Masking the Lightweight Authenticated Ciphers ACORN and Ascon in Software

Alexandre Adomnicai; Jacques J. A.  Fournier; Laurent Masson

Paper 2018/708

Masking the Lightweight Authenticated Ciphers ACORN and Ascon in Software

Alexandre Adomnicai, Jacques J. A. Fournier, and Laurent Masson

Abstract

The ongoing CAESAR competition aims at finding authenticated encryption schemes that offer advantages over AES-GCM for several use-cases, including lightweight applications. ACORN and Ascon are the two finalists for this profile. Our paper compares these two candidates according to their resilience against differential power analysis and their ability to integrate countermeasures against such attacks. Especially, we focus on software implementations and provide benchmarks for several security levels on an ARM Cortex-M3 embedded microprocessor.

Note: Fixed some typos.

Metadata

Available format(s): PDF
Category: Implementation
Publication info: Published elsewhere. Minor revision. BalkanCryptSec 2018
Keywords: ACORN Ascon DPA Masking
Contact author(s): alex adomnicai @ gmail com
History: 2019-03-20: last of 5 revisions; 2018-08-01: received; See all versions
Short URL: https://ia.cr/2018/708
License: CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2018/708,
      author = {Alexandre Adomnicai and Jacques J. A.  Fournier and Laurent Masson},
      title = {Masking the Lightweight Authenticated Ciphers ACORN and Ascon in Software},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2018/708},
      year = {2018},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/708}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/708}
}