Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2018/676

Static Power Side-Channel Analysis - An Investigation of Measurement Factors

Thorben Moos and Amir Moradi and Bastian Richter

Abstract: The static power consumption of modern CMOS devices has become a substantial concern in the context of the side-channel security of cryptographic hardware. Its continuous growth in nanometer-scaled technologies is not only inconvenient for effective low power designs, but does also create a new target for power analysis adversaries. Additionally, it has to be noted that several of the numerous sources of static power dissipation in CMOS circuits exhibit an exponential dependency on environmental factors which a classical power analysis adversary is in control of. These factors include the operating conditions temperature and supply voltage. Furthermore, in case of clock control, the measurement interval can be adjusted arbitrarily. Our experiments on a 150nm CMOS ASIC reveal that with respect to the signal-to-noise ratio in static power side-channel analyses, stretching the measurement interval decreases the noise exponentially and even more importantly that raising the working temperature increases the signal exponentially. Control over the supply voltage has a far smaller, but still noticeable, positive impact as well. In summary, a static power analysis adversary can physically force a device to leak more information by controlling its operating environment and furthermore measure these leakages with arbitrary precision by modifying the interval length.

Category / Keywords: implementation / static power, leakage, side-channel analysis, side- channel attacks, ASIC, operating conditions, temperature, supply voltage, measurement interval

Original Publication (in the same form): IEEE TVLSI
DOI:
10.1109/TVLSI.2019.2948141

Date: received 9 Jul 2018, last revised 24 Oct 2019

Contact author: Thorben Moos at rub de

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Version: 20191024:102411 (All versions of this report)

Short URL: ia.cr/2018/676


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