Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2019/1445

Rosita: Towards Automatic Elimination of Power-Analysis Leakage in Ciphers

Madura A Shelton and Niels Samwel and Lejla Batina and Francesco Regazzoni and Markus Wagner and Yuval Yarom

Abstract: Since their introduction over two decades ago, physical side-channel attacks have presented a serious security threat. While many ciphers' implementations employ masking techniques to protect against such attacks, they often leak secret information due to unintended interactions in the hardware. We present Rosita, a code rewrite engine that uses a leakage emulator which we amended to correctly emulate the micro-architecture of a target system. We use Rosita to automatically protect masked implementations of AES and Xoodoo and show the absence of observable leakage at only a 25% penalty to the performance.

Category / Keywords: applications / side channels, power analysis, automatic leakage mitigation

Date: received 12 Dec 2019, last revised 25 May 2020

Contact author: madura shelton at adelaide edu au, nsamwel@cs ru nl, lejla@cs ru nl, regazzoni@alari ch, markus wagner@adelaide edu au, yval@cs adelaide edu au

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Version: 20200525:121829 (All versions of this report)

Short URL: ia.cr/2019/1445


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