Paper 2018/1064

Towards Provably-Secure Analog and Mixed-Signal Locking Against Overproduction

Nithyashankari Gummidipoondi Jayasankaran, Adriana Sanabria Borbon, Edgar Sanchez-Sinencio, Jiang Hu, and Jeyavijayan Rajendran

Abstract

Similar to digital circuits, analog and mixed-signal (AMS) circuits are also susceptible to supply-chain attacks such as piracy, overproduction, and Trojan insertion. However, unlike digital circuits, supply-chain security of AMS circuits is less explored. In this work, we propose to perform “logic locking” on digital section of the AMS circuits. The idea is to make the analog design intentionally suffer from the effects of process variations, which impede the operation of the circuit. Only on applying the correct key, the effect of process variations are mitigated, and the analog circuit performs as desired. We provide the theoretical guarantees of the security of the circuit, and along with simulation results for the band-pass filter, low-noise amplifier, and low-dropout regulator, we also show experimental results of our technique on a band-pass filter.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Implementation
Publication info
Published elsewhere. Minor revision. ICCAD 2018
Keywords
AMS securitylogic lockingprocess variationsobfuscationhardware security
Contact author(s)
gjn @ tamu edu
History
2018-11-09: received
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2018/1064
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2018/1064,
      author = {Nithyashankari Gummidipoondi Jayasankaran and Adriana Sanabria Borbon and Edgar Sanchez-Sinencio and Jiang Hu and Jeyavijayan Rajendran},
      title = {Towards Provably-Secure Analog and Mixed-Signal Locking Against Overproduction},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2018/1064},
      year = {2018},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/1064}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/1064}
}
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