Paper 2018/708

Masking the Lightweight Authenticated Ciphers ACORN and Ascon in Software

Alexandre Adomnicai, Jacques J. A. Fournier, and Laurent Masson

Abstract

The ongoing CAESAR competition aims at finding authenticated encryption schemes that offer advantages over AES-GCM for several use-cases, including lightweight applications. ACORN and Ascon are the two finalists for this profile. Our paper compares these two candidates according to their resilience against differential power analysis and their ability to integrate countermeasures against such attacks. Especially, we focus on software implementations and provide benchmarks for several security levels on an ARM Cortex-M3 embedded microprocessor.

Note: Fixed some typos.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Implementation
Publication info
Published elsewhere. Minor revision. BalkanCryptSec 2018
Keywords
ACORNAsconDPAMasking
Contact author(s)
alex adomnicai @ gmail com
History
2019-03-20: last of 5 revisions
2018-08-01: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2018/708
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2018/708,
      author = {Alexandre Adomnicai and Jacques J. A.  Fournier and Laurent Masson},
      title = {Masking the Lightweight Authenticated Ciphers ACORN and Ascon in Software},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2018/708},
      year = {2018},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/708}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/708}
}
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