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