Paper 2018/1247

qSCMS: Post-quantum certificate provisioning process for V2X

Paulo S. L. M. Barreto, Jefferson E. Ricardini, Marcos A. Simplicio Jr., and Harsh Kupwade Patil


Security and privacy are paramount in the field of intelligent transportation systems (ITS). This motivates many proposals aiming to create a Vehicular Public Key Infrastructure (VPKI) for managing vehicles’ certificates. Among them, the Security Credential Management System (SCMS) is one of the leading contenders for standardization in the US. SCMS provides a wide array security features, which include (but are not limited to) data authentication, vehicle privacy and revocation of misbehaving vehicles. In addition, the key provisioning process in SCMS is realized via the so-called butterfly key expansion, which issues arbitrarily large batches of pseudonym certificates in response to a single client request. Although promising, this process is based on classical elliptic curve cryptography (ECC), which is known to be susceptible to quantum attacks. Aiming to address this issue, in this work we propose a post-quantum butterfly key expansion process. The proposed protocol relies on lattice-based cryptography, which leads to competitive key, ciphertext and signature sizes. Moreover, it provides low bandwidth utilization when compared with other lattice-based schemes, and, like the original SCMS, addresses the security and functionality requirements of vehicular communication.

Available format(s)
Cryptographic protocols
Publication info
Vehicular communications (V2X)post-quantum securitylattice-based cryptography
Contact author(s)
joliveira @ larc usp br
2019-02-15: last of 2 revisions
2019-01-03: received
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Creative Commons Attribution


      author = {Paulo S.  L.  M.  Barreto and Jefferson E.  Ricardini and Marcos A.  Simplicio Jr. and Harsh Kupwade Patil},
      title = {qSCMS: Post-quantum certificate provisioning process for V2X},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2018/1247},
      year = {2018},
      note = {\url{}},
      url = {}
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