Paper 2018/1064
Towards Provably-Secure Analog and Mixed-Signal Locking Against Overproduction
Nithyashankari Gummidipoondi Jayasankaran, Adriana Sanabria Borbon, Edgar Sanchez-Sinencio, Jiang Hu, and Jeyavijayan Rajendran
Abstract
Similar to digital circuits, analog and mixed-signal (AMS) circuits are also susceptible to supply-chain attacks such as piracy, overproduction, and Trojan insertion. However, unlike digital circuits, supply-chain security of AMS circuits is less explored. In this work, we propose to perform “logic locking” on digital section of the AMS circuits. The idea is to make the analog design intentionally suffer from the effects of process variations, which impede the operation of the circuit. Only on applying the correct key, the effect of process variations are mitigated, and the analog circuit performs as desired. We provide the theoretical guarantees of the security of the circuit, and along with simulation results for the band-pass filter, low-noise amplifier, and low-dropout regulator, we also show experimental results of our technique on a band-pass filter.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Implementation
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. Minor revision. ICCAD 2018
- Keywords
- AMS securitylogic lockingprocess variationsobfuscationhardware security
- Contact author(s)
- gjn @ tamu edu
- History
- 2018-11-09: received
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2018/1064
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2018/1064,
author = {Nithyashankari Gummidipoondi Jayasankaran and Adriana Sanabria Borbon and Edgar Sanchez-Sinencio and Jiang Hu and Jeyavijayan Rajendran},
title = {Towards Provably-Secure Analog and Mixed-Signal Locking Against Overproduction},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2018/1064},
year = {2018},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/1064}
}
